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This study addresses the themes of knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship, 
all of them key factors that contribute to the development and growth of new ventures.  
The study focuses specifically on the impacts of business plans, initial sources of capital, 
and technology on the patterns of growth and development of a group of new ventures in 
Austin, Texas from 1990 to 2003.  For the most part, these new ventures were in the early 
stages of their respective lifecycles and were analyzed through their stages of survival, 
growth, or demise.  The enterprises conducted operations during a period that witnessed 
rapid business growth, and culminated through the rise and fall of the Dot-Com Bubble.   
The relationships among their initial sources of capital, business plans, 
technology, and growth were collectively analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
The research involved a questionnaire survey of more than seventy-five Austin software 
enterprises.  Additionally, in-depth interviews were conducted with seven key entrepre-
neurs and two venture capital investors.  This study uses the Resource-Based View, and it 
categorizes styles of entrepreneurship, according to their initial sources of capital, into 
three major groups: self-funded, venture capital (VC) funded and corporation funded.   
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The findings demonstrate that the initial sources of capital significantly impact the 
selected styles of business plans.  50% of VC funded ventures, as opposed to 15% of self-
funded ventures, started with formal business plans.  Ninety percent of VC funded 
ventures that started with a formal business plan, however, used those plans for external 
communication with the third parties, essentially for funding purposes.  One-year after 
startup, 55% of the VC funded ventures had developed formal business plans while 45% 
of them still followed informal business plans.  One year after startup, among the self-
funded ventures, only 20% of them developed formal business plans while 80% of them 
followed informal, but adaptive, business plans.   
Only three ventures, out of the total sample group of seventy-five, started with 
patented technologies, but more than thirteen eventually registered patented technologies.  
An analysis of the role of patented technologies in the process of venture development 
suggests that new technology assumes a more critical role in the latter stages of enterprise 
development than it does during the initial stages.  Patents, accordingly, appear to be 
more a result of growth rather than a basis for growth.   
The overall rate of growth of VC funded ventures was about twice that of self-
funded ventures.  Self-funded ventures often proceed cautiously and try to grow in 
accordance with their limited resources in an evolutionary fashion.  VC funded ventures 
may follow more ambitious patterns of growth, depending on the amount of initial capital 
at their disposal, but the presence of capital does not guarantee long-term sustainability.  
The study concludes that formal business plans are used mostly as communication 
tools with external sources of capital and do not necessarily serve to guide operations.  
Formal business plans are, however, distinct from the process of business planning.  The 
latter tends to be a creative, complex, and on-going attempt to envision potential courses 
of action for the development of enterprises, and is relatively unique for each case.  
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Introduction 
The core inquiry of this study concerns the factors that contribute to the 
development and growth of new ventures.  Venture development is a complex process 
with numerous interacting factors.  Innovation and entrepreneurship, however, are two 
critically important drivers that influence patterns of venture development.  Knowledge 
flow is essential for innovation.  The theme of this study, accordingly, is knowledge, 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  The operational topic of the study, however, concerns 
the impacts of business plans, capital and technology on the patterns of growth and 
development of new ventures.   
The study focuses on the role of business plans in the early stages of venture 
development in a group of enterprises in Austin, Texas, since the late 1980s.  A business 
plan is a document that describes current and desired stages of a venture.  There exists a 
wide typology for business plans, varying from formal (classical) business plans, to short 
business plans and one-page (back of napkin) business plans.  Formal business plans 
prescribe a number of sequential procedures common to many types of ventures.  
Chapter One includes the platform of inquiry for this study—consisting of the 
core inquiry, the premise, the theme, the context, the methodology, the theory, the models 
and the operational topic.  Chapter Two describes the resources needed for new venture 
development and continues to articulate the theme of the study, which is knowledge, 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  Chapter Three describes the major factors that affect 
enterprise development, as well as the process of content development that leads to the 
operational topic.  Chapter Four begins with the data collection process for the study and 
then analyzes the main relationships among the factors selected in Chapter Three.  
Chapter Five presents major conclusions and suggests topics for potential future studies.   
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Appendix A—The Conceptual Structure—describes the conceptual structure of 
the study, which consists of the methodology, models and theories.  Appendix B—The 
Austin Regional Development—describes space context (milieu) and Appendix C—The 
Austin Software and Information Industry: the Origin and Development—describes the 
industrial context of the study.  Appendix D—Austin: the Galapagos Island of Venture 
Development—explains the importance of Austin as the regional context for this study.  
Additional appendices provide information about Chi-Square tests, the survey forms, 
interview questions, and questions for investors.   
This study utilizes a conceptual structure consisting of methodology, theory and 
model.  The Model-Based method is the methodological approach, and the Resource-
Based View is the theoretical base.  While the theoretical base has existed for some time, 
a new set of models is developed for this study.  The Innovation Navigation model 
employs the analogy of navigation to explicate the process of innovation.  The Innovation 
Navigation model classifies commercial innovation into four types: 1) Technological 
Innovation, 2) Market/Customer Innovation, 3) Creativity and Learning, and 4) 
Organizational Innovation (Organizational Change). Innovation covers all human 
endeavors.  This study, however, concentrates on “commercial innovation,” which 
concerns the aspects of innovation related to production (in its broad meaning) and 
enterprising. 
Ph. D. dissertation studies often rely on mainstream (conventional) academic 
research methodologies, which tend to use the analytic approaches at their core.  The 
analytic approach, as the study will demonstrate, may not allow us to explicate creative 
processes like knowledge generation and innovation.  The Conceptual Structure 
(Appendix A) explicates the methodological basis of the study.  In the dissertation the 
Conceptual Structure section, which explicates the methodological basis of the study, 
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appears as an appendix to allow readers to concentrate on the main topic—which 
concerns venture development.  In terms of sequence, the Conceptual Structure 
(Appendix A) should be consulted in accordance with Chapter One (the Platform of 
Inquiry).   
The unit of analysis in the study is enterprise; accordingly the study concentrates 
on a group of new ventures in the region of Austin.  The interactions between enterprise 
and regional development, however, are an integral part of this study, as innovation and 
venture development do not happen in a vacuum.  Regional context indeed exerts a deep 
impact on the process of venture development.  In the dissertation, the two sections that 
explicate the regional and industrial context of the study appear as two appendices, rather 
than two initial chapters to allow readers to concentrate on the main topic, which 
concerns venture development.  In terms of sequence, the study of regional and industrial 
contexts (Appendix B and C) should be consulted after reviewing the Conceptual 
Structure. 
The terms “venture”, “venture capital”, “business” and “corporation” are used 
frequently in this study.  For the sake of clarity, in this study, “VC” is used for venture 
capital firms, “venture” is used for young enterprises, “business” is used for mature 
enterprises, and “corporation” is used for large enterprises.   
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Chapter One: The Platform of Inquiry 
An exploratory study is a creative and complex process with many open loops and 
closed feedbacks.  This Chapter plots the Platform of Inquiry of the present study.  The 
platform of inquiry of this study consists of the following sections: 1) Core Inquiry, 2) 
Premise, 3) Theme, 4) Contexts, 5) Methodological Approach, 6) Models, 7) Theory, 8) 
Operational Topic, 9) Dissertation Title, and 10) Process.   
CORE INQUIRY 
“What are the factors that impact the growth and development of new ventures?” 
is the core inquiry of this study.  Numerous factors, such as technology, capital, talent, 
founders’ backgrounds and personalities, business cycle, regional structure, market 
turbulence, industry structure, legal procedure, etc. contribute to the development and 
growth of new ventures.  A significant number of prior studies assume that technology 
plays the key role in the growth of new ventures.  This view of the vital role of 
technology in the process of venture development has been manifested in numerous 
science and technology programs (OECD, 1991) and linear models of technology 
development (Kline, 1991).  This study, rather, suggests that venture development is a 
complex process with numerous interacting factors, and that technological determinism 
or linear modeling might tend to oversimplify the nature of venture development.   
PREMISE  
The study takes the liberty to describe the contexts on which the research is based 
on as well as the process of developing the operational topic from the core inquiry.  The 
approach used in this study to explicate the connections between the core inquiry, the 
theme, the contexts, the process, and the operational topic is different from many studies.  
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Some analytic studies tend to select the main questions of their research from a narrow 
set of independent and dependent variables and then conclude with a set of prescribed 
(almost arbitrary) linear causal relationships between the variables.  Relying on the rubric 
of ceteris paribus “all else being equal,” their conclusions tend to be narrow or often out 
of context.   
This study differs from that approach, because a fundamental premise is that in 
the real world “all else is not necessarily equal.”  Articulating the links between core 
inquiry, theme, context, process and operational topic may divulge many of the “else” 
factors that indeed could be very important.  If a study identifies some important factors, 
but is not able to address them, then the un-addressed factors are “beyond the reach” or 
“out of scope” of the study, like uncharted areas in the early modern maps.  Accordingly, 
the researcher becomes aware of the existence and potential role of “out of reach” or “out 
of scope” factors.  Ceteris paribus may obscure the uncharted areas.   
To demonstrate the key role of the uncharted areas in the process of exploration, 
“Ceteris Paribus as a Premise for Mapping,” in Appendix A, illustrates a map of the 
world drawn in 1544 by Batista Agnese.  The map demonstrates the existence of vast 
uncharted areas, left blank, in North America and Central Africa.  The uncharted areas 
were indeed vital for the next rounds of exploration.  The cartographer of the map did not 
assume ceteris paribus “all else being equal.”   
THEME 
The study utilizes the view that innovation and entrepreneurship are two critically 
important drivers that influence patterns of venture development.  In addition, this study 
regards innovation as a very broad phenomenon.  Accordingly, technological innovation 
is only one kind of innovation among a wide spectrum of other innovation typologies 
(Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt, 1977).  Looking at innovation as a knowledge phenomenon, 
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this study classifies innovation into four major types: 1) Technological Innovation, 2) 
Market/Customer Innovation, 3) Creativity and Learning, and 4) Organizational 
Innovation.   
Entrepreneurship integrates the different aspects of innovation together for 
venturing and enterprise development.  The study categorizes styles of entrepreneurship, 
according to the initial sources of capital, into three major groups: 1) Self Funded, 2) 
Venture Capital (VC) Funded, and 3) Corporation Funded.  The theme of the study, 
accordingly, becomes knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship. 
CONTEXTS: REGIONAL (SPACE), INDUSTRIAL AND TEMPORAL   
Venture development does not happen in a vacuum.  Regional structures (milieu, 
space), industrial systems and temporal contexts deeply impact patterns of venture 
development.  A comprehensive study of venture development has to address the role of 
regional structures, the industrial structures (which is unique to each economic sector) 
and temporal contexts.  This view that venture development relates to the internal 
resources and capabilities of venture and enterprises, as well as to the external 
interactions with the regional structures, is indeed a framework of this study.  Although 
national and global parameters affect regional development, the growth of employment 
therein is due to the collective growth of employment in enterprises that are active in the 
region.  The software industry is the industrial context and the region of Austin is the 
regional context (milieu) for this study.  Appendix B and Appendix C cover a brief 
review of the development of the Austin region and a review of the development of the 
Austin software industry.   
Temporal Context: The study emphasizes the early stages of venture development in 
Austin, Texas between 1990 and 2003.  This time span covers different periods: 1992-95, 
a period of fast growth, 1995-96, a period of slow growth, 1997-2002, a period of fast 
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growth and then fast decline (the Dot-Com Bubble), and since the late 2002, a period of 
slow decline / slow growth.  The 1997-2000 period has been characterized as one of 
unique technological, business and employment growth; accordingly, generalizing the 
results of this time span to other time periods or to other regions should be done with 
care.   
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
As its methodological (conceptual) approach, this study uses a model-based 
method.  Compared with conventional research methods, which tend to be concerned 
mainly with the links between phenomenon (reality) and theory, the Model-Based 
method, like a baseball game, consists of four bases: Phenomenon (Reality), Model, 
Theory and Application (Solution).  The distinction between model and theory is the main 
characteristic of the Model-Based method.  Accordingly, models behave as a platform for 
theory development, but theories can also enhance the depth and scope of their 
corresponding models.  The Model-Based method is consistent with the Diamond Model 
for Professional Science, articulated by Andrew Van De Ven (2000).  Appendix A 
includes further information about the Model-Based method.  
MODELS 
This section covers a brief review of the Innovation Navigation and Bio-
Organizational Venture Lifecycle models, which are used as the base-models in this 
study.  Appendix A covers further description of the two models.  The Innovation 
Navigation model, by using the analogy of navigation, depicts the process of innovation 
in a new context.  The Innovation Navigation model classifies commercial innovation 
into four types: 1) Technological Innovation, 2) Market/Customer Innovation, 3) 
Creativity and Learning, and 4) Organizational Innovation.   
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The Bio-Organizational Venture Lifecycle model consists of seven stages: 1) 
Inception, 2) Fledgling (the Valley of Death), 3) Adolescence, 4) Maturity, 5) 
Rejuvenation, 6) Demise and 7) Turbulence.  The transition from each of those stages to 
another one does not happen smoothly, as the S models of technology development 
suggest.  Due to the complexity of the real world, the transition between the stages, even 
inside each stage, is often punctuated with turbulence rather than with smooth courses of 
action. 
THEORY  
This study uses the Resource-Based View as its theoretical base.  Edith Penrose 
has been widely acknowledged as the key player in providing the intellectual foundations 
for the Resource-Based View of the Firm.  The Theory of Growth of the Firm (Penrose 
1959) looks at firms as broad sets of resources and the growth of firms involves 
exploitation of existing resources and development of new ones.  Penrose notes that  
a firm is more than an administrative unit; it is also a collection of productive 
resources the disposal of which between different users and over time is 
determined by administrative decision. When we regard the function of the 
private business firm from this point of view, the size of the firm is best gauged 
by some measure of the productive resources it employs (1959: 24). 
The Resource-Based View has been used predominantly to study mature 
businesses and large enterprises, accordingly comes the term Resource-Based View of the 
Firm.  This empirical study, as we will explore later, will use the Resource-Based View 
in the context of new ventures in their early stages of lifecycles.  This approach may 
indeed open a new venue for the Theory of Development of New Ventures to link it with 
the studies on the theory of entrepreneurship.   
Many scholars have noted that entrepreneurship lacks a substantial theoretical 
foundation (Garnsey, 2002).  For instance, Bygrave and Hofer emphasize that the major 
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challenge facing entrepreneurship researchers is to develop models and theories based on 
a solid empirical foundation (Bygrave and Hofer, 1991).  Making new theories about the 
nature and behavior of knowledge and entrepreneurship is very challenging, but not 
impossible.  Peter Drucker, in Post-Capitalist Society, for instance, indicated:  
How knowledge behaves as an economic resource, we do not yet fully 
understand; we have not had enough experience to formulate a theory and to test 
it.  We can only say so far that we need such a theory.  We need an economic 
theory that puts knowledge into the center of the wealth-producing process 
(1993). 
Consistent with the structure provided by the Resource-Based View, this study 
organizes the enterprise resources into five groups; 1) Natural Resources, 2) Physical 
Resources, 3) Financial Resources, 4) Knowledge Resources, and 5) Human Resources. 
Building on the above resource structure, the study classifies the factors that have strong 
impacts on the development of new ventures into six major groups: industry, location, 
stage of venture development, sources of financial capital, innovation and change, and 
founders’ backgrounds.   
OPERATIONAL TOPIC 
The study concentrates on software ventures in the Austin region in the early 
stages of their lifecycles.  Accordingly, the following question denotes the operational 
topic of this study: What is the impact of business plans, capital, and technology on the 
patterns of venture growth and development? In this study, sources of capital are related 
to styles of entrepreneurship and business plans are related to organizational innovation.  
The data collection for this study was performed in two stages: a survey stage and 
an interview stage.  The survey stage deals with business plans, capital, technology, and 
growth patterns.  The interview stage elaborates on the critical aspects that developed 
during the survey stage.   
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DISSERTATION TOPIC:  
Knowledge, Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Business Plans, Capital, 
Technology and Growth of New Ventures in Austin, Texas—the topic of this 
dissertation—is a combination of the Theme and the Operational Topic of this study.  
PROCESS: 
The main stages of the Platform of Inquiry are listed here in a linear and 
sequential format.  The actual procedure, however, was more like a funnel, or a reverse 
whirlpool, from the core inquiry to conclusions, back and forth many times and in a very 
complex manner.   
SUMMARIZING THE PLATFORM OF INQUIRY 
1. Core Inquiry: Factors that contribute to the development of new ventures 
2. Premise: All else is not necessarily equal  
3. Theme: Knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship 
4. Contexts: Regional (space), industrial and temporal 
5. Methodological Approach: The Model-Based Method  
6. Models: Gray Box, Innovation Navigation and Bio-Organizational 
Lifecycle  
7. Theory: The Resources-Based View  
8. Operational Topic: Impacts of business plans, capital, and technology on 
patterns of development of new ventures 
9. Process: Connecting core inquiry, theme, contexts and operational topic 
10. Dissertation Title: A Combination of the Theme and the Operational Topic  
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Chapter Two: The Resources for Enterprise Development  
This chapter begins with the analysis of the enterprise resources, which are 
organized into five groups: natural resources, physical resources, financial resources, 
knowledge resources and human resources.  The chapter concludes with the theme of the 
study, which is “knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship.”  
CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISE RESOURCES 
This study uses the Resource-Based View as its theoretical base1.  Resources, 
which are the basic elements for the analysis of enterprises, are organized in this study 
into five major groups:  
1. Natural Resources – the material and energy resources occurring in 
nature that can be used to produce.  Examples include air, water, oil, coal, and electricity. 
2. Physical Resources – the means that can be used to produce wealth.  
Examples include artifacts, machinery and equipment.  
3. Financial (Capital) Resources – cash and other financial assets that are 
needed to do business.  Examples are the initial capital to start a new venture and other 
capital resources needed for the development of existing enterprises.  
4. Knowledge Resources – the intangible assets that are needed for 
production and enterprise.  Examples are data, information, skills, and values. 
5. Human Resources – people that are engaged in and contribute to 
production.  Examples are labor, as well as managers and specialists. 
The five groups of enterprise resources are non-linearly interrelated.  The non-
linear interrelations among enterprise resources have been reviewed in “Dynamic Model 
of Production, and Evolution of the Knowledge Economy” (Mahdjoubi, 2004). Enterprise 
                                                 
1 The theoretical basis of this study is discussed as part of the Platform of Inquiry in Chapter One. 
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resources, accordingly, can best be conceived as a Gray Box model rather than a Black 
Box model.  The Black Box model consists of three main sections: 1) Input, 2) Output, 
and 3) Function (Process).  The Black Box model assumes that Functions have fixed 
structures that do not change over time, and that Functions predictably convert the Inputs 
into the Outputs over and over again.  The relationship between Input and Output is 
causal.  The Gray Box model, rather, consists of five sections: 1) Inward, 2) Outward, 3) 
Inside, 4) Outside, and 5) Overall.  Unlike the Black Box model, the relationships among 
the five sections of the Gray Box model are interactive and they are non-linearly 
interrelated2.   
NATURAL AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Software is the industrial context for this study.  Software development directly 
consumes almost no material and an extremely limited amount of energy (electricity).  
Consequently, in the software industry natural resources, such as material and energy, 
have a minimal competitive role, if any.  Obviously in the study of material- and energy-
intensive industries, for instance oil and aluminum, natural resources—along other 
enterprise resources—play a key role.   
Regarding physical resources, software enterprises often use general-purpose 
machinery (such as Personal Computers) and almost all enterprises have access to them.  
Physical resources, consequently, are also an excludable factor in the development of 
software enterprises.  Physical resources often provide no advantage in the software 
industry.  Some software firms develop internal software packages to enhance and 
facilitate their processes.  As data is the main ingredient of software packages, internal 
software packages are considered as part of knowledge resources in this study.   
                                                 
2 For further information about the Black Box and the Gray Box models, see appendix A. 
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FINANCIAL RESOURCES  
Financial resources include cash and other financial assets that are needed to do 
business.  A wide range of sources may provide the financial and capital resources 
needed for setting up and then developing new ventures.  Financial resources may include 
the personal funds and credits of the entrepreneurs and their families, friends and 
associates, angel investors, venture capital institutions, commercial banks, state or federal 
grants (e.g. SBIR, Small Business Innovation Research program), existing corporations, 
etc.  In this study, based on the sources of capital, ventures are organized into the 
following groups:  
• Self-Funded (Bootstrap) Ventures  
• Venture Capital (VC) Supported Ventures, that include two subgroups:  
a. VC Funded Ventures 
b. VC Backed Ventures 
• Corporation Funded Ventures 
Self-Funded Ventures  
Self-funding (bootstrapping) is a means of financing a new business venture 
though acquisition and use of internal resources without raising equity from external 
sources of capital like venture capital institutes or venture capital banks.  Self-funded 
ventures rely on the capital resources, credits and debts of the founders and their families, 
friends and associates.  Self-funded ventures also are called “bootstraps” (Bhide, 1992), 
“personally funded ventures” and “internal equity” (Ou and Haynes, 2003).  
Venture Capital (VC) Supported Ventures  
Venture Capital (VC), according to Kortum and Lerner, is an “equity or equity-
linked investment in young, privately held companies, where the investor is a financial 
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intermediary who is typically active as a director, advisor, or even a manager of the firm” 
(2000: 676).  Bagley and Dauchy indicate that although VC is a well-known form of 
financing, it is relatively uncommon, as most new ventures are self-funded.  Yet, because 
VC is used to finance many high-profile startups, it receives a great deal of attention 
(1998).  
VC supported ventures, in this study, are those enterprises that VC firms and VC 
banks have invested in during any given stage of their lifecycle.  The VC supported group 
is further classified under two subgroups: 1) VC Funded and 2) VC Backed.  VC funded 
and VC backed ventures are distinctively different, based on the time of VC investment 
in the venture.   
VC Funded Ventures 
VC funded ventures, in this study, are funded by venture capitalists in the early 
stage of the venture’s development, prior to a positive cash-flow and/or a sustainable 
sales record.  VC investors typically have invested in the business plans and business 
ideas of the VC funded ventures, often during the first year of the venture’s 
establishment.  Many VC funded ventures could not exist without VC investments, even 
for one year.  Compaq and Lotus are examples of very successful VC funded ventures.  
VC Backed Ventures 
VC backed ventures, on the other hand, are those self-funded ventures that VC 
investors have invested in during the later stages of their venture lifecycle, when the 
ventures already had a positive cash-flow and/or a sustainable sales record.  Such VC 
backed firms typically receive financial support more than one year after their 
establishment.  In this respect, VC backed firms, depending on their structures, may 
behave more or less like self-funded (bootstrap) ventures rather than VC funded ones.  
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Dell and Microsoft are examples of successful self-funded ventures that VCs invested in 
at a later stage of their lifecycle, when both had sustainable sales records.   
The proposed classification of VC supported ventures into VC funded and VC 
backed, based on positive cash-flow and/or sustainable sales record, is a new type of 
categorization.  Commonly, there are many overlapping terminologies to classify VC 
investments, such as Seed, Startup, Early Stage, and Later Stage (Van Osnabrugge and 
Robinson, 2000: 19), Mezzanine—the financing round before an anticipated public 
offering (Bagley and Dauchy, 1998), Bridge (Sohl, 1999: 106), and Real and Filler 
(Nesheim, 2002: 110).  Runka and Young (1987) in “A Venture Capital Model of the 
Development Process for New Ventures,” analyzed the perceptions of the CEO or 
managing directors of 73 U.S. venture capital firms about the key features of the 
development of new ventures.  They concluded: “Sufficient consensus was found on the 
aspects of the development process for a “venture capital model” of this process to be 
constructed. The model consists of five sequential stages: 1) Seed, 2) Start-up, 3) Second 
Stage, 4) Third Stage, 5) Exit Stage.”  This source also reviews the distinguishing 
characteristics of each stage, from the view point of VC investors, based on key 
development goals and benchmarks, and major risks associated with each stage.  
Corporation Funded Ventures (Corporate Venturing) 
Corporation funded ventures are cases in which existing corporations invest in 
their own internal departments or direct subsidiaries.  Block and MacMillan, in 
Corporate Venturing, consider six major characteristics of corporation funded ventures: 
1) the new ventures are initiated or conduced internally, 2) they will be managed 
separately at some time during their life, 3) they include activities that are new to the 
corporate enterprise, 4) they involve significantly higher risk of failure or large losses 
than the organization’s base businesses, 5) they involve greater uncertainty than the base 
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business, 6) they are taken for the purpose of increasing sales, profit, productivity, or 
quality (1995).  “Swimming in Newstreams: Mastering Innovation Dilemmas,” (Kanter, 
1989) reviews a case study of nine corporation funded ventures that he called “internal 
ventures.” The paper includes historical cases like the Raytheon New Products Center, 
and Eastman Kodak New Opportunities Program.  
“Know the Limits of Corporate Venturing,” a very recent article in Financial 
Times of August 9, 2004 by Campbell and Birkinshaw, classifies the models of corporate 
venturing (corporation funded ventures) into four main groups: 1) Harvest Venturing: 
Turning spare corporate resources into cash, 2) Ecosystem Venturing: Making minority 
investments to help ventures that are part of the ecosystem of existing business. 3) 
Innovation Venturing: Stimulating entrepreneurial activity within an existing function of 
an existing business unit and 4) Private Equity Venturing: Participating directly in the 
VC/private equity industry. Campbell and Birkinshaw’s article, which is part of 
Financial Times Summer School series, covers a succinct review of corporate venturing 
(corporation funded ventures) and then come to the following main conclusion: 
Almost all units set up to create new opportunities for a company fail to develop 
any significant new businesses, but that is not to say that the techniques are 
useless—they can be harnessed for other purposes (2004:9).  
Styles of Entrepreneurship and Initial Sources of Financial Capital 
The word entrepreneur originates from the French word, entreprendre, which 
means “to undertake.”  In business studies, entrepreneurship often means to start a new 
venture.  The concept of entrepreneurship, however, has been used in a very wide range 
of other professions from art to non-profit institutions.   
Conventionally entrepreneurship is divided into two major groups: entrepreneur 
and intrapreneur.  An entrepreneur is an independent person who organizes, operates, 
and assumes risks for a business venture, while an intrapreneur is a person within a large 
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corporation who takes direct responsibility for turning an idea into a profitable finished 
product through assertive risk-taking and innovation (dictionary.com).   
In this study, styles of entrepreneurship are associated with the initial sources of 
financial capital.  The above classification of entrepreneur versus intrapreneur is a 
classification of entrepreneurships based on initial sources of financial capital.  
Entrepreneurship, in the above classification, includes self-funded and VC funded 
entrepreneurs, and intrapreneurship includes corporation funded entrepreneurs 
(intrapreneurs).  As we will study later, styles of entrepreneurship are broader than the 
above two groups.  Self-funded entrepreneurs behave very differently than VC funded 
entrepreneurs.  In addition the behavior of intrapreneurs in large corporation is not the 
same as the behavior of intrapreneurs in medium enterprises.  
The Spectrum of New Ventures 
The typology of the three major groups of new ventures—self funded, VC funded 
and corporation funded—often creates a continuous spectrum rather than disconnected 
dichotomies.  The distinction between VC funded and corporation funded ventures in 
some cases is blurred.  For instance, some corporations have established VC arms, such 
as Dell Venture and Intel Capital.  On the other hand, some corporations use self-funded 
and VC funded procedures for their new corporation based initiatives.  Radical 
Innovation, for instance, suggests that corporations may pursue both bootstrapping (self-
funding) and VC-styled support in funding their new internal initiatives (Leifer, 
O’Connor and McDermott, 2000).  Radical Innovation also makes a comparison among 
the corporation funded ventures in Lucent’s New Ventures Group, Nortel’s Business 
Ventures Group, and Procter & Gamble’s Innovation Leadership Team (Leifer et al., 
2000: 207). 
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Literature Review on Studies of Sources of Capital and New Venture Development 
Amar Bhide from Columbia University has conducted extensive studies on 
startups (Bhide, 1992, 1994 and 2000).  The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses 
(Bhide, 2000) categorizes startup ventures into five groups: 1) marginal startups, 2) 
promising startups, 3) VC backed startups, 4) corporate initiatives, and 5) revolutionary 
ventures.  This classification, however, mixes the sources of capital (VC backed startups, 
and corporate initiatives) with the level of technology (for example revolutionary 
ventures).  A distinction between the sources of capital and technological abilities 
facilitates a better understanding of the patterns of venture development.  In addition, 
Bhide (2000) makes no distinction between VC funded and VC backed ventures.   
The impact of sources of capital on the profitability of new ventures has been 
reviewed in “New Venture Strategy and Profitability” (Shepherd, Ettenson, and Crouch, 
2000).  This source, however, concentrates on VC funded initiatives and does not 
compare them with self-funded and corporation funded ventures.  “Venture Capital 
Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms” (Davila, Foster and Gupta, 2003) is a recent 
paper that reviews the evolution of employee growth at the time of a round of financing.  
In this study the headcount factor is used as a proxy for growth.  The paper concludes that 
“changes in valuation have a significant positive relationship with changes in employee 
headcount of the startup” (Davila et al. 2003: 10).  The paper concentrates on a group of 
businesses mostly from Silicon Valley in the period of 1994-2000.  This period has been 
characterized as one of unique technological, business and employment growth; 
accordingly, generalizing the results to other time periods or to other regions should be 
done with care.  The Origins of Entrepreneurship (Case, 1989) summarizes the results of 
a long survey on entrepreneurship, and it describes some major factors that influence 
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entrepreneurship.  While the article deals with the practical aspects of entrepreneurship, it 
is not academically rigorous enough to possess theoretical value.   
KNOWLEDGE RESOURCES 
The previous section reviewed the role of financial resources in the process of 
venture development; this section examines the role of knowledge resources.  The role of 
knowledge in enterprise development has been studied under the umbrella name of The 
Knowledge-Based View of the Firm.  The Knowledge-Based View of the Firm, developed 
in the 1990s, is an extension of the Resource-Based View of the Firm, discussed in the 
Platform of Inquiry (Appendix A).  In addition, the term knowledge also accommodates 
service factors such as research, engineering and design.   
Grant argues that, “of all the diverse resources that a firm possesses, knowledge is 
perhaps the most important internal resource” (Grant 1996).  Accordingly, the flow of 
knowledge is the primary basis for the growth of firms and the development of societies.  
Nonaka in an paper in Harvard Business Review “maintains “successful companies are 
those that consistently create new knowledge, disseminate it widely through the 
organization and quickly embody it in new technologies and products.  The activities 
define the ‘knowledge creating’ company, whose sole business is continuous innovation” 
(Nonaka 1991: 96).  Nonaka thus emphasizes the key role of knowledge in the process of 
innovation.  Nonaka and Takeuchi in The Knowledge Creating Company argue that the 
Knowledge-Based View is a cross-disciplinary perspective that combines several streams 
of research—for instance epistemology, management, economics, and the information 
sciences (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Many studies of the 1970s and 1980s looked at knowledge as a layer in the 
hierarchy of “data, information, knowledge, and wisdom.”  Knowledge generation, 
accordingly, was considered as an activity based on the ability to process data and 
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information.  In the mid-1990s, The Knowledge Creating Company (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995) added the “tacit” dimension to the mainstream management studies.  
The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is based in turn on ideas of Michael 
Polanyi (1966).  Polanyi stated the truism that “We know more than we can tell” in order 
to emphasize the nature of tacit knowledge.  This new view of knowledge argues that 
information typically makes up the “explicit” aspects of knowledge.  Tacit knowledge 
covers the non-explicit (implicit) aspects of knowledge, such as the embedded values and 
skills of the company’s employees and affiliates.  According to The Knowledge Creating 
Company, “explicit knowledge can be articulated in formal language” while “tacit 
knowledge is hard to articulate with formal language” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  The 
book views knowledge as the basic unit of analysis for explaining the firm’s behavior.  
The core features of The Knowledge Creating Company (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) are 
these:   
• An emphasis on knowledge creation, not on knowledge per se  
• A vivid distinction between “explicit knowledge” and “tacit knowledge”  
• The role of non-Cartesian epistemologies for further development of tacit 
knowledge  
To expand the scope of knowledge and its interactions with innovation, the 
present study further classifies knowledge into three categories:  
• Knowledge that humans generate and then document, owing to human 
intellect and curiosity, such as science and literature  
• Knowledge that humans generate and then document as records, such as 
census data and statistics  
• Knowledge that humans generate to make a change   
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The above three groups of knowledge overlap.  Innovation relates mostly to the 
third group, knowledge for change, as change and innovation are deeply interrelated.  
Innovation also relates to group one and two of knowledge in the above list.  This study 
concentrates on the third group, the knowledge that we generate to make a change and to 
innovate.  Innovation requires both tacit knowledge (values and skills) and explicit 
knowledge, based on the typology of Michael Polanyi.   
Knowledge to Innovation: Bridging the Gap  
Technological innovation has often been defined in the context of the introduction 
of new products or new technologies (Rogers, 2003).  It is, however, common wisdom 
that the process of innovation is much broader than technological innovation.  Innovation 
is like a funnel where numerous ideas, attempts and efforts are needed to lead us to just a 
very limited number of successful products.  By looking at innovation as a knowledge 
phenomenon it would be possible to study the process of innovation from a very new 
vista.   
Knowledge and innovation are interconnected; innovation is always based on the 
application of new (generation and process) knowledge.  The application of new 
knowledge should also lead to change and innovation.  This approach on the links 
between knowledge and innovation is compatible with the following perspective: 
Knowledge holds the key to generating innovation. …  Innovation is a process in 
which the organization creates and defines problems and then actively develops 
new knowledge to solve them. …  This view of innovation suggests that 
organization should be studied from the viewpoint of how it creates knowledge, 
rather than with regard to how it processes information (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995).  
This study defines commercial innovation as the success-oriented flow of 
knowledge in action.  The flow of knowledge includes its generation (creation), 
processing and dissemination, and application.  Owing to the intrinsic interactions 
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between knowledge and innovation in the above definition of innovation, the study builds 
the foundation for a conceptual bridge between knowledge management and management 
of innovation.  Compatible with the Innovation Navigation model (see Appendix A) in 
this study, commercial innovation is organized into four interrelated groups: 1) 
Technological Innovation, 2) Market/Customer Innovation, 3) Creativity and Learning, 
and 4) Organizational Innovation (Organizational Change).   
HUMAN RESOURCES  
The previous section examined the role of knowledge resources in the process of 
venture development.  This section reviews the role of human resources, which include 
all the people who work in a production system.  The term human resources also includes 
labor in conventional economic studies.  Human resources play a key role in enterprising 
and new venture development.   
In the proposed classification for enterprise resources into five major groups—
natural, physical, financial, human, and knowledge—human resources and knowledge 
resources are separate and distinct, but they are intrinsically related to each other.  
Humans generate, process, and refine knowledge.  Through the flow of knowledge— 
generation, process, and refinement—humans add value as well as develop themselves.  
Learning (which includes education and training) is a two-way bridge between 
knowledge and human resources.  Learning, in this context, includes both individual and 
organizational (social) aspects of human development.  
Due to the extreme complexity of the role of human resources in the process of 
enterprise development, a comprehensive study of human resources is beyond the main 
scope of this study.  Consistent with the premise of “all else is not necessarily equal3,” the 
study, however, considers the role of human resources a key player in the process of 
                                                 
3 See Appendix B for the role and importance of the premises of “all else is not necessarily equal.” 
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venture development.  In this study, the role of human resources is almost like a semi-
charted area.  
THEME OF THE STUDY: KNOWLEDGE, INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
The study excludes natural and physical resources from the scope of its research, 
as the two factors have limited impacts on the development of the software industry.  The 
study regards human resources as a very important factor, but a comprehensive study of 
the role of human resources is beyond its main scope.  The study, accordingly, 
concentrates on the role of two factors: financial resources and knowledge resources.   
In the study, innovation is defined as the success-oriented flow of knowledge in 
action.  Entrepreneurship, which is associated with the initial financial capital resources, 
as well as the personalities of the founders, integrates the different aspects of innovation 
together for venturing and enterprise development.  Innovation and entrepreneurship both 
posses human and knowledge dimensions.  The theme of the study, accordingly, becomes 
knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship.  The study deals with the practical aspects 
of knowledge, rather than knowledge per se, or information and data processing.  
SUMMARY  
1. The study classifies enterprise resources into five major groups: natural 
resources, physical resources, financial resources, human resources and knowledge 
resources.   
2. Styles of entrepreneurship are associated with initial sources of financial 
capital.  New ventures, based on their original sources of capital, are organized into three 
major groups: Self-funded (bootstrap), VC funded and corporation funded.  
3. Innovation is defined as the flow of knowledge in action, which accords 
with the study’s emphasis on knowledge, innovation and entrepreneurship.  
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4. The next chapter is about the major factors affecting venture development.  
 25
Chapter Three: Major Factors Affecting Venture Development 
Chapter Two described the process of connecting the enterprise resources to the 
theme of the study.  Chapter Three describes the major factors that strongly impact 
venture development. This chapter also includes the following headings: the operational 
topic, business plans and organizational innovation, growth indicators, the structure of the 
survey form, and factor analysis of the survey study.   
MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING VENTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The theme of the study is 1) knowledge, 2) innovation and 3) entrepreneurship.  
The study divides its contexts4 into three groups: 1) industry, 2) space and 3) time.  The 
factors that have strong impacts on the development of new ventures, accordingly, are a 
combination of the contexts and the theme.  In this study, major factors that affect 
venture development are categorized into six major groups5:  
1) Industry  
2) Location  
3) Stages of venture development  
4) Initial sources of financial capital  
5) Innovation and change  
6) Founders’ backgrounds  
1. Industry 
The industrial system that is relevant to each type of industry exerts a strong 
impact on the growth of new ventures in the given industry.  For instance, the industrial 
                                                 
4 The context of the study is discussed in the Platform of Inquiry (Chapter 1).  
5 Natural and physical resources have been excluded in this study; as they make no advantage in the 
software industry, see Chapter 1.  In other types of industry, natural and physical resources may be added to 
the above six group. 
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system of the pharmaceutical industry is different from that of the software industry.  The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) governs the pharmaceutical industry. The software 
industry, however, has no governing body like the FDA. The following note, in Only the 
Paranoid Survive, serves to explain the key role of industrial systems in the process of 
venture development:  
The structure of the industry composes of an unstated set of rules and 
relationships, ways and means of doing business. …  If you have been in the 
industry for a long time, knowing these things has become second nature.  You do 
not even think about them; you just know that is the way things are (Grove, 1999: 
134). 
In the software industry, compared to the pharmaceutical industry, there exist 
fewer barriers to entry.  The rate of change and innovation of products in the software 
industry, is also very fast 
2. Location 
The social and regional structures where the new venture is located can also have 
strong impacts on the growth of new ventures.  Some regions are more hospitable to the 
new ventures of specific types of industries.  The region of Austin, Texas, for instance, 
has been more hospitable to the software industry than to metallurgical industries.   
3. Stages of Venture Development  
A new venture, even a one-person enterprise, is an organization. As such, it 
follows a set of phases, which are considered as stages in the Bio-Organizational Venture 
Lifecycle model.  The Bio-Organizational Lifecycle Venture Model is further discussed in 
Appendix A.  The venture lifecycle is organized into the following main stages: 1) 
Inception, 2) Fledgling (Valley of Death), 3) Adolescence 4) Maturity, 5) Rejuvenation, 
6) Demise and 7) Turbulence.  Each of the seven stages of the Bio-Organizational 
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Lifecycle model has a key development characteristic, which is also briefly discussed in 
Appendix A.  
4. Initial Sources of Financial Capital 
Initial sources of capital, which provide financial resources to set-up and then 
support new ventures, are among the most influential factors in the patterns of growth 
and development of new ventures.  Initial sources of capital may include personal funds 
of investors, angel investors, venture capital (VC) institutions, and existing corporations.   
5. Innovation and Change  
Innovation and change play a key role in the growth and development of new 
ventures.  Innovation, in this study, includes: 1) Technological Innovation, 2) 
Market/Customer Innovation, 3) Creativity and Learning, and 4) Organizational 
Innovation.  Technological innovation is also broader than patents or Research-and-
Development (R&D).   
6. Founders’ Backgrounds  
Founders of new ventures have unique backgrounds and characteristics, which 
individually and collectively impact the growth and development of new ventures.  
OPERATIONAL TOPIC OF THE STUDY 
By concentrating on software ventures in the Austin region in the early stages of 
their lifecycles, this study excludes three factors from the above list: industry (software), 
location (the Austin region), and stages of venture development (inception and fledgling).  
These three factors are common among all cases.   
The study consists of two stages: survey and interview.  The survey stage of the 
study focuses on three sub-factors related to innovation and initial sources of capital:  
• Patents: A sub-factor related to technological innovation. 
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• Business Plans: A sub-factor related to organizational innovation. 
• Initial Sources of Capital: A sub-factor related to styles of 
entrepreneurship. 
The three sub-factors selected for the survey stage of the study, as in Figure 3.1, 
are indeed compatible with the Innovation Navigation model discussed in detail in 
Appendix A.   
This study focuses on the impact of business plans, capital and technology on the 
patterns of growth, which is the operational topic of study.  The study further 
concentrates on the role of formal business plans in the early stages of venture 
development in a group of ventures in Austin, Texas. 
The survey stage of this study does not cover all factors that impact the 
development of new ventures.  For example, the founders’ backgrounds (personal and 
organizational characteristics of the founders), as well as market/customer innovation, 
and creativity and learning are important factors that certainly impact the patterns of 


















venture development.  The study of these factors, however, is beyond the scope of the 
survey stage of this study.   
BUSINESS PLANS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION  
A business plan is a document that describes current and desired stages of a 
venture.  Business plans, in this study, are associated with organizational innovation, as 
business plans are related to the manner that a new venture organizes and reveals itself.  
Business plans, per se, are not indicators of technological innovation, market innovation, 
or creativity and learning.  There exists a wide typology for business plans, varying from 
formal (classical) business plans, to short business plans and one-page (back of napkin) 
business plans.   
A formal (classical) business plan generally consists of a formal document that 
summarizes the operational and financial objectives of a business and contains detailed 
plans and budgets that show how the business’ objectives are to be realized.  A formal 
business plan typically incorporates of the following sequential procedures a: 1) 
marketing study, 2) technology forecasting, industrial structures, and production systems, 
3) personnel, human resources, and management team, and 4) financial analysis.  A 
formal business plan is a procedure common to many types of businesses, as briefly 
described above.  Timmons argues that formal business plans are used primarily for two 
purposes: raising capital and to provide a means of guiding growth (Timmons, 1994: 
176).  Formal business plans are an integral part of many MBA programs and a central 
feature of some academic entrepreneurial programs.   
The importance of formal business plans in the growth and success of new 
ventures, however, has been questioned in many studies.  William Sahlman, in “How To 
Write a Great Business Plan” argues that on a scale of 1 to 10, formal business plans 
actually rank no higher than 2 as a predictor of a new venture’s successes.  “Sometimes 
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the more elaborated and crafted the document, the more likely the venture is to flop, for 
lack of a more euphemistic word” (Sahlman, 1997: 97).  Arthur Rock downgrades the 
importance of formal business plans in the success of firms and emphasizes the 
importance of execution.  Rock then claims “Good ideas are a dime a dozen.  Good 
execution and good management are rare” (Rock, 1987).  Arthur Rock is the famous 
venture capitalist who provided funding for Fairchild Semiconductor in the 1950s, Intel 
and Teledyne in the 1960s, and Apple Computer in the 1970s.  The conventional wisdom 
embedded in most formal business plans is the assumption that new businesses should be 
planned in detail prior to their startup and that those details will serve as an harbinger of 
success.   
Bhide, in “How Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies,” argues on the basis of a study of 
nearly one hundred companies that most entrepreneurs spent little effort on their initial 
formal business plan (1994).  Bhide indicates that among the companies he studied, 41% 
had no formal (classical) business plan at all, 26% had just a rudimentary, back-of-the 
envelope type plan, 5% had merely worked up financial projections for investors, and 
only 28% had written a full-blown, formal business plan (1994: 152).  Bhide in this 
pioneering paper, however, makes no distinction between formal business plans and the 
process of business planning, as well as major applications of business plans, and 
potential relationships between business plans and initial sources of financial capital.  
The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses (Bhide, 2000), which is a 
continuation of “How Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies,” examines the impact of sources of 
financial capital on business plans.  Bhide argues that most bootstrap (self funded) 
ventures are based on quick improvisation and rarely on prior formal business plans.  At 
the other extreme, corporation funded ventures “follow a much more rule-based and 
structured approach” to business planning (2000:26).  VC funded entrepreneurs, Bhidle 
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argues, “rely more on anticipation and planning and less on improvisation and adaptation 
(2000: 142).  While this claim seems to have some merit, it is not that simple.  For 
instance, Gordon Moore and Bob Noyce established Intel in July 1968 based on a “one 
page business plan and based on the one page business plan, Arthur Rock lined up $2.5 
million, in less than two days” (Intel Museum).  The following case study of “3Com 
Corporation” also demonstrates that some venture capitalists look beyond formal 
business plans.  
In October 1980, 3Com began to seek venture capital in order to begin developing 
hardware products.  In February 1981, 3Com received the first round funding of 
$1 million from VC investors who looked beyond the formal plan and were 
attracted by Metcalfe’s vision and charisma, as well as his team’s strong technical 
talent (Chesbrough, 2002: 81). 
Lumpkin, Sharader and Hills (1999) addresses the question “Does Formal 
Business Planning Enhance the Performance of New Ventures?” by using mailed 
questionnaires to discern potential links between planning and performance among 54 
new entrant and 40 established firms in two Southwestern states.  The paper concludes, 
“Correlation analysis indicated no significant correlation between using a formal written 
plan and performance.”  The paper also addresses the type of planning that contributed to 
performance as firms aged, and concluded “that planning may not need to be in the form 
of a written business plan.”  The paper also includes a fairly substantial literature review 
of the sources on the role of business plans.  
“Longitudinal Analysis of Relationships Between Planning and Performance in 
Small Australian Firms” (Gibson, Cassar, and Winghan, 2001) summarizes the responses 
from 2,956 Australian businesses, over a four-year period, about their planning 
performance relationships.  The paper concludes that there is not a relationship between 
the introduction of planning and subsequent performance and “planning is more likely to 
be introduced into a small firm after a period of growth, rather than before a period of 
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growth.”  The study indicates, “Wholesale encouragement of formal business planning by 
the small business sector does not appear warranted.”   
Burn Your Business Plan (Gumpert, 2002) summarizes the results of a study of 42 
venture capitalists.  While the book deals with some practical aspects of business plans, it 
is not academically rigorous enough to possess theoretical value.  In “Pre-Startup 
Planning and the Survival of New Small Businesses,” Gary Castrogiovanni (1996) 
reviews a long bibliography of the pre-1996 major sources that relate to formal business 
planning, but he presents few new ideas on the topic.   
Lovallo and Kahneman, in their study of “planning fallacy,” provide an eloquent 
criticism of formal business plans that serves to amplify this researcher’s findings.   
When forecasting the outcomes of risky projects, executives all too easily fall 
victim to what psychologists call the planning fallacy.  Studies that compare the 
actual outcomes of capital investment projects with managers’ original 
expectations for those ventures show a strong tendency toward over-optimism. An 
analysis of start-up ventures in a wide range of industries found, for example, that 
more than eighty percent failed to achieve their market-share target. …  The 
cognitive biases that produce over-optimism are compounded by the limits of 
human imagination.  No matter how detailed, the business scenarios used in 
planning are generally inadequate.  The reason is simple: Any complex project is 
subject to myriad problems–from technology failures to shifts in exchange rates to 
bad weather – and it is beyond the reach of the human imagination to foresee all 
of them at the outset.  As a result, scenario planning can seriously understate the 
probability of things going awry (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). 
This observation, however, should not be construed to mean that planning, as a 
process, is unnecessary or counterproductive, but rather that formal business plans 
usually have their limitations.  
GROWTH INDICATORS  
Although the concept of growth has been studied for a long time, there are no 
standard indicators for enterprise growth.  There exist, rather, a wide range of enterprise 
growth indicators such as employment (number of employees), sale, profit, market-share, 
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and so on.  Each indicator not only influences studies on growth and development, it also 
impacts the process and patterns of growth and development, as human systems tend to 
grow further along the desired indicators.   
In this study, growth is quantifiable based on the total number of employees in 
each enterprise.  Garnsey, in The Growth of New Ventures, states that “many of the 
studies use number of employees as a growth indicator” (2002: 111).  Gibson, Cassar and 
Winghan, in “Longitudinal Analysis of Relationships Between Planning and Performance 
in Small Australian Firms”, also indicate that the number of employees is a common non-
financial performance measure (2001). 
Small and medium size software businesses in Austin are mostly private and they 
are generally reluctant to disclose their financial data and profitability records.  
Consequently, this study concentrates on employment as a key indicator of growth, along 
with other available growth parameters available to the public.   
For the study of growth, both the total number of employees and the rate of 
growth of employment are important.  Consequently this study looks at two types of 
growth indicators: 
• Total number of employees at the time of questionnaire completion (Winter 
2003) 
• Rate of growth of employment: Ratio of the total number of employees in 
winter 2003 and the age of venture 
TEMPORAL SCOPE OF THE SURVEY STUDY 
Because the emphasis of this study is on the early stages of venture development, 
four factors in the survey stage (i.e., Business Plans, Patents, Capital, and Number of 
Employees) are each examined at three time intervals: 
• At the time of establishment of the venture;  
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• Between the time of establishment of the venture and the time of 
questionnaire completion (Winter 2003); and 
• At the time of questionnaire completion. 
A combination of the above four main factors (sources of capital, business plans, 
patented technologies, and number of employees) and the three time intervals is 
presented in Figure 3.2.  
UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The unit of analysis, as used herein, is not a factor that impacts the actual process 
of enterprise development, but it does influence the scope of the studies on enterprise 
development.  In the survey stage of the study, the enterprise (firm) is the unit of analysis.  
In the interview stage the founder(s) is the unit of analysis.  The interviews, however, 
follow the evolution of each venture from inception to its maturity or demise.  The 
intention of the interviews is to identify the main factors contributing to the development 
of each enterprise.  The goal of the interview stage of investigation, as Case Study 
Research suggests, is to “retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of the real-life 
cycle of the business under investigation” (Yin, 1994: 3).  In the survey stage of the 
study, comparative analysis is used out of the desire to understand complex phenomena.  
Comparative study is suggested when “a how and why question is being asked about a 
Establishment of the Firm
Original Sources of Capital
Original Type of the Business Plan
Number of Patented Technologies
Current Number of Employees
Current Number of Patented 
Technologies
~ End of 2003
Changes in the Number of Employees
Changes in  the Sources of Capital
Changes in the Business Plans
General Information about the Venture
Figure 3.2: Main Factors and Time Spans 
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contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 
1994: 9).  The interviews stage use both “focused” and “open ended” questions.   
STRUCTURE OF THE SURVEY FORM 
A copy of the Survey form used in this study constitutes Appendix F.  The Survey 
form consists of 24 questions that can be organized into six groups: 
General Information about the Venture  
This group includes questions unique to each venture, like the year in which the 
venture was founded, and founders’ names.  
Information about Number of Employees  
This group covers questions about current number of employees and changes in 
the number of employees since start-up.  Information about the number of employees at 
different time intervals yields estimates about the size of an enterprise and its rate of 
growth.  The number of employees is the indicator that is associated with growth of a 
firm. 
Information about Sources of Financial Capital  
This group classifies sources of founding capital and how the sources of capital 
evolved.  Initial and later sources of capital may include: personal resources, angel 
investors, venture capitalists, existing corporations, bank loans, and the SBIR (Small 
Business Innovation Research) program.  
Information about Business Plans  
This group includes questions about initial types of business plans, when a 
venture was founded, and how it evolved: 
• Information about initial types of business plans  
• Information about main applications of formal business plans  
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• Information about the implementation of formal business plans during the first 
year of operation  
• Information about cases that did not develop full formal business plans  
• Information about development of the plan and vision for a company after the 
first year  
Information about Patented Technologies  
This group addresses the following alternatives: 
• Information about the number of patented technologies of a company, at the 
time a company was founded 
• Information about currently patented technologies of a company 
• Information about potential patents—the technologies that have not been 
patented, but could be patented if a company pursues them  
Concluding Questions 
This group seeks information about other cases or other potential questions.  
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY STUDY 
As it was discussed before, the survey stage of this study is based on four factors: 
1) Business Plans, 2) Sources of Capital, 3) Patents, and 4) Growth.  Multiple 
relationships between any two of the four factors are depicted as a matrix, Figure 3.3.  
Relationships between the factors in this study are symmetric; for instance the 
relationship between A and B is the same as the relationship between B and A. 




 1 2 3 4 
1  ● ● ● 
2 ●  ● ● 
3 ● ●  ● 
4 ● ● ●  
Based on Figure 3.3, there are up to six direct (one-to-one) relationships between 
each pair of the factors:  
1. 1-2: Relationship between Sources of Capital and Business Plans  
2. 1-3: Relationship between Sources of Capital and Patents  
3. 1-4: Relationship between Sources of Capital and Growth  
4. 2-3: Relationship between Business Plans and Patents  
5. 2-4: Relationship between Business Plans and Growth  
6. 3-4: Relationship between Patents and Growth  
There are four relationships among each set of three factors: 
7. 1-2-3: Relationships among Sources of Capital, Business Plans, and 
Patents  
8. 1-2-4: Relationships among Sources of Capital, Business Plans, and 
Growth  
9. 1-3-4: Relationships among Sources of Capital, Patents Technologies, 
and Growth  
10. 2-3-4: Relationships among Business Plans, Patents, and Growth  
There is one relationship among all four factors: 
Figure 3.3: Matrix of Relationships  
among the Four Factors of the Survey Study 
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11. 1-2-3-4: Relationships among Sources of Capital, Business Plans, 
Patents, and Growth  
In total there are potentially 11 relationships related to the four factors in this 
study.  It is interesting to note that for two factors there is only one relationship, for three 
factors there are three relationships, for four factors there are eleven relationships, and for 
five factors there are up to twenty-six relationships.  This simple calculation may explain 
why some academic studies tend to confine themselves to two or three factors.  Or 
alternatively, some academic studies identify numerous factors, but they examine only 
the direct relationships between each pair by using “Regression Analysis.”  In the latter 
case, the multi-relationships among the factors are mostly ignored.  
SUMMARY  
1. The chapter organized the procedure of data collection into two stages: survey and 
interview.  The survey study concentrates on four major factors: capital, business plans, 
technology and growth.  The information from the interviews is used to elucidate the 
conclusions of the survey stage.   
2. The next chapter deals with the process of data collection and analysis of the 
relationships among the factors related to the study’s topic.  
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Chapter Four: Data Collection and Relationships Analysis  
Chapter Three reviewed the factors of organization.  Chapter Four describes the 
process of data collection and relationships analysis.  The data collection for this study is 
performed in two stages: a survey stage and an interview stage.  The survey stage deals 
with business plans, capital, technology, and growth patterns.  The interview stage 
elaborates on the critical aspects that developed during the survey stage.  This chapter 
also includes some conclusions from the analyzed data.   
DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES  
This study uses eight procedures for data collection: 1) secondary information 
sources on Austin software enterprises, 2) websites of the focal companies, 3) websites of 
local newspapers, 4) cold calls to founders and executives, 5) taking part in meetings and 
sessions related to software industry and venture development, 6) networking with Austin 
civic entrepreneurs, 7) survey, and 8) interview.   
Secondary Information Sources on Austin Software Enterprises  
A long list of software companies in Austin was compiled through the review of 
numerous secondary sources.  These sources included but were not limited to the Greater 
Austin Chamber of Commerce, Austin Software Council, and Austin Technology 
Council.  The complied list includes information about existing and defunct software 
companies, the latter constituting the companies that shut down, were acquired, merged, 
moved out of Austin, etc. prior to this research. 
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Websites of the Focal Companies 
Based on the compiled list, the website of each company was checked and 
individually reviewed.  Relevant information for each company was included in the 
compiled list.  
Websites of Local Newspapers 
The Austin American-Statesman and The Austin Business Journal are two 
important periodicals in Austin, Texas.  Both periodicals report on major business events 
in the Austin region.  Websites of the two periodicals serve as on-line archives for the 
past activities of business ventures in this region.  On-line archives of both journals were 
used to generate data about existing as well as defunct software ventures and to describe 
their evolution.  The compiled list of software companies in Austin was updated based on 
information gathered in this stage.  The final list includes about 200 existing and defunct 
software companies in Austin.  Among the 200 ventures, five of them are publicly traded 
companies.  The majority of Austin software companies are privately held.  Direct 
contact provides primary data, which is a more suitable method for research data 
collection from private companies 
Cold Calls to Founders and Executives 
The first thirty enterprises were selected from the compiled list, thus providing a 
degree of randomness in the selection, since the companies were listed merely by name 
rather than by size or other quantitative dimensions.  The researcher attempted to talk (by 
telephone) with their founders or executives, and engaged ten executives in a series of 
phone conversations.  Of these, about one-third responded and completed the 
questionnaire.  Voice messages were left for the other twenty individuals.  Response rates 
were about 10% among the individuals for whom voice messages were left.  Follow-up 
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survey forms were sent by FAX and conventional mail to the twenty individuals;  the 
response rate was zero.  
Software executives are extremely busy, and due to the highly competitive nature 
of this business, they are reluctant to respond to cold calls, as Andy Grove (1999) also 
describes in Only the Paranoid Survive.  It became evident that relying on the cold call 
approach would not allow this researcher to collect the type of data needed for this study.  
New methods of data collection, accordingly, were improvised.  
Taking Part in Meetings and Sessions Related to Software Industry and Venture 
Development in Austin 
Between March and December 2003, the investigator attended as many as 40 
meetings and sessions related to the software industry and new venture development in 
Austin.  During these sessions, he met some of the founders and executives of software 
firms in Austin and asked them to complete the questionnaire.  The response rate in these 
cases was approximately 50%.  In these meetings and sessions related to the software 
industry and new venture development also it was possible to network with numerous 
Austin civic entrepreneurs, who became instrumental in getting the researcher connected 
to the founders and executives of various Austin software ventures.  
Networking with Austin Civic Entrepreneurs 
Dr. George Kozmetsky often compared “civic entrepreneurs” with “business 
entrepreneurs.”  Business entrepreneurs, he said, are the ones who make money.  “Civic 
entrepreneurs are those who have made it, and look for the satisfaction of giving back to 
society.  The satisfaction is not money; rather the satisfaction is to see others make it” 
(Marshal, 2000).  Networking with Austin civil entrepreneurs not only provided the 
researcher with valuable insight; Austin civil entrepreneurs also introduced him to the 
busy founders and executives of various key Austin software ventures.  Based on the 
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introductions from these Austin civic entrepreneurs, the researcher then contacted the 
founders and executives of Austin software ventures and asked them to complete the 
questionnaire.  Backed by the trust that was generated through the introductions of the 
Austin civic entrepreneurs, the response rate in these cases was about 85%. 
SURVEYS  
So far, more than 75 ventures, out of a short list of about 110, have taken part in 
the survey stage.  Ventures that completed the survey forms are listed in Appendix I.  
Among the surveyed ventures, there are firms that ceased to do business or were 
acquired.  Nevertheless, their founders provided information about the early stages of 
their development.  The emphasis of this study is on the early stages of venture 
development6 (Inception, Fledging, and Adolescence).  The early stage of development 
for each venture is, however, compared with its most recent stage.  In more than 80% of 
cases, the original founders have completed the forms, even in instances in which they 
are no longer active in the ventures.   
INTERVIEWS  
The emphasis of this study has been on the survey stage.  Data gathered in the 
interview stage, however, has been used to elucidate the findings gained later in the 
survey stage.  More than 60 people were encountered in relation to the data collection 
procedure of this study.  Appendix J covers the list of people who were encountered.  Of 
these, the researcher interviewed and tape-recorded seven entrepreneurs, and two VC 
investors.   
Interviews with founders and executives provided a rich source of information on 
the Inception (pre-startup) and Fledging stages of development of the subject ventures.  A 
                                                 
6 See the Bio-Organizational Lifecycle model in Appendix C for a review of the different stages of 
enterprise development. 
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comparable study, Research and Development Abroad by U.S. Multinationals (Ronstadt, 
1977) used a comparative study to analyze the R&D activities of seven U.S.-based 
multinational organizations abroad.  Ronstadt’s study showed how the particular purpose 
of each foreign R&D unit affected their size, location, investment timing, and their 
administrative affiliations with the other units of the same organization.  Ronstadt (1977) 
concentrates on the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.   
This study, however, concentrated on early-stage development of homegrown 
software ventures in Austin, rather than just on mature businesses.  The emphasis has 
been on interviewing the founder(s) of each venture and elucidating their entrepreneurial 
practices.  From that perspective, this research also acts a comparative and longitudinal 
study of entrepreneurship.  The interviews encompassed the following topics: innovation 
capabilities, founders’ backgrounds, reactions and responses to the economic downturn of 
2001; and the role of regional support.   
ANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL POPULATION AND THE SAMPLE POPULATION 
Unlike many studies in which the composition of the total population is not 
known, the Texas Workforce Commission provided aggregated data about the 
composition of the Austin Software Industry (SIC 373) in 2000.  This aggregated dataset 
is sorted into two classes: 1) Number of Businesses and 2) Number of employees.  
According to the total number of employees, the two classes (number of businesses and 
number of employees) are categorized into the following size groups based on the 
number of employees: 1-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 250-499, and 500+.  The 
study, however, regroups the same data, based on the size of enterprises, into four major 
groups: 1) Micro Enterprises: 1-4 employees, 2) Small Enterprises: 5-49 employees, 3) 
Medium Enterprises: 50-499 employees, and 4) Large Enterprises: 500 and more 
employees.   
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Figure 4.1 depicts the size of enterprises and employment in the total population 
of the Austin software industry based on the dataset provided by the Texas Workforce 
Commission.  Figure 4.1 demonstrates that micro enterprises, with one to four 
employees, represent more than 60% of the total enterprises in the Austin software 
industry, but they employ fewer than 5% of software industry employees.  This ratio of 
about 60% of all enterprises to 5% of employment represented by micro ventures is not 
unique to the Austin software industry.  A separate unpublished study by the present 
researcher demonstrates that the ratio of about 60% of all enterprises to 5% of 
employment in micro ventures is a pattern common to many industries and regions.  
Figure 4.1 also demonstrates that large enterprises with more than 500 employees 
are fewer than 3% of total enterprises, but they employ about 20% of software industry 
employees.  Small and Medium software enterprises in the Austin region constitute the 
middle group between Micro ventures and Large enterprises.  Small and Medium 
Software Industry (STC373) in Austin - 2000
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Figure 4.1: Total Population:  
Size of Enterprises and Employment in the Austin Software Industry  
  Micro    Small   Medium    Large 
  1-4     5-49   50-499    500+ 
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enterprises make up about 35% of total software enterprises in Austin, but they employ 
more than 75% of the employees.   
As this study explores the relationships between venture and regional 
development, it concentrates on the homegrown software ventures in Austin.  
Accordingly, the study excludes the branch offices of enterprises not headquarted in 
Austin, irrespective of their sizes.  
As part of the data collection procedure for the study, more than 75 software 
enterprises took part in the survey phase; they are referred to as the Sample Group.  The 
relationships between the number of firms and employees in the Sample Group are 
depicted in Figure 4.2.  The Sample Group includes a wide range of software enterprises 
founded by using different sources of capital.  The list of surveyed enterprises appears in 
Appendix I.   
A comparison of Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 in the range of small and medium (5 to 
499 employees) demonstrates that the composition of the Sample Group and Total 
Figure 4.2: Sample Group:  
Size of Enterprises and Employment in the Austin Software Industry 
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Population are comparable.  A comparison of Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 in the range of 
Micro Ventures (with one to four employees) demonstrates that the composition of the 
Sample Group and Total Population are not proportional, and micro ventures are 
underrepresented in the Sample Group.  Compared with the small- and medium-size 
enterprises, the ratio of Sample to Total Population for micro enterprises is about one-
fourth of the same ratio for small- and medium-size enterprises.  As discussed before, the 
emphasis of the study is, however, on small and medium enterprises.  
DATA ANALYSIS OF INITIAL SOURCES OF FINANCIAL CAPITAL 
The study characterizes ventures based on their sources of capital into three main 
groups: 1) Self funded, 2) Venture Capital (VC) supported, and 3) Corporation funded.  
Among the 75 companies participating in this survey, one of them is a member of the 
communication industry, and information about two others was not satisfactory; thus they 
will not be analyzed in this study.  
Among the 72 companies analyzed, 41 of them are self-funded.  Twenty-nine of 
them are VC supported; venture capitalists invested in those 29 ventures during different 
stages of their lifecycles.  Two ventures are corporation funded; they started as the 
subsidiaries of existing corporations.  Due to the limited number of corporation funded 
ventures that took part in the study, a separate statistical analysis of the corporation 
funded ventures is not possible.   
Further analysis of the two corporation funded ventures (as part of the interview 
stage), however, demonstrated that medium-size corporations established both of them.  
From the style of business planning and patenting their technologies, the two corporation 
funded ventures behaved like self-funded ventures.  Accordingly, the two corporation 
funded ventures herein are included in the self-funded ventures group.  Table 4.1 
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demonstrates the age of ventures at the time of VC investment.  This table is in ascending 
order.  
Table 4.1: Age of Ventures at the Time of VC Investment 
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Average Age of the Ventures at the time of 
VC Investment: 2.8 Years 
Median Age of the Ventures at the time of 
VC Investment: 10 Months (0.8 Year) 
 48
The average age of the ventures at the time of VC investment is 2.8 years and the 
median age of the ventures at the time of VC investment is ten months (0.8 years).  The 
difference between the average and median age demonstrates that the age distribution of 
the ventures at the time of VC investment is highly skewed.  Thus, one needs to divide 
the range of VC supported venture into more homogenous sub-groups to explain the 
behaviors and patterns of each sub-group separately.  The next section explains the 
distinction between the two major sub-groups of VC supported ventures.  
VC FUNDED AND VC BACKED VENTURES IN THE AUSTIN SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Figure 4.3, which is based on the same data as Table 4.1, demonstrates the age of 
the VC supported ventures at the time of VC investment for participants in the survey.  A 
detailed study of Table 4.1 (Age of the Ventures at the Time of VC Investment) and 
Figure 4.3 clearly demonstrates that there is a gap of one year between enterprises 
younger than “one year and four months” (16 months) and older than “two years and four 
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months” (28 months).  Accordingly, VC supported ventures are broken down into two 
sub-groups: 1) ventures that were younger than one year and four months (16 months) at 
the time of VC investment, and 2) ventures that were older than two years and four 
month (28 months) at the time of VC investment.  The third group in Figure 4.3 includes 
the self-funded ventures without any VC investment thus far.   
Ventures Younger than 16 Months: Twenty-one VC investments occurred 
when the ventures were less than 16 months old.  In the present study, this group of 
ventures is referred to as VC funded ventures.  VC funded ventures, in some studies, are 
referred to as Seed Stage and Early Stage investments (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 
2000: 19).  Among 20 VC funded ventures in the study, the average age of the ventures at 
the time of VC investment is about seven months, and the median age of the ventures at 
the time of VC investment is about eight months.  Although the median and average 
numbers are very close, the distribution of the above factors does not correspond to a 
normal distribution or bell-shaped curve.  
Ventures Older than 28 Months:  Eight VC investments occurred when the 
ventures were more than 28 months old.  In this study, this group is referred to as VC 
backed ventures.  VC backed ventures, in some studies, are referred to as Later Stage 
investment (Van Osnabrugge and Robinson, 2000: 19).  Among the eight VC backed 
ventures in the study, the average age of the ventures at the time of VC investment is 
about 8.3 years and the median age of the ventures at the time of VC investment is six 
years.  The difference between the median and average age of the ventures at the time of 
VC investment in this group indicates that they are more homogeneous than the overall 
VC supported group, but that they are less homogenous than the VC funded group.  
Figure 4.3 also indicates that the VC backed group, by itself, consists of three sub-groups, 
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each with two or three members.  The limited number of cases in the three sub-groups of 
VC backed ventures does not permit a separate analysis for each sub-group.  
Investments in VC funded ventures often happen when new ventures are in the 
early stage of their lifecycle.  VC funded investments often happen prior to achieving a 
positive cash-flow or sustainable sales record when venture capitalists invest in ideas 
rather than in products with actual sales records.  Investments in VC backed ventures 
happen when ventures are in the later stages of their lifecycle.  Investments in VC backed 
ventures often happen after the companies have achieved positive cash-flow and/or 
sustainable sales records and venture capitalists invest in products with actual sales 
record, rather than just ideas and plans. 
The distinction between VC funded and VC backed ventures is a key feature of 
this study.  Based on the studies for this dissertation, as well as other studies of the 
present researcher, the distinction between VC funded and VC backed ventures has 
seldom been reviewed in academic studies.  Some practitioners of venture development, 
however, are familiar with the difference between the two groups7.  
It is a key hypothesis of this study that the initial types of investment (associated 
with the styles of entrepreneurship) have strong impacts on the patterns of venture 
development.  Using the term hypothesis, here, does not mean that this study uses the 
Black Box8 model—with linear causal relationships between the input and output 
factors—as its base model.   
                                                 
7 Interview with informant No. 7, who is a VC investor.  The distinction between VC funded ventures 
(investments in ideas) versus VC backed ventures (investments in actual products) was discussed first in 
this interview.  
8 The Black Box model is described in Appendix A – The Conceptual Structure. 
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DATA ANALYSIS OF THE TIME OF VC INVESTMENT  
Figure 4.4 depicts the time (month-year) of VC investments in 29 VC supported 
ventures.  The figure demonstrates that eight investments happened between 1989 and 
1998.  Between January 1999 and December 2000 there were 17 VC investments.  The 
concentration of 6 investments in just 2 months—November and December 1999—is 
puzzling.  This observation, on the concentration of VC investment in 1999 and 2000, is 
compatible with the general pattern of VC investment in Austin picking up during 1999 
and 2000, as discussed in Appendix C.  This period has been referred to as the Dot-Com 
Bubble.  Since 2001, the number of VC investments in Austin software firms has 
decreased drastically compared to the peak of 1999 and 2000.  
DATA ANALYSIS OF THE AGE OF VENTURES AT THE TIME OF VC INVESTMENT 
Figure 4.5 depicts the age of ventures at the time of VC investment.  This figure 
demonstrates that during the Dot-Com Bubble (1999 and 2000) among the Sample Group 
the number of VC investments drastically increased.  During the same period, the age of 
Figure 4.4: Time of Investment in the VC Supported Ventures 














































the ventures at the time of VC investment also decreased considerably.  This observation 
implies that during the Dot-Com Bubble, VC firms predominantly invested in Seed Stage 
(VC funded) software ventures.  Since January 2001, not only has the total number of VC 
investments decreased drastically, but the VC investments have often been in mature 
ventures (VC backed ventures).  This change of pattern in VC investments (decreasing 
number of total VC investments, and fewer investments in the early stage VC funding) 
potentially impacts future regional economic development programs in Austin.  
The drastic change in the patterns of VC investment prior to and after the 
economic boom of late 1990s is not unique to the Austin software industry.  This pattern 











































































Figure 4.5: Age of the Ventures (in Years) at the Time of VC Investment 
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mirrors the description of change of VC investments in the late 1980s.  Van Osnabrugge 
and Robinson determined: “After the 1987 stock crash, the VC industry shifted its 
investment focus away from start-ups and early-stage firms, in favor of mature ventures” 
(2000: 49). 
MICRO ENTERPRISES  
As discussed in the previous section, according to their sources of capital, 
ventures may be classified into three groups: 1) VC funded ventures in which VCs 
invested in companies younger than 16 months of age, 2) VC backed ventures in which 
VCs invested in companies greater than 26 months of age, and 3) Self-funded ventures 
without VC investments9.  The ventures, according to their sizes (number of employees), 
are also organized into three groups: 1) micro enterprises with 1 to 4 employees, 2) small 
and medium size enterprises with 5 to 499 employees, and 3) large enterprises with 500 
employees or more.  The matrix combination of the two types of classification (sources 
of capital and size) provides a better base for the comparison of the self-funded ventures 
and VC funded ventures (which are all in the range of 5 to 499 employees).  The focus of 
this study is on small and medium enterprises with 5 to 499 employees.  Large 
enterprises, with 500 or more employees, are excluded from the survey study as they are 
better studied on a case-by-case basis.  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INITIAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL AND PATTERNS OF 
GROWTH  
In the study there are two indicators of growth: “current number of employees” 
and “overall rate of growth” (current employee number / current age of the venture).   
                                                 
9 In this study, the self-funded group includes also two corporation funded ventures that have 
characteristics similar to the self-funded ventures, as discussed before.  
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Statement 1 
This study hypothesizes that initial sources of capital impact patterns of growth.   
Statement 1: Sources of capital in the early stage of development of new ventures 
impact their later patterns of growth.  
Statement 1A: VC funded ventures tend to have a higher rate of growth than self-
funded ventures.  
To demonstrate the validity of the above statements, the following data for each 
venture are calculated:  
• Current Employee Number  
• Current Age of the Ventures  
• Rate of Growth (Current Employee Number / Current Age of the Ventures) 
• Age of the Ventures at the time of VC Investment  
Table 4.2 summarizes the above information for the four groups of ventures:  
1) VC funded-ventures, 2) VC backed ventures, 3) Self-funded ventures and 4) Micro 
ventures10.  
 













Number of Ventures  18 5 25 23 
Total Employment in Fall 
2003, in Persons  
1154 717 1024 56 
Average Number of 
Employees, in Persons  
64 143.4 41 2.4 
Current Average Age, in 
Years 
5.3 17.9 7.5 5.2 
                                                 
10 Table K.1 (which appears in Appendix K) covers more detailed information about the enterprises that 
took part in the survey stage.  
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Average Rate of Growth, in 
Persons /Year 
12 7.7 5.5 1.1 
The total numbers of employees (in the second row) in the first three groups of 
Table 4.2 are comparable: VC funded = 1154 persons, VC backed = 717 persons, and 
self-funded = 1024 persons.  This implies that the economic impacts of the first three 
groups tend to be comparable.  The total number of employees in the micro venture group 
is 56 persons.  This suggests that the micro venture group has very limited economic 
impact, but this group provides the stream of new ventures and is essential for new 
venture development.  
A comparison between the average number of employees and the average rate of 
growth among the four venture groups demonstrates interesting patterns:  The average 
number of employees (third row) for each group is: VC funded = 57.7 persons, VC 
backed = 143.4 persons, self-funded = 43 persons, and micro venture = 2.4 persons.  
Apparently the average number of employees in the VC funded and self-funded groups is 
comparable: 64 versus 41.  The average “rate of growth” (current employee number / age 
of the venture) for VC funded and self-funded groups, however, is different: VC funded = 
12 (persons/year), VC backed = 7.7 (persons/year), and self-funded = 5.5 (persons/year).  
A comparison of the above data indicates that the average rate of growth of VC funded 
ventures is about two times (12/5.5 = 2.2) that of self-funded ventures.  “Venture Capital 
Financing and the Growth of Startup Firms” (Davila et al. 2003) describes a study of a 
group of businesses mostly in Silicon Valley in the period of 1994-2000.  In this study, 
the average growth rate of VC funded ventures is about 2.2 times that of self-funded 
ventures.  The average growth rate for VC funded ventures is about 16.5 employees per 
year, versus 7.2 employees per year for self-funded ventures in that study.  
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The difference between the average rate of growth in VC funded and self-funded 
ventures validates statement 1A, for ventures employing 5 to 499 people.  This statement 
does not imply that VC funded ventures always grow faster than any self-funded venture.   
The relationships between the sources of capital and growth patterns can be 
observed better in a figure than in a table.  Figure 4.6 depicts the relationships between 
sources of capital, patterns of growth (total number of employees and rate of growth), 
current age, and age at the time of VC investment, among the four main groups of 
ventures: VC funded, VC backed, self-funded and micro ventures.  
The number of employees and the average rate of growth in the VC backed 
ventures are atypical compared to VC funded and self-funded ventures: The average rate 
Figure 4.6: Initial Sources of Capital and Patterns of Growth. 
Rate of Growth is explained by numeric values in the left column (from 0 to 50). 
Current Employee # is indexed in the right column (from 0 to 500). 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
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of growth (number of employees/year) of VC backed ventures is comparable with self-
funded ventures: 7.7 versus 5.5.  The average number of employees in the VC backed 
ventures, however, is different from both VC funded and self-funded ventures.  Based on 
the above data, the proposed dividing line between VC funded and VC backed ventures 
in this study appears to be justifiable, as it demonstrates the distinctive characteristics of 
VC funded versus VC backed ventures.  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INITIAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL AND ORIGINAL STYLES 
OF BUSINESS PLANS  
Exploring the relationship between “initial sources of capital” and “original styles 
of business plans” is one of the key intentions of the study, in which the original styles of 
business plans are organized into the following groups: 1) Formal (classical) business 
plans11, 2) Short business plans12, 3) Work-up financial plans, 4) One-page plans (back-
of-the-envelope type), and 5) No conventional business plans.  The above classification 
for original business plans corresponds to the classification of business plans in “How 
Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies” (Bhide, 1994: 152).  The commonalities between the 
classification of business plans in the two studies (Bhide’s study and the present study) 
make it possible to compare the results of the two studies.  
Statement 2  
This study hypothesizes that the initial sources of capital impact the original 
styles of business plans.  
                                                 
11 According to the questionnaire for the survey study, a “full-blown formal (classical) business plan” 
consists of market study, technology forecasting, and financial analysis. 
12 According to the questionnaire for the survey study, a “short business plan” consists of a brief 
description of the technology and a brief description of potential markets, without a detailed market study 
and financial analysis, and it is about 5-10 pages. 
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Statement 2 A: VC funded new ventures have a greater tendency to develop 
formal (classical) business plans, and self-funded new ventures have a lesser tendency to 
develop formal (classical) business plans.  
Lines 30, 42, 44, 45, 46 and 47, in Figure 4.7, present data about the original style 
of business plans for each venture.  Figure 4.7 demonstrates that among 20 VC funded 
ventures, 10 of them started with “formal business plans” (or 50%).  Among the 28 self-
funded ventures, however, only 4 of them started with “formal business plans” (about 
15%).  Figure 4.7 also demonstrates that no VC funded venture started with “no 
conventional business plans,” while seven (or 25%) of the self-funded ventures started 
with “no conventional business plans.”  This simple calculation supports the main 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
Figure 4.7: Initial Sources of Capital and Original Styles of Business Plans 
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the left column (from 0 to 50) 
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assertion of this study, that initial sources of capital impact the styles of business plans, 
and VC funded ventures have a greater tendency to develop formal business plans.  
In respect to short business plans, however, there exists less of a distinction 
between VC funded and self-funded ventures.  In this study nine VC funded ventures 
(45%) started with short business plans, compared with seven self-funded ventures (25%) 
that started with short business plans.  
Chi-Square Relationship between Initial Sources of Capital and Original Styles of 
Business Plans 
Table 4.3 demonstrates the “observed data” between “Original Sources of 
Capital” (VC Funded Ventures versus Self Funded Ventures) and “Styles of Business 
Plans” (Formal Business Plans versus Non-Formal (Other Types) Business Plans).  
 
Table 4.3: Observed Data Between Initial Sources of Capital  
and Original Styles of Business Plans 
 Formal Business 
Plans 
Other Types of 
Business Plans 
VC Funded Ventures  10 10 
Self-Funded Ventures  4 24 
χ2 = 7.27 
The calculated Chi-Square13 value for the relationships between “Initial Sources 
of Capital” and “Original Styles of Business Plans” is equal to 7.27.  This Chi-Square 
value is higher than 3.48, which is α level (p-value of 0.05 for 1 degree of freedom).  The 
value of Chi-square for this case (7.27) is even higher than 6.63, which is p-value of 0.01 
for 1 degree of freedom.  This calculation for Chi-Square demonstrates a strong 
                                                 
13 Appendix D covers information about the conceptual background of Chi-Square and calculation of the 
Chi-Square values for this study.   
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association between initial sources of capital and original styles of business plan for the 
enterprises that took part in this study. 
Impact of Original Styles of Business Plans on the Patterns of Growth of VC 
Funded Ventures 
To review the impacts of formal business plans on the patterns of growth of VC 
funded ventures, the rate of growth and current number of employees of the 10 VC 
funded ventures that started with formal business plans and the 9 VC funded ventures that 
started with short business plans are compared.  The average rate of growth of the first 
group (10 VC funded ventures that started with formal business plans) is 13.9 persons / 
year and the average rate of growth of the second group (9 VC funded ventures that 
started with short business plans) is 14.8 persons / year.  The average number of current 
employees for the first group is 51.7 persons and the average number of current 
employees for the second group is 54.8 persons.  The χ2 test for the first case (average 
rate of growth) is 0.08 and the χ2 test for the second case (average number of current 
employees) is 0.10. Both Chi-Square values are lower than 3.48, which is α level (p-
value of 0.05 for 1 degree of freedom).  In both cases, the difference between the two 
groups is not significant.  This calculation implies that developing formal business plans 
per se have no significant impact on the potential patterns of growth among the VC 
funded ventures that participated in this study.  
PATTERNS OF BUSINESS PLANS IN THE LATER STAGES OF VENTURE LIFECYCLES  
Another key question of the survey relates to patterns of business plans in the later 
stages of venture lifecycles.  This question seeks to explain patterns of business plan 
development as ventures mature.  In the survey form, respondents were directed to select 
only one of the responses:   
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• Question: After the first year, how was the plan and vision for this 
company transformed?   
1. The transformation was mostly based on formal (classical) business 
planning.  
2. The transformation was mostly based on adaptation without formal 
planning. 
Statement 3  
This study suggests that one-year after startup, new ventures tend to develop their 
business plans into something less formal and more adaptive.  
Responses to the question related to the patterns of business plans in the later 
stages of venture lifecycles are marked in lines 38 and 39 of Figure 4.8.  Eighteen VC 
funded ventures responded to this question.  Ten of them (55%) marked the first 
alternative (based on formal business plans) and eight of them (45%) selected the second 
alternative (based on informal business plans).  Among the VC funded ventures the 
nature of business plans after the first year (formal versus informal business plans) is 
compatible with the nature of business plans before startup in that half of them started 
with formal business plans and half of them started without formal business plans.  On 
the other hand, among the 23 self-funded ventures that responded to this question, five of 
them (20%) marked the first alternative (based on formal business plans) and eighteen of 
them (80%) selected the second alternative (based on informal business plans).  This 
calculation supports Statement 3.  
Interestingly enough, the nine VC funded ventures that marked the first 
alternative (based on formal business plans) all belong to the same group of 10 VC 
funded ventures that started with formal business plans.  Among the 5 self-funded 
ventures that selected the second alternative (based on informal business plans) only one 
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of them belongs to the original four self-funded ventures that started with formal business 
plans.  This observation may imply that VC funded ventures follow a more structured 
format while self-funded ventures follow a more evolutionary format in the later stages of 
their lifecycles.  
Chi-Square Relationship between Initial Sources of Capital and Later Styles of 
Business Plans 
Table 4.4 demonstrates the “observed data” between “Original Sources of 
Capital” (VC Funded Ventures versus Self Funded Ventures) and “Later Styles of 
Business Plans” (Formal Business Plans versus Informal Business Plans).  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Initial Sources of Capital and Later Styles of Business Plans 
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the left column (from 0 to 50). 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of the text might be black. 
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Table 4.4: Observed Data Between Initial Sources of Capital  
and Later Styles of Business Plans 
 Formal 
Business Plans  
Informal 
Business Plans  
VC Funded Ventures  10 8 
Self-Funded Ventures  5 18 
χ2 = 4.97 
The calculated Chi-Square value for the relationships between Initial Sources of 
Capital and Later Styles of Business Plans is equal to 4.97.  This Chi-Square value is 
higher than 3.48, which is α level (p-value of 0.05 for 1 degree of freedom).  This 
calculation for Chi-Square demonstrates a significant association between initial sources 
of capital and later styles of business plans among the enterprises that took part in this 
study.  
MAIN APPLICATIONS OF FORMAL (CLASSICAL) BUSINESS PLANS  
Another key question of the survey concerns the main applications of the formal 
(classical) business plan.  This question served to clarify the main intentions of the 
founders, who had already developed formal business plans in the startup of their new 
ventures.  The main applications of the formal business plans are classified into two 
groups, and the respondents were able to select one or both of them, as this classification 
is not mutually exclusive:   
• Question: In your opinion, if this company started with a formal (classical) 
business plan, what was the main application of that business plan? 
1. For external communication with the third parties such as VC investors, 
banks, government agencies, etc.  
2. Practical internal guide for implementation. 
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Statement 4 
This study suggests that the sources of capital impact the main application of 
formal (classical) business plans.  
Statement 4A: VC funded ventures have a greater tendency to use their full 
(classical) business plans for communication with third parties. 
Statement 4B: Self-funded ventures have a greater tendency to use their formal 
business plans for practical internal guidance.  
The responses to the question related to the main applications of formal business 
plans are marked in lines 37 and 37 of Figure 4.9.  The Figure demonstrates that nine of 
ten (90%) VC funded ventures that started with a formal business plan used them for 
Initial Sources of Capital and Main Applications of Formal Business Plans 
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Figure 4.9: Initial Sources of Capital and Main Applications of Business Plans  
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the left column (from 0 to 50) 
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“external communication with the third parties.”  Only two of them (20%) used the 
formal business plans as “practical internal guidance for implementation.”  Only one VC 
funded venture used the formal business plan for both “external communication with the 
third parties” and “practical internal guidance for implementation.”  VC funded ventures 
often use formal business plans for communication with third parties to seek external 
sources of capital.   
2 of the 4 (50%) self-funded ventures that developed formal business plans, 
however, used the formal business plan for “external communication with the third 
parties” and 3 of the 4our (75%) self-funded ventures used it for “practical internal 
guidance for implementation.”   
The limited number of cases that responded to this question falls below the 
threshold for the application of a Chi-Square test.  Thus, the existing data do not fully 
support or reject Statement 4, that the initial sources of capital impact the main 
application of formal business plans.  Nevertheless, the representations in Figure 4.9 
imply a strong tendency for VC funded firms to deploy their formal business plans for 
communication with external sources of capital.  Figure 4.9 also illustrates that the 
limited number of self-funded ventures that developed formal business plans, deployed 
the formal business plans both for external communication and internal managerial 
guidance tool.  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FORMAL BUSINESS PLANS 
In addition to the development and evolution of formal business plans, the 
patterns of implementation of formal business plans also are important.  To have a better 
understanding of the patterns of implementation of formal business plans, the following 
question was asked in the survey form: 
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• Question: If this company started with a full formal (classical) business plan, 
how was that plan implemented during the first year of operations?  
1. Almost as planned  
2. Major changes in the original plan  
3. Strong changes in the original plan  
4. Drastic changes in the original plan  
Statement 5 
This study hypothesizes that the ability to implement a formal business plan is 
associated with initial sources of capital.  
Responses to the question related to the implementation of formal business plans 
are marked in lines 31, 32, 33 and 34 of Figure 4.10.  10 VC funded ventures responded 
to this question; 6 of them (60%) selected the first alternative (almost as planned), 3 of 
them (30%) selected the second alternative (major changes), and one of them (10%) 
selected the fourth alternative (drastic changes).  Interestingly enough, the same 6 
ventures that selected the first alternative (almost as planned) also used formal business 
plans in the next stages of development of the ventures.  Among the 4 self-funded 
ventures that started with a formal business plan, only one of them (20%) was able to 
implement the business plan almost as planned, one of them (20%) was able to 
implement the business plans with “major changes” and two of them (50%) selected the 
fourth alternative (drastic changes).  The limited number of cases in this test fall below 
the threshold for the application of a Chi-Square test. Thus, the existing data do not fully 
support or reject the above Statement 5 that the ability to implement formal business 
plans is associated with the initial sources of capital.  
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SUFFERING FROM LACK OF A FORMAL BUSINESS PLAN 
To understand better the roles and potential impacts of formal business plans, the 
survey asked the following two questions.  In each case, the respondents were instructed 
to select only “Yes” or “No”:  
• Question: If this company did not start with a formal business plan, did the 
company suffer from not having a formal business plan?  
• Question: If this company did not start with a formal business plan, do you 
wish it had a formal business plan?  
The responses to the above questions are marked in lines 48 and 50 of Figure 
4.11.  Analysis of the data demonstrates that most respondents who did not start their 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
Figure 4.10: Initial Sources of Capital and Implementation of Formal Business Plans  
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the left column (from 0 to 50) 
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ventures with formal business plans do not think that they had suffered from a lack of 
formal business plans (90% of self-funded ventures and 70% of VC funded ventures).  
Along the same line of thinking, only 20% of VC funded entrepreneurs who did not start 
with formal business plans wish they had, compared with about 15% of self-funded 
entrepreneurs.  This simple calculation implies that most entrepreneurs are satisfied with 
what they have done in using the different styles of business plans.  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INITIAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL, PATENTS AND RATE OF 
GROWTH 
The survey included questions regarding patented technologies.  The participants 
were asked to indicate whether they started their ventures with patented technology (or 
technologies), as well as their current number of patents (both patent applications and 
Figure 4.11: Suffering from Lack of Formal Business Plan  
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the left column (from 0 to 50) 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
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registered patents).  In addition, the survey asked participants to estimate their potential 
patents—technologies that the respondents think are patentable, but have not been 
patented.  Figure 4.12 demonstrates data about the patents related to each enterprise14.  
The data about the number of patents (at start-up, current, and potential) are marked in 
lines 1 to 12 of Figure 4.12.   
Figure 4.12 demonstrates that there are only three ventures (out of a total of 72 
ventures) that started with patented technologies.  The rate of growth of two of the 
enterprises that started with patented technology is below the average rate of growth. The 
                                                 
14 Detailed information related to patents, as well as rate of growth is available in Table J.1, in Appendix J. 
The Table includes the following information about all enterprises that took part in the study: Current 
Employee Number; Rate of Growth (ratio of current employee number / current Age); Number of 
registered patents for each venture; Potential Patents. 
Figure 4.12: Initial Sources of Capital and Patents  
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the right column (from 0 to 50) 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
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data indicate that there are no direct relationships between number of patents at start up 
and later patterns of growth.   
Growth or Patents: Which One Comes First?  
Figure 4.12 also demonstrates a modest association between rate of growth and 
current patents, especially among the VC funded ventures.  Although technology plays a 
key role in venture development, it does not appear to be the case that patents per se are 
the key factors in the success of new ventures in their early stages of development.  
Numerous papers and studies have reviewed the role of patents in the growth of 
businesses, but they have mostly reviewed mature businesses and very large enterprises.  
Patents and growth often have feedback and closed-loop relationships with each 
other. Each one may nurture the other one.  In this context, a key question is “Growth or 
Patent: Which one comes first”?  Are patents a source or a cause of further growth, or 
conversely, does growth provide the resources to apply and register patents? An analysis 
of the ventures that took part in this study and started with registered patents may provide 
an answer to this puzzle.  Figure 4.12 indicates that, among the ventures that responded to 
the question related to patents in the survey form, only three ventures had registered 
patents at the time of their startup (Cases No. 1, 16, and 48).  Among the three ventures, 
only one of them is a high growth venture (Case No. 1).  This comparison indicates that, 
in the early stages of venture development, patents do not necessarily promote growth.  If 
patents were considered to be a correlate of growth, there should be a strong association 
between patents at the time of start-ups and the later growth of the ventures that started 
with patents.  There are, however, more patents registered during later stages of the 
venture lifecycles.  This pattern implies that growth is a better justification for ability to 
register and secure patents.   
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Patents and Micro Ventures 
Figure 4.12 also demonstrates that ventures with “potential patents” are 
concentrated among the micro and very small ventures (with fewer than 20 employees).  
Figure 4.12 demonstrates that there are 6 micro ventures that marked the section on 
potential patents, compared to only one medium-size venture (with about 60 employees) 
that indicated it has a potential patent that has not been registered.  In addition, as it was 
discussed in the section on comparing the Total Population and a Sample Group, micro 
ventures in this study are underrepresented.  The ratio of Sample to Total Population for 
micro enterprises is about one fourth of the same ratio for small and medium-size 
enterprises.  It means the responses in the micro venture group should be multiplied by 
four to provide a better base for comparison with the small- and medium-size enterprises 
group.  This observation of the high number of micro ventures with potential patents may 
imply that, in the early stage of venture development, too much attention to patents might 
act more as a hindrance than a help.  Alternatively, new ventures with high technological 
capabilities may be acquired by mature firms rapidly and thus they do not develop their 
own portfolio.  
Current Age and Age of Ventures at the Time of VC Investment 
Previous sections of this chapter have reviewed the characteristics of each venture 
at the time of startup, as well as their most recent characteristics.  To have a better 
understanding of the patterns of evolution of each venture, Figure 4.13 depicts the current 
age of each enterprise, as well as the age of each venture at the time of VC investment, if 
that is applicable.  
Figure 4.13 demonstrates that VC funded ventures, with a mean age of 5.3 years, 
are among the youngest existing ventures.  VC backed ventures, with a mean age of 17.9 
years, on average are the oldest existing ventures.  The mean age of the self-funded 
 72
ventures, which have not yet received VC investments, is 7.5 years.  The mean age of 
micro ventures is 5.2 years.  The mean age of micro ventures (5.2 years) is comparable 
with VC funded (5.3 years), as well as self-funded ventures (7.5 years).  The mean age of 
micro ventures (5.2 years) may indicate that many ventures start as micro ventures but do 
not grow fast and stay as micro ventures, irrespective of their ages.  
INITIAL SOURCES OF CAPITAL, INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT (ANGEL), AND RATE OF 
GROWTH 
Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide capital to start-up ventures.  
Angel investors are distinct from VC firms, which are investment organizations.  
According to The Money of Invention “While angels perform many of the same functions 
 Current Age and Age of Venture at the Time of VC Investment
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Figure 4.13: Initial Sources of Capital and Current Age  
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the right column (from 0 to 50) 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
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as venture capitalists, they invest their own capital rather than that of institutional and 
other individual investors” (Gompers Lerner, 2001: 249). 
In this study, angel (individual) investors invested in 16 of the ventures.  A 
detailed review of the data indicates that 10 individual (angel) investments were related 
to VC funded ventures, two investments were related to VC backed ventures, and four 
investments were related to self-funded ventures.  The above description of patterns of 
investment demonstrates that individual (angel) investments occurred often among VC 
funded ventures. Among the VC funded cases, it does not seem that there exist major 
differences in the Rate of Growth and Age at the Time of VC Investment between Angel 
Investments cases (marked in line 26) and other cases.  
Figure 4.14: Initial Sources of Capital, Angel Investment and Rate of Growth 
The factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the right column (from 0 to 50) 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
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REACTION TO THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN OF 2001  
The reaction to the economic downturn of late 2000 and early 2001 (after the Dot-
Com Bubble burst) was a topic of discussion in the interview questions of this study.  The 
impact of the Dot-Com Bubble on the behavior of the software enterprises in Austin was 
also discussed in many meetings with the entrepreneurs and venture development 
specialists.  As this study focuses on the behavior of self-funded versus VC funded 
ventures, it is relevant to consider the reactions to the economic down turn of 2001.  
 





of Employees in 
Late 2000 (Just 
before the Peak 
of the Dot-com 
Bubble) 
Total Number 
of Employees in 
Fall 2003 (or 
the most recent 
data) 




2000 and Late 
2003, % 
VC Funded 20 1071 1155 + 0.08% 
Self-Funded 24 1171 1024 - 0.13% 
χ2 = 0.85 
Table 4.5 compares the Total Number of Employees in late 2000 (just before the 
peak of the Dot-Com Bubble) and the Total Number of Employees in late 2003.  The data 
demonstrates that the 20 VC funded ventures had 1155 employees in late 2003, while in 
late 2000 they had about 1071.  The difference between the two employment numbers 
corresponds to approximately a 0.08% rise.  On the other hand, the 24 self-funded 
ventures employed about 1171 employees in late 2000, while in late 2003 they had about 
1024 employees, which corresponds to about a 0.13% fall.  The Chi-Square value for the 
above table is equal to 0.85.  For significance at the .05 level, the Chi-Square value 
should be greater than or equal to 3.84.  
A conclusion is that the analysis is not able to trace a significant difference in the 
collective behavior of VC funded versus self-funded ventures in relation to the economic 
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downturn of 2001.  This analysis, however, is not consistent with the total employment 
reduction in the Austin information sector that has occurred since early 2001.  Between 
January 2001 and January 2003, for instance, the Austin information sector suffered a 
loss of about 14% in its workforce.  This pattern of employment reduction is discussed in 
more detail in Appendix C.   
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COMBINED DATA IN ONE FIGURE  
Figure 4.15 compiles all the data in one figure.  Combining all the data in one 
figure makes it possible to make further analysis based on all of the factors that are 
presented.   
Figure 4.15: Combined Data in One Figure 
Current Employee # is indexed in the right column (from 0 to 500).   
Other factors are explained by the various numeric symbols in the left column (from 0 to 50) 
Each number on the horizontal axis (1 to 75) represents an enterprise.   
Owing to a software problem, the numbers in the print or PDF version of this text might be black. 
Business Plans, Capital, Technology and Growth of New Ventures in Austin, Texas 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. This chapter describes the data collection procedures for the study.  
2. The study divides the participating ventures into three groups: 1) VC 
funded ventures that gained VC investment when they were less than 16 months old, 2) 
VC backed ventures that gained VC investment when they were more than 28 months old 
(a gap of one year exists between the two groups), and 3) Self-funded ventures that have 
not received any VC investment.  
3. The chapter demonstrates that between 1999 and 2000 (the Dot-Com 
Bubble) patterns of VC investment in the Austin software firms were unusual.  During 
this period, the number of VC investment cases drastically increased and the age of the 
ventures at the time of VC investment also decreased considerably.  During the Dot-Com 
Bubble, the VCs predominantly invested in the VC funded (Seed Stage) ventures.  Since 
January 2001, not only the total number of VC investments has decreased drastically, but 
the VC investments have often been in mature ventures (VC backed ventures).   
4. The chapter demonstrates that the average rate of growth (current 
employees number / current age of the ventures) of VC funded ventures is about 2.2 
times that of self-funded ventures.  
5. Initial sources of capital impact the selected styles of business plans.  VC 
funded new ventures have a greater tendency to develop formal (classical) business plans, 
and self-funded new ventures have a greater tendency to develop one-page business 
plans. 
6. Initial sources of capital deeply impact the main application of formal 
business plans.  VC funded ventures have a greater tendency to use their formal 
(classical) business plans for communication with third parties.  Self-funded ventures, 
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however, have a greater tendency to use their formal business plans for practical internal 
guidance. 
7. The ability to implement the formal business plans is also associated with 
the initial sources of capital.  VC funded entrepreneurs are better able to implement their 
formal business plans.  
8. Most entrepreneurs are satisfied with their original styles of business 
plans.  
9. The next chapter covers major conclusions and potential future studies.n 
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Chapter Five: Major Conclusions and Potential Future Studies 
Chapter three covered the body of data analysis incorporated into this study.  The 
chapter reviewed the following topics:  1) relationships between initial sources of capital 
and patterns of growth, 2) relationships between styles of business plans and sources of 
capital, 3) main applications of formal (classical) business plans, 4) implementation of 
the formal business plans, 5) patterns of business plans in the later stages of venture 
lifecycles, and 6) relationships between patents and growth.   
Chapter Four described the major conclusions as well as potential future studies.  
This chapter covered the following topics: 1) formal business plans as a communication 
tool (suit and tie), 2) rate of growth and sources of capital, 3) growth or patents: which 
one comes first, 4) changing patterns of ventures in their lifecycle, and 5) corporation 
funded ventures by medium size enterprises.  
Overall, this study has reviewed the early stages of venture development in 
Austin, Texas between 1990 and 2003.  This time span covers a period of fast growth, a 
period of slow growth, a period of fast growth, and then fast decline (the Dot-Com 
Bubble).  The 1997-2000 period has been characterized as one of unique technological, 
business and employment growth; accordingly, generalizing the results of this time span 
to other time periods or to other regions should be done with care.  The distinctive 
characteristics of the Dot-Com Bubble (1997-2001) and the subsequent Dot-com Crash 
(2001-2002), however, do provide an opportunity to study the process of venture 
development in economic boom and bust.  
MAJOR CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, this study has pointed to the following major conclusions: 1) 
Formal Business Plans as a Communication Tool (Like Suit and Tie), 2) Patents also as a 
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Communication Tool, 3) Rate of Growth and Sources of Capital, 4) Evolution of 
Ventures in their Lifecycle, and 5) Corporation Funded Ventures by Medium Size 
Enterprises.  
Formal Business Plans Mostly Act as a Communication Tool (Like Suit and Tie)  
The findings of Chapter Four demonstrated that many academic studies and 
courses have overemphasized the role of “formal business plans” as a practical internal 
guide essential for venture development.  Instead, formal business plans serve largely as a 
communication tool to secure external sources of capital, as the section on the Main 
Application of Formal Business Plans (Figure 3.8) demonstrated.  The study has also 
demonstrated that VC funded ventures have a greater tendency to develop formal 
business plans prior to initiating new ventures than do self-funded ventures.  
In this investigator’s discussions with interviewees, it appeared that many 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists were well aware of the deficiencies of formal 
business plans.  One entrepreneur compared formal business plans with a “suit and tie” 
that one wears on formal occasions15.  He said, “We prepared the business plan, like a 
suit and tie, to demonstrate that we know and follow the rules of the game.”  Then, he 
added, “When we finalized the business plan, nobody read it.”  The same entrepreneur 
also emphasized the role of the process of business planning.  He said that although 
nobody read the final document, “thinking about the business plan helped us to clear 
many problems before the start up.”  Some venture capitalists also are aware of the 
limitations of formal business plans.  One VC investor in an interview stated, “I am more 
interested to see practical Power-Point presentations.”  He, then added, “I am more 
interested in two things: market and team. I am not interested in technology16” This 
                                                 
15 Interviewee No. 4  
16 Interviewee No. 6 
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venture capitalist, thus, stresses the importance of effective, well-conceived business 
planning.  Teamwork and appropriate strategic initiatives, all of which might be implicit 
in good business planning, are normally absent from many formal business plans.  
Another interviewee said, “Everyone knows how to cook a business plan17.”  
The following case serves as an example to describe how Ken Olson, the co-
founder of DEC (Digital Equipment Corporation, the famous VC funded venture) used 
the formal business plan to secure venture capital from AR&D in 1957. At that time, 
Olson was 31 years old and he had more than seven years of technical and managerial 
experience, but he had no experience in setting up a new venture.  
[The AR&D staff] gave us three pieces of advice: Do not use the word computer, 
because Fortune magazine said no one is making money in computers. … The 
promise of five per cent profit on sales in our initial presentation is not enough; 
raise it … so we promised ten per cent. … Promise fast results, because most of 
the AR&D board members were over 80.  So we promised to make a profit in one 
year (Olson, 1987: 8, appeared in Roberts, 1991: 7). 
Roberts then continues, “With the business plan thus revised to meet the 
investors’ stated prejudices, the AR&D board approved the investment in Digital 
Equipment Corporation of $70,000 for which they took 70% of the authorized stock” 
(Roberts, 1991: 7).   
Patents also Act as a Communication Tool  
Patents and growth have closed-loop relationships, and often feedback each other. 
Based on the data from Figure 4.12, “Growth or Patents: Which One Comes First?”, the 
last section in Chapter Four demonstrates that growth is a better justification for the 
ability to register and secure patents.  Figure 4.12 also demonstrates an association 
between the number of patents and initial sources of financial capital.  8 VC funded 
ventures (40%) had patents, compared with only 3 self-funded ventures (15%).   
                                                 
17 Interviewee No. 9 
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Considering the attention of VC funded ventures devoted to their external 
communication relations, as discussed under “Formal Business Plans as a 
Communication Tool,” one can conclude that VC funded ventures may have leveraged 
the use of their patents as a communication tool with third parties, particularly with 
investors.  This topic was discussed with three interviewees.  One interviewee, who is a 
VC funded entrepreneur, indicated that he applied for patents because “patents can 
potentially support the efforts for the next round of capital as well as for marketing18”.  
Another interviewee indicated that, from his perspective, “patents act as a deterrent force, 
like an Atom Bomb, to discourage would be opponents19”.  He then added, “When are 
you small no one cares about you.  When you start to grow, you need to protect your 
flanks.”  Another entrepreneur20 compared patents with “flagged land mines”.  He added, 
“Patents are defensive tools and you pay to expose your patents to almost everyone.”  He 
continued, “To register patents, you spend your money and disclose your technology, to 
protect yourself from would be competitors from a specific angle and hoping that nobody 
is going to attack you from that specific angle.  What if nobody is going to attack you 
from specific angle?”  
Based on a sample of 530 companies in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, 
Kortum and Lerner, in “Does Venture Capital Encourage Innovation?” (1998), reported 
the impact of venture capital on patented inventions throughout twenty industries over a 
span of three decades.  They concluded that the, “amount of venture capital activity in an 
industry significantly increases its rate of patenting.”  This observation is indeed 
consistent with the findings of this study.  Using a regression analysis, however, the 
authors concluded that “Venture capital has had a substantial impact on innovation in the 
                                                 
18 Entrepreneur No. 5 
19 Entrepreneur No. 4 
20 Entrepreneur No. 9 
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U.S. economy” (Kortum & Lerner. 1998: 36).  This conclusion, however, is biased 
because the authors extrapolated the observation from one county (Middlesex, 
Massachusetts) to the whole nation (U.S.).  They also over-stretched the relationships 
between patenting and innovation.  Innovation is broader than just technological 
innovation, and patents do not cover all aspects of technological innovation. As the 
present study demonstrates, VC funded ventures have stronger tendencies to patent and 
they also have stronger tendencies to pursue formal communication relationships with the 
external sources of capital.  
Rate of Growth and Sources of Capital  
The sources of capital in the early stages of the lifecycle of a new venture (VC 
funded versus self funded) drastically impact the rate of growth of new ventures.  In their 
early stages, VC funded ventures grow faster than self-funded ventures.  Figure 3.5 and 
Table 3.2, for instance, demonstrate that in this study the average rate of growth (current 
number of employees/current age of the venture) of VC funded ventures is about two 
times that of self-funded ventures.   
A key factor in a realistic process of business planning is the distinction between 
the average rates of growth in the VC funded ventures versus self-funded ventures.  In the 
early stages of their lifecycle, VC funded ventures potentially have a higher rate of 
growth, but they are also prone to fluctuations in the external investment patterns.  As 
reported in Chapter Three, fluctuations in the external investment patterns have a stronger 
impact on the seed stage investments (VC funded ventures) than on later stage 
investments (VC backed ventures).  
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Evolution of Ventures in their Lifecycles  
The emphasis of this study is on the development of new ventures during the early 
stages of their lifecycles.  The structure of new ventures in the early stages of their 
lifecycles (as described in Chapter Three) plays a key role during later stages of 
development.  This study demonstrates that new ventures adapt their operating pattern 
and behaviors, as they grow through the different stages of their lifecycles: The following 
patterns of adaptation were observed: 
1. Changing patterns of technology, from relying on non-patented 
technologies to patented technologies.  Self-funded ventures, compared with VC funded 
ventures, have a reduced tendency to register patents.  
2. External investments have distinct patterns in economic booms and busts. 
After the Dot-Com Bubble of 1999 and 2000, venture capitalist tended to make later-
stage investments (VC backed ventures) rather than early-stage investments (VC funded 
ventures). 
Corporation Funded Ventures by Medium Size Enterprises  
Existing studies on corporation funded ventures often concentrate on the internal 
investments of large enterprises or corporate venturing (for instance, Block and 
MacMillan, 1995; Bhide, 2000).  The characteristics of corporation funded ventures in 
medium size enterprises have rarely been reviewed.  It appears that the studies on 
corporation venturing assume that corporation funded ventures by medium-size 
enterprises are not significant and they behave like corporation funded ventures by large 
enterprises.  This study, in contrast, demonstrates that corporation funding by medium-
size enterprises, from the standpoint of business planning and their approach toward 
registered patents, share many commonalties with self-funded ventures.   
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SUGGESTED FUTURE STUDIES  
In conclusion, this study pointed to the needs for further in-depth studies in the 
following areas: 1) The Valley of Death, 2) The Process of Business Planning, 3) 
Personalities of Self-Funded Entrepreneurs versus VC Funded Entrepreneurs, and 4) Role 
of Luck and Serendipity in Venture Development, 5) MBA Courses on Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship, and 6) The Study of the Near-Failures. 
The Valley of Death  
The period after the start-up of a new venture and before it reaches a sustainable 
break-even point—where the new venture gains sustainable positive cash flow—also is 
called the Valley of Death21 (the Fledgling stage).  The Valley of Death contains a very 
high mortality rate, as many ventures are not able to cross sustainable break-even points 
and then become visible players on the enterprise landscape.  Reugg and Feller in A 
Toolkit for Evaluation of Public R&D Investment make the following statement, which 
supports the need for further study of the “Valley of Death”:  
Findings from two studies reinforce the view that there is a “Valley of Death” 
where insufficient funding for early stage, high-risk technologies exists despite 
large inflows of private ventures funding (2003: 136).  
After successful ventures pass the break-even point and they grow up to become 
visible and traceable, they are beyond the Valley of Death stage.  An interviewee22 
referred to the Valley of Death (Fledgling stage), as the “Ghost Stage,” as the ventures in 
this stage are almost invisible!  Another interviewee23 called the Fledgling Stage (the 
Valley of Death) the “Under the Radar Stage.”  There exists a challenge and a paradox in 
the study of ventures in the Valley of Death (the Fledgling stage): when new ventures are 
                                                 
21 The Valley of Death is discussed as part of the Bio-Organizational Lifecycle model in Appendix D.  
22 Entrepreneur No. 9 
23 Entrepreneur No. 1  
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in the Valley of Death, typically they are not traceable (they are under the radar), and 
when ventures are grown up and traceable, they are no longer in the Valley of Death (the 
Fledgling stage).  The study of the Valley of Death is likewise a potentially fruitful topic 
for future research.  
The Process of Business Planning and Action Plans 
In Chapter Three this study referred to the distinction between “formal business 
plans” and the “process of business planning.”  The process of business planning is a 
creative and complex attempt to envision and map the potential trajectory of a business 
and tends to be unique for each firm.  The process of business planning for a new venture 
should provide a real plan of action and survival kit for entrepreneurs on how to prepare 
themselves for the challenges of the early stages of venture development–the Inception 
and Fledging stages.  The process of business planning should lead to action plans rather 
than formal plans. Drucker indicates that Napoleon allegedly said, “No successful battle 
ever followed its plan.” Yet Napoleon also made action plans for every one of his battles 
(Drucker, 2004: 60).  
The process of business planning is influenced by the founders’ personalities, 
potential initial sources of capital, how to develop and improvise proper survival strategy, 
and how to find proper paths to cross the Valley of Death.  A key observation of this 
study is that the process of business planning is an important, but relatively un-explored 
topic.  
Personalities of Self-Funded Entrepreneurs versus VC Funded Entrepreneurs 
The section of Personalities of Entrepreneurs (in Chapter Three) referred to the 
key role of human resources and the personalities of the founders in the process of new 
venture development.  Human resources in this study are a semi-charted area.  The same 
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chapter also demonstrated the key role of the initial sources of financial capital (VC 
funded versus Self funded) in the styles of entrepreneurship, and the patterns of growth 
and development of new venture.  As the study continued, it became more evident that 
the personalities of the founders and the styles of entrepreneurship are inter-connected.  
As one interviewee indicated, self-funded entrepreneurs and VC funded entrepreneurs are 
like “two different types of animal24.”  
It would be interesting to integrate the role of founders’ personalities in the 
patterns of growth and development, and this would be a fruitful topic for future research.  
In the case of VC funded ventures, not only the personalities of the founders, but also the 
personalities of their VC investors, as well as the culture, organization, and priorities of 
the VC investment firm might also impact the growth patterns of new ventures.  
Role of Luck and Serendipity in Venture Development 
In venture development luck plays a key role.  New ventures, by their nature, deal 
with uncertainty and the unknown.  Some successful ventures chance upon an attractive 
long-term formula quickly, while others encounter several false leads first.  Some 
unlucky ventures die in their early stages even though they might have had promising 
prospects.  Interviewee No. 2, a VC investor, underlined the role of luck in the process of 
venture development and stressed the risky nature of new venture development.  
Accordingly, the role of serendipity and luck in venture development appears to warrant 
the need for future investigation.  
There are interesting connections to be made in the study of the process of 
business planning and the study of the Valley of Death stage, the role of personalities of 
self-funded versus VC funded entrepreneurs, and the place of luck and serendipity in 
venture development. 
                                                 
24 Entrepreneur No. 9 
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Courses on Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
Formal business plans have taken on such a large role in the financing of start-up 
and early-stage firms that many “how to” books have been written on the subject.  Many, 
if not most, university “entrepreneurship” courses are dominated by the preparation and 
evaluation of formal business plans.  Yet, as Roberts indicates, “Little objective analysis 
has been done on their contents or impact on investor decision making” (Roberts, 
1991:198).  Many educational programs appear to have a tendency to underplay the 
essential role of self-funded ventures and to overemphasize the need for securing external 
capital.  Executive master’s and MBA programs, however, should address the 
deficiencies and limitations of the formal business plans, as well as the role of the process 
of business planning in venture development.  A proactive course on innovation and 
entrepreneurship might also give due attention to the Fledgling Stage (The Valley of 
Death) compared to the Adolescence Stage (Growth Stage) and initial sources of 
capital25.   
The Study of the Near-Failures26 
New ventures in their Fledging stages face challenges that could lead to their 
demise.  Bill Gates, for instance, describes the fatal event in the Fledgling stage of 
Microsoft:  
In 1975 Microsoft started out in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  MITS (located in 
Albuquerque) was the first company to sell an inexpensive personal computer to 
the general public. In return for the software, MITS gave Microsoft royalties and 
office space during the first year. But after MITS was acquired by another 
company, it stopped paying. We had no income for a year and were basically 
broke. …  
                                                 
25 A proposed course entitled “Innovation Commercialization and Entrepreneurship,” developed by the 
present researcher, addresses some of the topics discussed in this section.  The proposed course, however, 
still needs further elaboration.  
26 The concept of “Near Failure” is from Dr. Robert Ronstadt, who introduced it to the present author.  
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After that episode, Microsoft has been perpetually cash flow positive.  In fact, I 
developed a rule: We always have to have enough cash on hand to be able to run 
the company for at least a year even if no one pays us.  The MITS experience, 
suddenly having no income, made me conservative financially, a trait that persists 
to this day (Gates, 1996: 44). 
The above description demonstrates that even Microsoft passed from a stage of 
near-failure in its early stage of development.  In 2003, Microsoft had accumulated more 
than $50,000,000,000 cash in reserve.  Apparently Microsoft has institutionalized its 
early experiences of near-failure.  
As part of the interviews for this study, the entrepreneurs were asked about any 
early- or near-failure episodes.  One interviewee27 referred to the unexpected departure of 
a technical partner that could have led to the failure of the whole venture.   
There exist potential links between the ability to surpass the early failures and the 
survival strategies in the Fledgling stage of new venture development.  It appears that 
new ventures that followed an aggressive growth strategy could not tolerate an early 
stage failure.  In an aggressive growth strategy an early stage failure may lead to a total 
collapse, like a failing rocket after lift-off.  On the other hand, pursuing a slow growth 
and under-the-radar strategy may give new ventures a better chance to cope with their 
early stage failures, although they may face more challenges later due to lack of capital.  
 
                                                 
27 Entrepreneur No. 3 
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Epilogue  
In conclusion, this study indicates that styles of entrepreneurship, based on initial 
sources of capital, are critical in the evolution of new ventures.  New ventures, according 
to their initial sources of capital, were organized into three main groups: self-funded 
(internal sources of capital), VC funded (external sources of capital), and corporation 
funded.  In relation to external sources of capital, it can be noted that when new ventures 
receive venture capital investment appears to be very important.  In the case of VC 
funded ventures, which receive venture capital in the early stages of their lifecycle, the 
funding has a fundamental and durable impact on the behavior of the venture, its modus 
operandi, and its patterns of growth.  It is, however, somewhat surprising that the overall 
rate of growth of these VC funded enterprises is only twice as fast as that of their self-
funded cohort enterprises.  A common perception has been that VC funded ventures grow 
up to ten times faster than self-funded ventures.  This common perception appears to be 
an illusion.  
The findings of this study suggest the need to devote proper attention to the 
diverse behaviors of self-funded and VC funded ventures, since they each follow 
distinctive patterns of growth.  Self-funded ventures often proceed cautiously and try to 
grow in accordance with their limited resources, in an evolutionary fashion.  VC funded 
ventures may follow more ambitious patterns of growth, depending on the amount of 
initial capital at their disposal.  Some VC funded ventures are able to leapfrog the Valley 
of Death, and grow like “precocial birds28.”  But the presence of capital does not 
guarantee long-term sustainability.  The availability of abundant initial capital might be 
                                                 
28 “Precocial birds” are relatively mature at birth, and they are capable of moving around on their own soon 
after hatching.   
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associated with unrestrained spending.  Those self-funded enterprises that are able to 
cross the Valley of Death appear to have a relatively high degree of resilience and 
survivability.  
Additionally, many MBA educational programs appear to have a tendency to 
underplay the essential role of self-funded ventures and overemphasize the need for 
developing formal business plans and securing external capital.  Likewise, many business 
incubators might follow the same pattern of underestimating the key role of self-funded 
ventures and over emphasizing the role of formal business plans.  Accordingly, many 
MBA programs and business incubators might not really help new ventures survive their 
perilous journey through the Valley of Death.  
Throughout the study, this researcher noted that the common perception about the 
role of new technology in the early stages of venture development also appeared to be 
misleading.  While new technology does appear to assume a more critical role in the 
latter stages of enterprise development, its contributions to the early stages of 
development of new ventures appears to be overrated.  Various monographs devoted to 
the central role of new technology in the initial stages of enterprise development need to 
be read critically.  Other factors, such as prudent organization, sound management, and 
marketing innovation, perhaps, appear to fulfill equally important roles.  
All in all, innovation covers a broad conceptual arena, and one that extends far 
beyond technological innovation.  In this study, the truly innovative enterprises were 
successful in integrating organizational, human resources and marketing innovation with 
their technological thrusts.  These innovative enterprises also regarded their R&D 
(Research-and-Development) and patent undertakings as components of their broad 
innovative endeavors.  These broadly innovative enterprises also appeared to possess a 
penchant for sound, methodical, and sustainable managerial operations, with an eye to 
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evolutionary growth.  It is noteworthy that some exemplary self-funded enterprises were 
able to cross the Valley of Death, adapt to the changing conditions in a relatively 
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Appendix A -  
The Conceptual Structure 
The conceptual structure of this study consists of the methodology, models and 
theories.  The theoretical base of the study—the Resource-Based View—has been 
reviewed in Chapter Two.  This section (Appendix A) includes a brief review of the 
methodological approach and the models for the study.  The section begins with a 
description of the Model-Based method.   
In accordance with the Model-Based method, this study regards modeling as a key 
tool for developing creative concepts and explicating new relationships.  Unlike some 
other studies that do not explain the models that they use, this study explicates the models 
used.  Two models are directly used in this study: the Innovation Navigation model and 
the Bio-Organizational Lifecycle model.  The two models, however, are based on the 
foundation of other models, which are described in the appendix.  This section 
demonstrates that changing the structure of models allows new venues to emerge.  
THE MODEL-BASED METHOD 
Mainstream academic research methods often are concerned with the procedures 
for developing theories by “specifying relationships among variables, with the purpose of 
explaining and predicting the phenomena” (Kerlinger, 1973: 9).  The efforts of the 
mainstream academic research methods to make direct connections between theory and 
phenomena are depicted in Figure A.1.   
Andrew Van de Ven in Professional Science for a Professional School (Van De 
Ven, 2000) articulates the Diamond Model for Professional Science with four bases: 
Phenomena (Reality), Model, Theory and Application (Solution.)  A distinction between 
theory and model is one of the most important characteristics of the Diamond model, 
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which also depicts four main relationships among the above bases: 1) 
phenomena and model, 2) model and theory, 3) theory and application, 
and 4) application and reality.  
Additional relationships can be articulated in the context of the 
Diamond model that provides the foundation of the Model-Based 
Methodology: A relationship “between phenomena and theory” and 
another one “between model and application.”  Compared to the 
analytic research methodology of science, which connects phenomena 
and theory, one can imagine design as a synthetic methodology for art, 
technology, and management that connects model and application.  
A paradigm consists of a grand model, which defines the 
framework for the study, and a validation method that justifies which 
behaviors are accepted in the context of the paradigm and according to 
the model.  It is important to note that academic scholars and 
practitioners use two distinct paradigms, or “frames of reference”, 
according to Shrivastava & Mitroff (1984).  
In the context of the Diamond model, two types of paradigms 
are distinguishable: 1) the Academic (Scientific) Paradigm and 2) the 
Practitioners’ Paradigm.  The Academic Paradigm consists of the 
triangle of phenomena (reality), model, and theory by using scientific methodology and 
aims to develop new theories.  The Practitioners’ Paradigm consists of the triangle of 
phenomena (reality), model, and application by using design methodology and aims to 
develop new solutions and applications.   
The combination of the two paradigms, the Academic (Scientific) Paradigm and 





















practice.  A direct connection (bridge) between theory and practice still does not seem 
pervasive, although it has often been advocated.  Indirect connection between theory and 
practice via models, offers a challenging possibility.  Such connections between theory 
and practice, where models play a pivotal role, may require new conceptual frameworks 
beyond conventional scientific research methods.  Theoreticians often claim, “there is 
nothing more practical than a good theory.” Some practitioners reply, “in theory there is 
nothing more practical than a good theory.  In practice this is just a theory.”  Creating 
synergies between the two paradigms of scientists and practitioners is essential to 
establish better connections between theory and practice.   
The relationship between phenomena (reality) and model is not necessarily a 
straightforward procedure, but metaphor and analogy can facilitate the explication of the 
relations between model and phenomena.  It can be argued that metaphor and analogy 
work somewhat differently in relation to a model (or a concept); metaphor is used mainly 
to “explain” the relationship and analogy to “explore” a new relationship.  In this context, 
metaphor can be perceived as a stage from model to phenomena, and analogy a stage 
from phenomena to model. 
The integration of the above relationships (original Diamond model, scientific and 
design methodologies, analogy and metaphor, and scientific versus practitioners’ 
paradigms) provides a new methodological approach, here referred to as the Model-
Based method (see Figure A.2).  This approach is apparently more flexible than the 
mainstream scientific research method (Figure A.1), which concentrates on the direct 
links between theory and phenomena (reality).  The Model-Based methodology, 
however, covers the main aspects of the mainstream scientific research method.  This 
approach is called the Model-Based method in order to underline the key role of models 
in integrating scientific and practical studies.   
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The analytic-scientific methodology has deeply impacted the disciplinary 
structure of the sciences29.  By integrating the scientific and design methodologies, 
however, the Model-Based methodology can be used in disciplinary, interdisciplinary, 
and cross-disciplinary studies.  When the knowledge of scientists and practitioners is 
combined, it could produce a dazzling synthesis that profoundly advances both theory 
                                                 
29 See “A Brief Study of the Cartesian (Analytic) Method” in this Appendix.  
Figure A.2: The Model-Based Method 
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and practice.  The desired synthesis, however, does not occur according to linear 
procedures that almost always proceed from theory to practice.  
In earlier papers, the Model-Based methodology was referred to as the Grounded 
Model methodology.  This name change reflects the independence of the Model-Based 
methodology from the Grounded Theory methodology.  In this section only the main 
characteristics of the Model-Based methodology were discussed.  Details of the 
conceptual background behind the Model-Based methodology are available at “Bridging 
Theory and Practice, a Dilemma,” Mahdjoubi (2002).  
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CETERIS PARIBUS AS A PREMISE  
Ceteris paribus is a Latin term, which often has been translated as “all else being 
equal.”  To demonstrate the key role of Ceteris paribus (all else being equal) as a 
premise, two world maps are compared.  Figure A.3 is a map of the world drawn in 1544 
by Batista Agnese.  Apparently this map is not yet complete, as it demonstrates the 
existence of vast uncharted areas, left blank, in North America and Central Africa.  The 
uncharted areas were indeed vital for the next rounds of exploration.  In spite of the vast 
uncharted areas, the above map provides a fairly comprehensive view of the World in a 
new projection.  By depicting the scope 
of the uncharted areas, the 
cartographer’s premise was not ceteris 
paribus “all else being equal.”   
Figure A.4 is a map of the 
world drawn in 1363 by Ranulf Higden.  
The Mediterranean Sea covers the left, 
and the Red Sea and Mesopotamia are 
on the right side of this map.  Following 
the dominant belief of that time, the 
world is depicted as flat and the Holy 
Land, by intention, is located at the 
center of the map.  This map includes 
almost no uncharted area.  The 
cartographer’s premise was likely 
ceteris paribus.   
Figure A.4: A Map of the World Drawn in 1363 




Diagram No. 5 is the map of the world drawn in Robinson projection. This map depicts 
what we commonly consider as the ‘World’. Although this map may include a scale, 
which makes the comparison of different regions possible, its measurement for 
navigation is inaccurate. 
Diagram No. 6, the map of the world in Mercator projection, is the widely used 
navigation chart. In this projection the longitudes are parallel vertical lines and the 
latitudes are parallel horizontal lines. By drawing a straight line between two points 
and using a compass, a navigator can determine the sailing direction between those 
points. The distances can be measured directly and easily. This map, named after its 
designer Gerardus Mercator, has been considered the masterpiece of navigational 
charts since its development in the 17th century. 
Diagram No. 2 is the Map of the world drawn in 1363 by Randulf Higden. 
Mediterranean Sea covers the left, Red Sea and Mesopotamia are in the right side of 
this map. Following the dominant belief of that time, the World is depicted flat and the 
Holy land located at its center. This map is primarily a representation of some 
territories in the Old World. There is no scale in this map, and naturally no 
measurement is possible to be based on it.  
Diagram No. 3 is the map of the world drawn in 1520. Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea 
are located almost in the middle of this map. Mediterranean Sea covers the left side, 
and North Africa and North Indian Ocean occupy the lower part of this map. Although 
the knowledge of Asia, Africa and Indian Ocean is vague and fanciful, this map has a 
relatively accurate knowledge of the contours of the Mediterranean coastline. This 
map is based on the writings of the Greek geographer, Ptolemy, who lived around 150 
AD. Ptolemy was the first to use a system of regularly spaced coordinates on maps to 
be used as a type of scale. 
Diagram No. 4 is the map of the world drawn in 1544 by Batista Agnese. America has 
been inserted to the world map, however Australia and Antarctica are still terra 
incognita. The undiscovered areas in North America and Central Africa have been left 
unmarked. The Magellan’s voyage, who for the first time circumnavigate the globe, is 
marked here. This map, which looks to Earth as a sphere rather than a flat subject, is 
based on presentation of a systematic scale to make measuring possible. 
Diagram No. 7: The Earth as seen by the Apollo 17 astronauts, 1972 
Diagram No. 1 shows part of a Roman road map of the 1st century AD. This road map 
depicts the routes between the major cities of the Roman Empire and the approximate 
distances along the roads. As the cartographer lacked an overall vision of the shapes 
of land and sea, these masses are distorted almost beyond recognition. In this part of 
the road map, North Africa and the Mediterranean Sea are located in the lower section. 
The middle section covers part of Italy (the city of Rome in the middle), and Adriatic 
Sea and Balkans are shown in the upper section.  
Figure A.5: Evolution of the Map of the World 
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 To corroborate the “premise” and the “intention” of the map, in Figure A.4 the 
cartographer depicted the Nile, for instance, from west to east, rather than from south to 
north.  Depicting the Nile from south to north, which was known then, would have 
exposed vast uncharted areas in Central Africa, and moved the center of the map 
southward.  Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 are indeed two maps from “The Evolution of the 
Map of the World,” Figure A.5, which demonstrates the evolution of the major world 
maps and brief conceptual premises behind each one.  
A BRIEF STUDY OF THE ANALYTIC METHOD AND CARTESIAN APPROACH 
Epistemology in philosophy is the study of the theory of knowledge, which goes 
back to ancient Greek, but philosophy by itself can be traced back to 2000 BCE in 
ancient Near East.  Since the 17th century a main issue in the epistemology of Western 
philosophy, however, has been rationalism versus empiricism.  Rationalism claims that 
knowledge can be obtained deductively by reasoning and empiricism says that 
knowledge can be attained inductively from sensory experiences.  René Descartes, a 
French rationalist philosopher, argued that the main source and final test of knowledge 
was deductive reasoning based on self-evident principles, or axioms (Nonaka 1995).  
Descartes in Discourse on Method (1637) indicated the foundation of the analytic 
(scientific) method, as follows: 
1. Accepting only what is clear in one’s own mind, beyond any doubt. 
2. Splitting big problems into smaller ones. 
3. Arguing from the simple to the complex. 
4. Checking when one is done.  
“Splitting big problems into smaller ones” is indeed a pillar of the analytic 
(Cartesian, scientific) method, as the term “analysis” (dissolving in Latin) indicates.  
Capra in The Turning Point (1983) explains that the essence of Descartes’ approach is the 
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analytic method of reasoning, which consists in breaking up phenomena into pieces.  
Accordingly, this approach has become an essential characteristic of modern scientific 
thought and has proved extremely useful in the development of scientific theories.  Capra 
then argues that “overemphasis on the Cartesian method has led to the fragmentation that 
is characteristic of both our general thinking and our academic disciplines and to the 
widespread attitude of reductionism in science—the belief that all aspects of complex 
phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts” (1983. 59). 
Descartes’ work, along with that of Galileo, Newton, Bacon, and others, 
established the analytic-scientific approach towards knowledge.  Galileo was a pioneer in 
combining experimentation with the use of mathematical language.  Capra indicates that 
the conceptual framework created by Galileo and Descartes was completed by Newton, 
who developed a consistent mathematical formulation of the mechanistic view of nature.  
From the second half of the 17th century to the end of the 19th century, the mechanistic 
Newtonian model of the universe dominated all scientific thought.  The natural sciences, 
and to a large extent the humanities and social sciences, accepted the mechanistic view of 
the classical physics as the correct description of reality and modeled their own theories 
accordingly (Capra, 1983). 
THE BLACK BOX MODEL 
The Black Box model (Figure A.6) has been used, as a base model, in many 
studies and disciplines.  The Black Box model consists of three main sections: 1) Input, 
2) Output, and 3) Function (Process).  The Black Box model assumes that Functions have 
fixed structures that do not change much over time, and that Functions predictably 
convert the Inputs into the Outputs over and over again.  If we can find the rule of a 
Function one time, then it is applicable indefinitely, and we can predict the behavior of 
the Output by knowing the Input and Function.   
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Science in Action (Latour, 1987) describes the key role of the Black Box model in 
the process of science and technology development.  Latour indicates “the word black 
box is used by scientists whenever a piece of machinery or a set of commands is too 
complex.  In its place they draw a little box about which they need to know nothing but 
its input and output” (Latour, 1987: 2).  Anderson and Hosking (1992) also make a 
reference to challenges of “theorizing relational processes in ways which do not rely on 
the traditional input-output model of organizations as entities” without explicating the 
Black Box basis of the “input-output model.”  They claim “in contrast to the traditional 
perspective, what emerges is, in principle, not predictable or designable” (Anderson & 
Hosking, 1992: 3).  
The Black Box Model and the Cartesian (Analytic) Approach 
The Black Box model is consistent with the Cartesian (analytic) approach of 
“splitting big problems into smaller ones30,” and ceteris paribus31 “all else being equal.”  
Accordingly, each system is inside a super-system (environment) and it may contain 
many sub-systems, each one independent from the others.  Consequently, the Black Box 
model assumes that the system under study is inside a super-system, and that the system 
under study can be (and indeed, is) separated from any other parallel systems (ceteris 
paribus).  Inside a Black Box system there might be other sub-systems, but they also 
behave as a series of baby (mini) Black Boxes, and they are separable from each other.  
                                                 
30 See “A Brief Study of the Cartesian (Analytic) Method” in this Appendix 
31 See “Ceteris Paribus as a Premise” in this Appendix.  
Output Input 
Figure A.6: The Black Box Model  
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The Black Box Model and the Mathematical Function  
The Black Box model also is consistent with the analytic scientific research 
method of linear causality and dependent and independent variables: Input = 
independent variable or cause, and Output = dependent variable or effect (Figure 
A.8).  Theories that look for linear structures and “linear cause and effect” propositions 
follow a Black Box model, although many may not articulate the Black Box as their base 
model.  
The Black Box model has extensive applications, for instance in mathematical 
modeling.  Function (f) in the mathematical relationship of Y = f (X) is a representation 
of the role allocated according to a Black Box model to convert the Input (X) into the 
Output (Y).  Bennett and Briggs, in Using and Understanding Mathematics, state it thus: 
 
It may be helpful to think of a function as a box with two slots, one for input and 
one for output.  A value of the independent variable can be put into the box 
through the input slot.  The function inside the box operates on the input and 
produces the corresponding value of the dependent variable, which appears as 











Figure A.7: The Black Box Model  
and the Cartesian (Analytic) Approach 
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with respect to one or more independent variables.  When there are only two 
variables, we often summarize them as an ordered pair with the independent 
variable first: (independent variable, dependent variables).  We say that the 
dependent variable is a function of the independent variable.  If x is the 
independent variable and y is the dependent variable, we write the function as: Y 
= f (X) (2002: 500).  
The Black Box model, although very useful, is not a universal model that is 
always applicable to everything; nonetheless many academic and practical studies have 
assumed that it is.  While the Black Box model may provide useful simulations for most 
material and energy transformations, the Black Box is not the model of choice for 
creative phenomena such as knowledge generation and innovation.  A Black Box 
model—that predictably transforms Inputs into Outputs—cannot fully simulate human 
creativity, because a creative mind is able to provide unpredictable outcomes.  Thus, we 
face a challenge and paradox: the Black Box model does allow us to explicate creative 
and generative phenomena; however, without the Black Box, we could be disconnected 
from the Cartesian (analytic) approach which indeed is based on the Black Box model 
and has been the pillar of the scientific method.  
THE GRAY BOX MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE BLACK BOX MODEL 
To remedy the shortcomings of the Black Box model in dealing with the creative 
characteristics of innovation, this study proposes a new configuration called the Gray Box 
model (Figure A.9).  This name is used to emphasize the transparency of this model in 
contrast to the opacity of the Black Box model.  The Gray Box model consists of five 
sections: 1) Inward, 2) Outward, 3) Inside, 4) Outside, and 5) Overall.   
Using the terminology of the systems approach, a Gray Box system may include 
many baby Gray Boxes, but they interact with each other.  The relationships among the 
Gray Box systems are not necessarily linear, hierarchical, and predictable.  The 
interactions among Gray Box systems are complex, but they are not random or chaotic.  
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In a Gray Box system, the transformation process may change due to the interactions 
inside the Gray Box system, as well as the interactions that the Gray Box system has with 
the Outside and other parallel Gray Box systems.   
The structure of the Gray Box model was described first in the following paper: 
Using the Gray Box Model to Explore the Relationships Between Knowledge 
Management and E-Business (Mahdjoubi and Tomak, 2001).  This study uses the Gray 
Box as a base model to articulate the process of venture development and innovation.  
The Gray Box model is distinct from the famous Black Box model that has acted as a 
base model in numerous academic studies and disciplines.   
THE GRAY BOX MODEL VERSUS THE BLACK BOX MODEL 
The Gray Box Inward and Outward sections are similar to the Black Box Input 
and Output sections.  The terms Inward and Outward, however, imply flow and 
movement.  The Gray Box Inside section is comparable to the Black Box Function factor.  
Unlike the fixed Function factor, the Inside section is able to change and evolve.  The 
changing characteristic of the Inside section affects the transformation process between 





Inward and Outward.  The Gray Box Outside section is comparable to the Black Box 
environment, but the Inside and Outside sections may have interactive relationships.  As 
such, the Outside system can transform the nature of the Inside section (for example 
natural evolution), which then changes the conversion of Inward into Outward.  On the 
other hand, the Inside also may change the behavior of the Outside system (for example, 
pollution).  The Gray Box Overall section integrates the interactions among the other four 
sections.  The Overall section is used to integrate the interactions among the different 
sections of the goal-seeking and proactive-organizing entities, which will be discussed 
later in this appendix.  Deliberate change of the Overall section is used in strategy 
development.  Using computer science terminology, the Gray Box model is reverse-
applicable to the Black Box model.  For instance, if the Inside section does not change, 
and if a given phenomenon is isolated from Outside, then we will have a simple Black 
Box. 
A main conclusion of this section is that the analytic method, Cartesian approach, 
and causal relationship are pertinent to the study of phenomena that can be presented by a 
Black Box model and in the condition of Ceteris Paribus as a premise.  The Black Box 
model, however, is not able to present the creative characteristics of innovation and 
knowledge generation.  Accordingly, researchers may need to develop new models as 
well as new non-analytic methodologies and non-Cartesian approaches to study the 
processes of innovation.  
CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISE ACTIVITIES  
The Gray Box model is used to make a new classification for enterprise activities.  
Looking at an enterprise as a system for the flow and process of knowledge (Nonaka, 
1995), the activities of an enterprise can be categorized into four major groups: 1) 
Technology, 2) Customers/Market, 3) Human Resources (People) and 4) Organization.  
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The four major groups of enterprise activities (Technology, Customer/Market, Human 
Resources and Organization) are classified in a linear and sequential format.  These four 
groups of enterprise activities are compatible with the Gray Box model.   
• Technology acts like the Inward section,  
• Customer/Market is related to the Outward section,  
• Human Resources (People) hold the Inside section, and  
• Organization covers the Overall and Outside sections.  
Similar to the Gray Box model, the interactions between the four major groups of 
enterprise activities (Technology, Customer/Market, Human Resources and 
Organization) are non-linear.  The four major groups of enterprise activities interact with 
each other like the pieces of a puzzle, as depicted in Figure A.10: The Enterprise 
Activities Model.  In addition the above four major groups may change their position.  
For instance, the feedbacks of customers, may act like a new technology.  
As discussed before, the Gray Box model is reverse-applicable to the Black Box 
model.  By using a Black Box model, the main enterprise activities will be confined to 
Technology and Customer (Market).  One could argue that the studies that confine 
strategy to technology and market are indeed based on a Black Box view for enterprising, 
although they rarely articulate the Black Box as their base models.  










The Enterprising Activities model (Figure A.10) looks at the major enterprise 
activities in the context of their present (current) situations.  We need to integrate the role 
of “decision-making for the future” and “performance metrics of the past” into the above 
model to make it more practical.  The Enterprise Navigation Model (next section) tackles 
this challenge.  
THE ENTERPRISE NAVIGATION MODEL  
The metaphor of 
navigation often has been used to 
explain management concepts 
and ideas.  For instance, the July 
26, 1993 issue of Fortune 
magazine includes a special 
section on strategy, which 
includes a picture of a map, a 
magnetic compass, and a divider 
(Figure A.11).  Fortune, 
however, does not elaborate 
potential interrelations between 
the two systems: “navigation” 
and “global management.”  The 
picture acts like a simple 
metaphor.  In addition, the 
metaphor of navigation has been used in the title of a wide range of books, such as 
Navigating Complexity (Battram, 1998), Navigating Change (Hambrick et al. 1998), and 
Figure A.11: Fortune, July 26, 1993 Cover Page 
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Strategy Safari (Mintzberg et al. 1998).  Amidon & Mahdjoubi (1999) elaborate a 
structured view on the application of the navigational analogy to business strategy. 
Intellectual Capital (Edvinsson, 1997) uses the Knowledge Navigator as a 
metaphor to explain the management of Intellectual Capital, which refers to the efforts to 
explain the role of knowledge in business performance metrics and a new style of 
financial analysis.  Corporate Longitude (Edvinsson, 2002) further extended the 
metaphor of navigation to articulate the role of Intellectual Capital (analogous to 
longitude) compared with conventional financial analysis (analogous to latitude).  
Longitude is the angular distance on the earth’s surface, measured east or west 
from the prime meridian at Greenwich, England.  Latitude is the angular distance north or 
south of Earth’s Equator.  Cartographers and navigators locate geographic locations by 
marking their latitude and longitude.   
The Enterprise Navigation model uses the analogy of navigation to develop a new 
model that is able to explain the management of goal-seeking and proactive-organizing 
business entities.  Navigation is based on three fundamental tools: 1) Compass, 2) Map, 
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and 3) Scales of Measurement.  Compass, Map and Scales of Measurement employ 
interactive relationships with the future, present, and past.  
The management of goal-seeking and proactive-organizing entities require three 
sets of fundamental tools: 1) decision criteria: values, rules of engagement, and 
reasoning, 2) internal structure and communities of practice, and 3) appraisal.  Decision 
Criteria, Internal Structure, and Appraisal, similar to the Compass, the Map, and Scales of 
Measurement, have interactive and continuous relationships with the future, present and 
past.  An analogous comparison among the above parallel sets explains the Enterprise 
Navigation model, as depicted in Figure A.12.   
In the Enterprise Navigation model, decision criteria (values, rules of 
engagement, and reasoning) are like a compass directed towards the future.  2) The 
internal structure and communities of practice are similar to maps that are directed 
towards the present.  3) Appraisals are like scales of measurement that let us quantify past 
achievements.  In addition, Goals in management are comparable to Destination in 
navigation.  In the earlier stages of this study the Enterprise Navigation model was 
referred to as the Knowledge Navigation model. 
The structure of the Enterprise Navigation model is described further in 
Knowledge Sensitive Performance Metrics (Harmon and Mahdjoubi, 2001).  An early 
description of the Enterprise Navigation model appeared in An Atlas for Knowledge-
Innovation (Amidon and Mahdjoubi, 1999).  In addition The Mapping of Innovation 
(Mahdjoubi, 1997) reviewed a structure for enterprise navigation as it relates to enterprise 
information processing.  
THE INNOVATION NAVIGATION MODEL  
The categorization of enterprise development into four groups (Technology, 
Customers, Human Resources (People), and Organization) is applicable to the three 
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aspects of the Enterprise Navigation model, i.e. Map, Compass, and Scales of 
Measurement.  For instance, the enterprise structure (Map) should cover sections on 
Technology Development, Customer Development, Human Resources Development, and 
Organizational Development.   
Innovation occurs in all aspects of enterprise activities.  Defining commercial 
innovation as the success-oriented flow of knowledge in action, and using the Enterprise 
Navigation model as described above, commercial innovation may be further organized 
into four interrelated groups: 1) Technological Innovation, 2) Market/Customer 
Innovation, 3) Creativity and Learning (Human Resource Development), and 4) 
Organizational Innovation (Organizational Change).  The above configuration provides a 
new classification for innovation which also is consistent with the Gray Box model 
described earlier: Technological Innovation acts like the Inward section; Market 
Innovation is related to the Outward section; Creativity and Learning holds the Inside 
Corporate Compass: Innovation 
in decision criteria, rules of 












Corporate Longitude: Performance 
metrics for innovation.
© Darius Mahdjoubi, 2003
Figure A.13: The Innovation Navigation Model 
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section, and Organizational Innovation covers the Outside and the Overall sections.  This 
configuration links the Gray Box model to the Enterprise Navigation model.  In addition 
the chart includes Corporate Longitude (Innovation in Performance Metrics), and 
Corporate Compass (Innovation in Values, Decision Criteria, Rules of Engagement, and 
Reasoning).  This configuration, as depicted in Figure A.13, is called the Innovation 
Navigation model.  
Astute observation will note that the above groups possess have non-hierarchical 
and non-linear relationships with each other.  The Innovation Navigation model satisfies 
the non-hierarchical and non-linear requirement of trans-disciplinary knowledge 
generation, suggested by Gibbons et al. (1994).  For instance, Corporate Compass— 
Innovation in value systems, decision criteria, rules of engagement, and reasoning—
comes first, because it acts like a compass and points towards future actions.  Corporate 
Longitude—Performance metrics for innovation—comes at the bottom of the figure, 
because it acts like a scale of measurement and relates to appraisal of past achievements.  
The four groups of innovation are located in the middle of Figure A.13, and they act like 
the different continents of a Mercator map, juxtaposed onto each other.   
The Mercator map is the widely used navigational chart, named after its designer 
Gerardus Mercator (1512-1595), has been considered the masterpiece of navigational 
charts since its development in the 16th century.  In the Mercator projection the 
longitudes are parallel vertical lines and the latitudes are parallel horizontal lines.  By 
drawing a straight line between two points and using a compass, a navigator can 
determine the sailing direction between those points.  The distances can be measured 
directly and easily.  The map in the middle of Figure A.13 is also in Mercator projection.   
 115
The above three enterprise groups (Corporate Compass, Innovation, and 
Corporate Longitude), have time structures related to the future, present, and past, as they 
are related to Compass, Map, and Scales of Measurement in the navigation system.   
THE INNOVATION NAVIGATION MODEL AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP  
The Innovation Navigation model provides a new classification for the different 
types of innovation.  As it was described before, innovation is a concept much broader 
than technology, as innovation encompasses all aspects of a venture. Entrepreneurship is 
another concept that deeply impacts the process of venture development.  Innovation and 
entrepreneurship, indeed, interact with each other, as Peter Drucker in Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship writes, “Innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs, the means by 
which they exploit change as an opportunity for a different business or service” 
(1985:18).   
The integration of innovation and entrepreneurship is essential for a successful 
innovation commercialization.  Innovation without entrepreneurship tends to accentuate 
science, and entrepreneurship without innovation tends to emphasize classical 
accounting.  The combination of entrepreneurship in the Innovation Navigation model, as 
in Figure A.14, demonstrates the key role of entrepreneurship that integrates the different 
aspects of commercial innovation.  Entrepreneurship is indeed like a dimension 
perpendicular to the innovation plate.   
As it was discussed in background studies for venture development (Chapter 
Two), sources of capital also act as an indicator of the styles of entrepreneurship.  Based 
on sources of capital, this study categorizes entrepreneurship into three major groups:  
I.  Self-Funded (Bootstrap) Entrepreneurs:  Self-funding (bootstrapping) 
is a means of financing a new business venture though the acquisition and use of internal 
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resources without raising equity from external sources of capital like venture capital 
institutes or venture capital banks.   
II. VC Funded Entrepreneurs: Venture capital (VC) is a fund-raising 
procedure to exchange equity (ownership) in return for financial investment.  The VC 
funded ventures are funded by venture capitalists in the early stage of the venture’s 
development, prior to a positive cash-flow and/or a sustainable sales record.  VC 
investors typically have invested in the business plans and business ideas of the VC 
funded ventures often during the first year of the venture’s establishment.   
III. Corporation Funded Intrapreneurs: Corporation-funded ventures are 
cases in which existing corporations invest in their own internal departments or direct 
subsidiaries.   


















THE KOZMETKSY EFFECT MODEL 
C.V. Ramamoorthy, in “A Study of the Service Industry – Functions, Features 
and Control”, coined the term Kozmetsky Effect model.  Ramamoorthy categorizes the 
process of technology commercialization into four broad phases: a) knowledge 
generation, b) technological innovation, c) tools development and design methodologies 
and d) implementation and manufacturing (2000: 890), Figure A15.  
Ramamoorthy defines latency as “the time differences between two successive 
phases during a specific instance of growth of a technology”  (2000: 891).  Ramamoorthy 
then argues:  
Figure A.15: The Kozmetksy Effect Model 
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The latencies between the four types of phases get reduced or compressed with a 
maturing technology. … The knowledge and technology curves get closer and 
closer to the tool development and implementation curves. … This convergence 
of knowledge and technology curves the phase latencies shrinks and may 
ultimately coalesce.  This convergence of knowledge and technology curves 
creates an inflection point (2000: 891). 
Citing the pioneering studies of Dr. George Kozmetsky, Ramamoorthy calls this 
convergence of the knowledge, technology, tools and implementation curves to an 
inflection point the “Kozmetsky Effect” (2000: 891).  The study of the information sector 
in Austin (in Appendix C) demonstrated that growth is an outcome due to the complex 
interactions of many factors.  Technology is not the only factor that impacts growth.   
The Kozmetsky Effect model, however, is very insightful as it depicts the role of 
the inflection point in connecting linear and non-linear (complex) stages of venture 
development. The Economic Transformation of the United States, 1950-2000 
(Kozmetsky and Yue, 2002) provides further insight into the non-linear characteristic of 
the turbulence stage after the inflection point.  Kozmetsky and Yue claim:  
The inflection points may trigger explosive growth or they may lead to demise. 
For established companies, the strategic inflection point will generate 
opportunities to rise to new heights as well as risks to fall to the ground.  For 
emerged companies the strategic inflection point will offer opportunities for 
growing quickly as well as risks of being wiped out completely.  The strategic 
inflection point represents a time period of confusion in a chaotic environment 
(2002: 73).  
From this perspective, the Kozmetsky Effect is like a combination of the classical 
S shape models of technology development and complex systems.  From another 
perspective, the Kozmetsky Effect model has commonalities with the Paradigm Shift, as 
Thomas Kuhn suggested in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1970).  
Andrew Grove in Only the Paranoid Survive makes a reference to the Inflection Point 
from a mathematical perspective.  “Inflection point happens when the rate of change of 
the slope of a curve (second derivative) changes sign.  In physical terms, inflection point 
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is where a curve changes from convex to concave, or vice versa” (Grove, 1996: 32).  This 
view on the role of inflection points may be used as the first step for the mathematical 
modeling of turbulence in real world phenomena.  
THE KOZMETSKY EFFECT MODEL AND COMPLEXITY  
A very interesting feature of the Kozmetsky Effect is the distinctive patterns of 
growth on the two sides of the inflection point.  Prior to the inflection point, it seems that 
growth follows smooth patterns.  After the inflection point and inside the turbulent stage, 
however, growth is like the railway trails in amusement parks with sharp curves and steep 
inclines.  Before the inflection point, growth is more like riding up in the inclined 
elevator of the Eiffel Tower.  Inside the turbulence stage, however, the pattern of growth 
becomes like a roller coaster–as one entrepreneur described it.  In this respect, the pattern 
of growth after the inflection point (inside the turbulent stage) seems to be like the “edge 
of chaos” in “complex systems.”  A brief review of complex systems is useful to explain 
this point of view.  
According to Complex Adaptive Systems: A Nominal Definition, “a complex 
system behaves according to three key principles: 1) order is emergent as opposed to 
predetermined, 2) the system’s history is irreversible, and 3) the system’s future is often 
unpredictable” (Cooley, 2003). The complex outlook is in contrast to the deterministic 
Newtonian-Cartesian approach that is based on predictability and reversibility.  
Agents are the basic building blocks of a complex system.  Agents are 
autonomous or semi-autonomous units that seek to maximize some measure of goodness, 
or fitness, by evolving (deliberatively or adaptively) over time.  Cooley, in Complex 
Adaptive Systems argues:  
Agents scan their environment and develop schema representing interpretive and 
action rules.  These schema are often evolved from smaller, more basic schema. 
These schema are rationally bounded: they are potentially indeterminate because 
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of incomplete and/or biased information; they are observer dependent because it 
is often difficult to separate a phenomenon from its context, thereby identifying 
contingencies; and they can be contradictory (Cooley, 2003).  
COMPLEX RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS 
Complex systems may be further categorized into two sub-groups: a) Complex 
Adaptive (Reactive) Systems and b) Complex Deliberative (Proactive) Systems.  
Complex Adaptive Systems react to change by evolving.  Complex Deliberative Systems 
redefine their goals, proactively reorganize the resources, and creative deliberate courses 
of action to seek their goals.  Natural systems are mostly reactive; they adapt to change 
by evolving themselves.  Some human-made systems proactively engage with change.  
Complex Responsive Systems use a combination of complex deliberative (proactive) and 
complex adaptive (reactive) approaches.  Human creative systems are both creative and 
adaptive.  Business enterprises and business innovation are cases of complex responsive 
(deliberative and adaptive) systems.  
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THE BIO-ORGANIZATION LIFECYCLE MODEL  
A new organization, even a one-person venture, often follows a set of common 
stages.  Using the analogy of biological lifecycles, the stages of a new organization are 
referred to as the Bio-Organization Lifecycle model, which consists of the following main 
stages: 1) Inception, 2) Fledgling, 3) Adolescence, 4) Maturity, 5) Rejuvenation, 6) 
Demise, and 7) Turbulence (Figure A16).   
The dividing line between stages is at best fuzzy and the time during which an 
enterprise can be classified in a particular stage varies widely among enterprises.  Yet, the 
relative stage of evolution strongly influences the behavior and pattern of enterprises in 
many aspects from technology development to financial capital requirement, as each 
stage characterized by distinctive features.  
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The Bio-Organization Lifecycle model, proposed here, is not a form of 
predestinations, but it depicts major commonalities among ventures.  The suggested 
model, however, does not advocate a one-size-fits-all approach that is always applicable 
to all ventures.  Any organization, indeed, has a unique lifecycle.  The model, rather, 
intends to explicate the main characteristic of each stage of venture development that 
may vary from organization to organization.  
1. Inception covers the period from the initial idea of a new organization to its 
actual startup.  During the Inception stage the founders have the highest level of free will 
to think and sometimes daydream about the new organization.  Ideation is the main 
characteristic of this stage.  But the founders must realize that the moment they cross the 
startup threshold and enter the next stage (Fledgling – The Valley of Death), the rules that 
govern a new organization change.  The best use of the Inception stage is to become 
ready for the challenges of the next stage, Fledgling (Valley of Death).  
2. Fledgling (The Valley of Death): The period after the actual startup of a new 
organization and before it reaches a sustainable break-even point–where the new 
organization gains positive cash flow–is called the Fledgling Stage.  This stage also is 
called the Valley of Death, due to the high mortality rate among new organizations in the 
Fledgling stage.  During the Fledgling stage and inside the Valley of Death, a new 
organization, like a new baby, relies on the resources of its founders.  During the 
Fledgling stage the survival of the new organization becomes the main challenge that 
confronts the founders.  A survival strategy for this stage defines how a newborn 
organization is able to use the available capital resources to allow it to cross the Valley of 
Death.  The Valley of Death can continue for an indeterminate period of time.  If a new 
venture is not able to reach the sustainable break-even point, it will die after using the 
capital resources at its disposal.  It will be lost in the Valley of Death.  It is as simple as 
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that.  But if a venture is able to cross the Valley of Death, it becomes resilient, like steel.  
The reality of the Valley of Death is harsher for self-funded (bootstrap) ventures as they 
do not have the safety nets of venture capital and corporation funded ventures.  In the 
Valley of Death, new ventures need to acquire income sources.  The income might not be 
from the core products, but rather from a related product or service, but as long as it helps 
the new baby venture to cross the Valley of Death, it should be taken into consideration.  
3. Adolescence covers the stage after the fairly sustainable Break-Even point to 
become a major player in the niche market the venture has selected. During this period, 
growth in the main product and market that the venture started becomes the primary 
challenge the new venture faces.  
4. Maturity follows the stage of Adolescence.  During this stage expansion 
becomes the main challenge.  Expansion may happen in the context of new products 
and/or new markets.  
5. Rejuvenation: Some mature firms are able to rejuvenate themselves to grow 
and expand further.  Rejuvenation may happen many times, as some old organizations 
have demonstrated.  
6. Demise: Old soldiers may never die, but ventures, like humans, the minute 
that they are born, appear to be destined to die.  The dilemma, however, is when and 
how!  Demise may happen after any of the stages described above.  In this classification, 
however, Demise is sequenced after Rejuvenation.  
7. Turbulence (The Age of Chaos): The transition from each of those earlier 
stages to another does not happen smoothly, as the S models of development depict.  Due 
to the complexity of reality, the transition between those stages, even sometimes inside 
each stage, occurs with non-linear and turbulent changes rather than with smooth courses 
of action.  The concept of non-linear and turbulent transition from one stage to another 
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one has been borrowed from the Kozmetksy Effect model, which was discussed before.  
The Fledgling stage is inherently turbulent and indeed it may have associations with “the 
edge of chaos” in complexity.  No wonder the Fledgling Stage also is called the Valley of 
Death.  The experiences gained in the turbulent periods of the Fledgling stage, if 
internalized to become policy and culture, could be useful to prepare for future turbulent 
stages.   
Using cash-flow (revenues minus costs) as a surrogate for venture development 
(growth), Figure A.16 depicts different stages of the Venture Lifecycle.  The idea of 
using the financial stream as a surrogate for development (growth) in the context of an 
enterprise lifecycle is adapted from Chart of Timing of Venture Capital Financing 
(Fitzpatrick, 1991).  Many other sources also have used Fitzpatrick’s chart, for instance, 
Cardullo (1999).  
DEVELOPMENT CHARACTERISTICS IN THE BIO-ORGANIZATION LIFECYCLE MODEL 
It is common wisdom that new ventures in their early stages of development 
(Inception and Fledgling) behave differently compared to the next periods when they 
grow and become profitable.  Each of the seven stages of the Bio-Organization Lifecycle 
model has a key development characteristic.  The development characteristics of the 
stages are located in the lower part of Figure A.16, and they are marked in red (or gray) 
color font.  The key development characteristics of each stage of Bio-Organization 
Lifecycle are organized into the following list: 
• Ideation: Key characteristic of the Inception Stage.   
• Survival: Key characteristic of the Fledgling Stage (The Valley of Death) 
• Growth: Key characteristic of the Adolescence Stage  
• Expansion: Key characteristic of the Maturity Stage.  
• Revitalization: Key characteristic of the Rejuvenation Stage  
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• Salvage: Key characteristic of the Demise Stage  
• Confusion: Key characteristic of the Turbulent Stage.  
INTENTION AND STRATEGIES FOR VENTURE DEVELOPMENT 
In each stage of venture development, a deliberate strategy or an intention should 
address the main characteristic unique to the stage.  Intention and strategies should 
provide a guide on how to complete each stage and be prepared for the next one.  
According to the intention or selected strategy, the other aspects of venture development, 
such as innovation, should be selected.  Utilizing the analogy of exploration for venturing 
(venture development), then the innovation system acts like a navigational system.  This 
approach connects the Bio-Organization Lifecycle model and the Innovation Navigation 
model.  
LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS FAILURES AND NEAR FAILURES 
All entrepreneurial ventures are not fully successful and the aftermath of a 
business’s demise isn’t pretty at all.  The entrepreneurs are often in debt and the future might be 
in grave doubt, and some even might lose their self-esteem.  Shuman & Rottenberg (1999) 
suggests, “In the Silicon Valley, like the gold rush, while a few struck it rich, the vast 
majority went bust.  For all the great success stories to come out of Silicon Valley, it has 
spawned many, many failures.”  Shuman & Rottenberg, nevertheless, indicate “even in 
failure all that entrepreneurial effort does not necessarily go to waste” (1999).   
The demise of new ventures, however, is not necessarily the end for many 
entrepreneurs.  Persistent entrepreneurs have often learned from the experiences and 
nevertheless went on to initiate new ventures as a result of experiences gained largely 
from their failures and near-failures, to regroup their resources and to initiate new 
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ventures.  Experiences gained from previous failures can be used as a basis for future 
successes, Figure A.17.  
 
Figure A.17: Learning from Previous Failures and Near-Failures to Start New Ventures  

















Appendix B -  
The Austin Regional Development 
This section covers a brief review of the development of the Austin region, the 
Austin Technopolis, and a pilot study on growth and innovation in Austin.  The regional 
study is conducted to explicate the geographical context of the study of the growth and 
innovation of new ventures.  
The Development of the Austin Region: A Brief Review 
The rapid development of Austin in the 1980s and 1990s has been investigated in 
a number of studies Regional Case Study: Austin, Texas or “How to Create a Knowledge 
Economy” (Miller, 1999); supported by the Delegation of the European Commission to 
the United States, provides a short but fairly comprehensive view on the development of 
Austin in 1980s and 1990s.  Historical and Empirical Study of Austin’s Economic 
Growth, a master’s thesis by Janghoi Kim (2002), reviews the development of the Austin 
region from an endogenous growth perspective.  
In 1957, the Austin Area Economic Development Foundation created a “blueprint 
for the future” that set out to recruit new industries.  The economic development program 
began to yield its first results in 1963, as IBM located its Selectric typewriter facilities in 
Austin. Texas Instruments (TI) followed in 1967, Motorola in 1974 and AMD in 1979. 
Other small satellite factories followed the main players. Until the early 1980s, Austin 
had achieved success as a branch plant location for major manufacturing operations. 
Since the early 1980s, however, Austin has been able to transform itself from a 
branch plant location into an innovation hub. In 1984, Microelectronics and Computer 
Technology Corporation (MCC) located its headquarter and main facilities in Austin. In 
1984, 3M relocated the first of three innovation divisions to Austin. In 1988, 
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SEMATECH, a semiconductor research consortium, chose Austin for its site.  This 
consortium served to attract Applied Materials, a leading manufacturer of semiconductor 
equipment, to locate a facility in Austin, which had the effect of luring numerous 
suppliers to Austin as well. Korean Samsung Electronics’ building of a plant in 1996 
strengthened this trend.  Dell, the homegrown computer company may be viewed as the 
culmination of these efforts.  
Austin’s high-tech economy in the 1980’s and 1990’s relied on three main 
industries: 1) Computers and Peripherals, 2) Semiconductors and Electronics, and 3) 
Software Development.  According to Miller (1999) in the late 1990s, high-tech 
employment in Austin was broken down as follows: 1) Computers and Peripherals: 31%, 
2) Semiconductors and Electronics: 22%, and Software Development: 21%. Other high-
tech industries: 26%. In contrast to the semiconductor industry, which almost all of the 
manufacturers are transplants, much of the Austin software industry is homegrown.   
Table B.1 demonstrates the total employment change in the Austin region 
between 1990 and 1998 (Source: Adapted from ES-202 Data System by Labor Market 
Information Department and Texas Workforce Commission (11/2000).  
 
Table B.1: Total Employment Change in Austin MSA between 1990 and 1998 
SIC 














Total (=Agricultural + 
Non-Agricultural)  381,734 596,109 214,375 56.2% 
Agricultural Industries 2,323 4,517 2,194 94.5% 
Total Non-Agricultural 
Industries 379,411 591,592 212,181 55.9% 
Total Manufacturing  49,829 82,484 32,655 65.5% 
High Technology 
Manufacturing 27,496 51,711 24,216 88.1% 
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38 
Instruments and 
Related Products 2,978 3,907 929 31.2% 
283 Pharmaceuticals  2,088 1,980 -109 -5.2% 
Total Non-
Manufacturing  218,424 380,327 161,903 74.1% 
High Technology 
Services 15,804 34,367 18,563 117.5% 
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Computer and 






12,153 19,892 7,739 
63.7% 
Government 111,159 128,782 17,623 15.9% 
Federal 12,834 10,081 -2,754 -21.5% 
State 58,177 61,934 3,757 6.5% 
Local 40,148 56,767 16,620 41.4% 
THE AUSTIN TECHNOPOLIS 
Austin is also regarded as a model technopolis.  The term technopolis has been 
used to explain the relationships between enterprises (new ventures and mature 
businesses) and regional development in high growth regions like Silicon Valley.  
According to Creating the Technopolis “the modern technopolis is one that interactively 
links technology commercialization with the public and private sectors to spur economic 
development and promote technology diversification” (Smilor, Kozmetsky and Gibson, 
1988). Emergence of Technopolis argues that “there are two important conditions 
necessary for the development of a technopolis: the presence of a knowledge or growth 
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center and the existence of an environment that supports innovation” (Preer, 1992).  
Along the same line of thinking, Aydalot and Keehte claim “local environments play a 
major if not determinant role as incubators of innovative activity. The firm is not an 
isolated agent of innovation: it is one element within the local industrial milieu which 
supports it” (Aydalot and Keehte, 1988: 9).  In “The Science and Process of 
Entrepreneurship” Butler provides an historical view of the regional context of 
entrepreneurship development and he argues that regional advantage concentrates on the 
creation of firms that are able to create wealth and jobs through innovation (2003:88).  
Anna Lee Saxenian, in Regional Advantage, compares the regional innovation 
system of Silicon Valley in California with Route 128 around Boston, Massachusetts.  
Saxenian concludes that Silicon Valley’s regional advantage is mostly due to its open 
networks of communication and exchange across firms compared to the vertically 
integrated and more closed structure of Route 128 companies. These somewhat 
contrasting industrial systems in Silicon Valley and Route 128, Saxenian argues, affected 
the rate of new startups and time-to-market for new products (Saxenian, 1994). Regional 
Advantage is a very interesting source, but it concentrates on only two exceptional 
regions (Silicon Valley and Route 128), and it does not elaborate on the internal 
structures and capabilities of the firms of these regions.  
Nauwelaers and Reid, in Innovative Regions, analyzed the role of regional 
innovation systems in regional and national development (Nauwelaers and Reid, 1995: 
7). The importance of regional structures in the context of national systems of innovation 
has been further studied in “Regional structures of Innovation and Regional 
Development,” a paper by Andreas Cornett (2002).  The above sources, however, do not 
elaborate on the interactions inside enterprises and between them and their regions.   
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A PILOT STUDY ON GROWTH AND INNOVATION IN AUSTIN 
As part of the proposal stage of this Ph.D. study, an extensive pilot study was 
conducted on growth and innovation in the Austin, TX.  The pilot study includes a 
historical analysis of the evolution of the Austin region since 1940, and an analysis of the 
development of the Austin region in the 1990s. The pilot study indicates that small and 
medium size enterprises provide about 75% of employment in the Austin software 
industry.  By definition, small and medium size enterprises employ between 5 to 499 
employees.  The pilot study also indicates that Austin small and medium size software 
enterprises are fairly young.  The founders and early managers of these enterprises mostly 
still work in the Austin area; consequently, data can be gathered about the startup and 
early stages of development for many of these enterprises.   
Austin small and medium size software enterprises use different information 
technology platforms and provide a wide range of information services.  Austin software 
enterprises have different styles of entrepreneurship based on their sources of capital.  
These enterprises have been established according to different styles of business plans.  
Data on diversity in the sources of capital, styles of business plans, and technological 
platforms, along with the availability of founders and managers, would it possible to 
conduct a thorough study on the development of Austin small and medium size software 
enterprises.  The study can cover the venture lifecycle from pre-startup to maturity.  
The pilot study also demonstrated the patterns of Complex Responsive Systems in 
the development of the Austin region.   
1. The system’s history is irreversible.  
2. The system’s future is unpredictable, as current study indicates.  
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3. In the context of a region and an industrial sector, each enterprise acts like 
an agent, which interacts with the internal system (the enterprise) and with the 
external systems of the region, the nation, and the globe.   
4. The order of growth is responsive.  The pilot study demonstrates that there 
have been both deliberative efforts for the growth and development in the Austin 
region as well as emerging, as discussed in “Complex Responsive Systems” 
(Appendix A). 
The pilot study pointed to a need for an in-depth study of the growth patterns of 
the software industry in the Austin region.  The software industry thus became an 
industrial context for the in-depth study, but the analysis was performed in the space 
context of the particular region of Austin, Texas.  This geographic proximity of the firms 
permits the gathering of fresh data about relations between the regional and enterprise 
development.   
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Appendix C -  
The Austin Software and Information Industries:  
the Origin and Development 
This section covers the development of the software industry in Austin and briefly 
reviews the development of the Austin information industry since the early 1990s.  The 
software and information industries are served to explicate the industrial context of the 
study in relation to the growth and innovation of new ventures.  
THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Broadly defined, software includes programs and instructions that modify or run 
computer hardware.  Commonly, software products are classified into the following main 
market segments: 1) standard (packaged) software that is sold to general users, 2) 
customized software solutions, 3) embedded software, and 4) internet and networking 
systems.  The firms active in the software industry can be organized into the following 
groups: 1) producers of computer systems, 2) independent computer services firms, 3) 
independent software vendors, 4) training firms, 5) headhunters and job placement 
agencies related to software specialists, and 5) consulting services related to computers 
and networks.  
Defining the boundaries and size of the software industry and tracing the 
evolution of the industry’s structure is difficult.  The reason is because most data 
collected pertain only to the traded software, or software produced by one enterprise for 
sale to another.  It is often difficult to distinguish between computer services and 
computer software.  Embedded software, or software that is incorporated into hardware 
such CPUs, printers, cellular phones, and PDAs, is another source of ambiguity in the 
role of the software industry.  Almost half of Motorola’s engineering workforce, for 
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instance, deals with software design, but Motorola is commonly considered a hardware 
firm.  
Software is a relatively new industry that has experienced rapid change in market 
structure and growth.  The rapid increase in the computation and communication 
capabilities and reductions in the cost of hardware have been instrumental in expanding 
the range of software applications.  In the 1960s, computer hardware, such as CPUs, disk 
drivers, printers, made up to about 80% of the cost of a computer systems. The cost of 
software made up the rest.  Today the situation is almost the reverse. Business may pay 
up to 80% for software and related services such as training, upgrading, troubleshooting, 
and maintaining. 
Another difficulty in the study of the software industry is a deficiency in 
industrial classification systems.  In the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system, 
for instance, software is grouped under SIC 737 (computer and data processing services). 
This segment includes a wide range of activities, such as programming, software 
customization, data processing and data entry.  Prior to 2000, employment and economic 
data about the software industry in the State and Federal databases was organized 
according to the SIC.  
In the mid 1990s, the governments of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico jointly 
developed the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) to provide 
statistical comparability about business activity across North America and to replace the 
SIC system.  In the NAICS classification the information industry (NAICS 51) consists 
of software and data processing, telecommunications and publishing.  The Texas 
Workforce Commission and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics currently base their 
employment data on the NAICS classification.  For the region of Austin, however, there 
is no detailed data about employment in software, rather there is aggregated data about 
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the information industry, as a whole. This shortcoming makes the study of the software 
industry in Austin more challenging.  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN AUSTIN 
The development of the software industry in Austin has been the main topic of the 
following documents: Greater Austin Software Industry Report (Gibson, Long, and 
Kozmetsky, 1993), The Austin Software Industry: An Engine for Economic 
Development?, a master thesis by Ruth Cardella (1999), and Origin and Formation of the 
Software Industry in Austin, an unpublished report by Michi Fukushima (2004). The 
present section of this study has extensively benefited from this source.   
Compared with some other regions in the U.S, like Boston, MA and Silicon 
Valley, CA, the Austin software industry is fairly young.  In the 1960s and 1970s the 
Austin software industry was fairly small, but since the early 1980s, it has grown up 
rapidly.  According to Cardella between 1980 and 1996, software employment went from 
accounting for less than 0.7% to over 2% of total employment (1999: 55).  The 
Economist, in a special issue about high-tech regions, indicated, “Austin’s future 
increasingly depends on its software companies.  Its main areas of software expertise are 
in multimedia, semiconductors, education and databases” (The Economist, March 29, 
1997: 14).  
According to the Software Industry Association in 2000 Austin ranks 20th in the 
U.S. with 31,450 software engineers.  Adjusting for difference of population in each area, 
however, Austin ranks seventh in the U.S. regions in terms of the density of software 
engineers per capita, following Boulder, CO, Silicon Valley, Washington D.C., Seattle, 




Table C.1: Density of the Software Engineers in Year 2000 
 
Metro Area Density  
US = 100 
Boulder-Longmont, CO 619 
San Jose, CA 563 
San Francisco, CA 403 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 304 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 288 
Boston, MA-NH 270 
Austin-San Marcos, TX 267 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 259 
Denver, CO 240 
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ 238 
There are many factors that have contributed to the rapid growth of the Austin 
software industry and these factors interact with each other in a complex context.  This 
study, nevertheless, reviews the roles of four main players that have had impact on the 
development of the software industry in Austin: 1) The University of Texas at Austin, 2) 
Texas Instruments, 3) IBM-AIX, and 4) MCC.   
The University of Texas at Austin  
The University of Texas at Austin (UT-Austin) has played a critical role in 
developing the entry-level talent that is a key ingredient of the software industry.  In 1966 
UT-Austin established the Department of Computer Sciences (CS department), which 
was initially a graduate program to develop computer scientists.  In September 1974, the 
Department added an undergraduate program and provided for 350 undergraduate 
computer science majors.   
In late 1960s, UT-Austin established the Computation Center, which provided 
access to the state of the art computing capabilities for the students and faculty.  The 
Computation Center used the “Control Data 66100” computer, which was one of the most 
powerful analytical machines at that time, but the operating system and software that 
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Control Data supplied did not meet all the departments’ needs, and it was difficult to use. 
Students and faculty needed to develop the required software and almost rewrote Control 
Data’s operating system.  By customizing the software for themselves, faculty members 
and students learned a great deal.  That was a unique experience, unparalleled in many 
other universities.  
The department of Electrical and Computer Engineering is the second largest 
undergraduate program at UT-Austin and has ranked in the top 10 Electrical & Computer 
Engineering departments in the country for over a decade.  Other UT-Austin institutes, 
such as the Institute for Innovation, Creativity and Capital (IC2), the Austin Technology 
Incubator (ATI), and the Software Quality Institute played key roles in sustaining and 
enhancing the software industry in Austin.   
IC2 is a trans-disciplinary “Think and Do” tank devoted to solving unstructured 
problems.  As a research unit at UT-Austin, IC2 is focused on knowledge exploration, 
dissemination, and application across a broad range of academic and applied areas. Dr. 
George Kozmetsky (1917-2003) founded IC2 in 1977.  Many studies have praised Dr. 
Kozmetsky as a legendary character who played a key role in the development of Austin.  
Miller indicates, “One of the most influential individuals in the development of Austin 
development has been Dr. George Kozmetsky” (1999).  A co-founder of Teledyne in 
Silicon Valley, Dr. Kozmestky came to Austin in 1966 to become Dean of UT-Austin’s 
College of Business Administration to 1982.  Dr. Kozmetsky then founded IC2 in 1977 
and stayed there, as CEO and then Chairman to the last days of his life (2003).  
Austin Technology Incubator (ATI) was founded in 1989, as a subsidiary of IC2.  
ATI currently operates as a non-profit incubator and provides business resources and 
professional services to selected business start-ups.  The incubator occupies part of the 
MCC building, which belongs to UT-Austin. ATI has been a learning laboratory for 
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hundreds of Texas entrepreneurs and students to practice and study the process of 
technology commercialization.  So far, the ATI has graduated 65 companies.  
In studies on the development of software industry in Austin, very often, excess 
emphasis has been placed on the role of software developers and computer engineers, 
while almost no reference is made to the role of other contributors.  Like other industries, 
technological innovation includes only one aspect of software development, and to 
develop a strong industry in a region, many non-technical aspects should be taken into 
consideration.  For example Kay Hammer, the co-founder of Evolutionary Technologies 
International (ETI), has pursued her formal education in English, but made notable 
contributions to software development at Texas Instruments (TI) and Computer 
Technology Corporation (MCC) and became the co-founder of Evolutionary 
Technologies International (ETI32).  
In spite of UT-Austin’s emphasis on research, almost no prominent software 
technology in Austin appears to be based on UT-Austin’s research.  This key point was 
mentioned in some interviews, as part of this study.  
Texas Instruments  
Texas Instruments (TI) is widely referred to as the original “Training Institute” for 
Austin software development.  TI’s Austin office hired many new university graduates at 
entry level technical positions and provided them training relevant to their technical 
specialization. After five to eight years of work experience, many left TI for other jobs or 
to start their own businesses.   
In 1966, Texas Instruments started Advanced Scientific Computer (ASC), a large 
computer development program.  The main intention of the ASC project was to develop 
state-of-the art computer systems for scientific purposes.  This project was originally 
                                                 
32 ETI will be discussed in more detail later. 
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stared in Dallas.  In 1969, TI decided to move this project to Austin to secure a qualified 
labor force.  Most hardware engineers who worked in the ASC project were transferred 
from Dallas.  TI, nevertheless, hired many software engineers in Austin, especially 
students graduated from UT-Austin. TI also hired a large number of computer engineers 
from University of Colorado, and the State University of New York.  The total number 
was estimated to be about 100. The ASC project ended around 1975.  After that, 
engineers working on the project dispersed and moved on to other TI projects.  Some of 
the software engineers who had come to Austin went back to Dallas.  However, many of 
them stayed in Austin and worked for other large companies or started their own 
ventures. This group made a strong nucleus for the fledgling Austin software industry.  
IBM-AIX Project  
Since 1967 IBM has been one of the largest private employers in Austin. In the 
late 1960s, the original IBM manufacturing facility made magnetic tape typewriters to 
sell to the state government. In 1972, IBM’s Austin branch made memory typewriters 
that used a basic memory board. In 1983, the IBM facilities in Austin began to assemble 
computers. In 1984, IBM also selected Austin as the main location to develop AIX, the 
IBM version of the UNIX operating system.   
In the early 1980s, there were not many programmers and software engineers in 
Austin who were familiar with the UNIX operating system.  Accordingly, IBM brought 
in many experienced programmers and software engineers from outside the company and 
other places to undertake this task.  IBM often recruited students directly out of colleges 
and trained them within the organization.  For the AIX project IBM, however, relied on 
temporary hires and beginning 1984 it made contracts with recruiting companies, such as 
Pencom33, which were specialized in UNIX personnel. Recruitment continued through 
                                                 
33 Pencom was the first graduate company from the Austin Technology Incubator (ATI).  
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1992 and at its peak included more than 500 programmers and software engineers. After 
the termination of the development of IBM-AIX, more than 130 of the UNIX 
programmers and engineers who had worked for IBM as contractors stayed in Austin. 
They contributed to the development of other software companies like Tivoli, Tandem, 
and Motiv.   
In 1992 IBM changed its “no lay-off” policy.  Between 1993 and 1997 IBM 
Austin was involved in three major lay-offs. The lay-offs, in some respects, provided new 
local resources for the growth of the Austin software industry. Some laid-off specialists 
started their own companies, or they joined newly established ventures, taking advantage 
of local opportunities and contributing to the further development of the Austin software 
industry.  
Selection of Austin as the main base for IBM-AIX, although very important for 
the development of the Austin software industry, has not been documented historically. 
There are, nevertheless, different observations on this key influence. According to 
Edward (Ted) Taylor “IBM management saw Austin as a place where the UNIX project 
could be conducted in relative seclusion.  UNIX was not a very politically correct 
decision for IBM and they wanted to keep this project away from there more 
‘mainstream’ facilities in New York” 34 . Ted Taylor was an executive in Pencom 
Systems Incorporated, a recruiting company in New York, specializing in UNIX 
specialists (Fukushima, 2004).  
There are, however, others who think that IBM located its AIX project in Austin 
because “labor cost in Austin was not expensive compared to other regions and there was 
a large labor pool there supplied by UT-Austin” 35.  IBM AIX was a key player in the 
                                                 
34 Interview with Edward Taylor by Michi Fukushima. (Fukushima, 2004) 
35 Interview with Charlie Jackson by Michi Fukushima. (Fukushima, 2004) 
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development of the Austin software industry as the project stimulated the diffusion of 
technical, technological, and managerial talents throughout the region(Fukushima, 2004).   
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation  
A watershed event in Austin’s high-tech development occurred in 1984 when the 
city won the nationwide competition for Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation (MCC). In 1983 MCC had been established as the first private sector high 
technology consortium to promote U.S. technological leadership in electronics. A year 
later, MCC chose Austin over 57 cities in 27 states as its headquarters and main research 
facility. Following an organized campaign, the Texas stakeholders put together a package 
of incentives worth more than $25 million.  This included a university-financed facility 
and laboratory leased to MCC at minimal cost (Miller, 1999). Following the MCC win, 
other firms began to locate to Austin. 
MCC helped the Austin software industry in many aspects and it relocated many 
software specialists to Austin.  Many of these individuals stayed in the area and 
contributed to the further development of the Austin software industry.  MCC also 
brought scientific and administrative talents to the Austin software industry.  In 1987, the 
number of MCC employees hit a peak of more than 400 individuals.  Afterwards, MCC 
decreased its workforce and since the early 2000s it has become dormant.   
When MCC was founded, Admiral Robert Inman, the first CEO and Chairman of 
the Board, insisted on hiring qualified researchers not only from the shareholder 
companies, but also from research universities, federal laboratories, and non-shareholder 
corporate laboratories.  As a result, 65% of MCC’s researchers came from non-
shareholder companies, about 20% came from universities and government laboratories, 
and the rest came from the shareholder companies (Fukushima, 2004).   
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MCC’s employee turnover rate fluctuated with the consortium’s leadership. 
Under the helm of Inman (1983-86), long-term pre-competitive research was emphasized, 
and MCC was a comfortable place for researchers.  The rate of turnover at that time was 
under 3%.  Under the second director, Grant A. Dove (1987-1990), MCC changed its 
policy and focused on more business-oriented activities, such as technology transfer and 
fundraising.  During this period the rate of turnover shot up to 30%, although the total 
number of researchers remained stable.  
Craig Fields, the next director of MCC between 1990 and 1994, changed MCC’s 
policy again and emphasized “distributed R&D, early buy-in of project-based research 
activities, technology transfer through specific plans, the value of member company 
diversity, entrepreneurial behavior, and spin-out companies” (Gibson and Rogers, 1994).  
Fields encouraged researchers to spin out companies, and some MCC spin-outs were 
created under his leadership, although very rare of them survived.  
Because MCC was doing cooperative research, in its early stages of development, 
under the helm of Inman, spin-outs were not its main purpose and MCC’s administration 
didn’t have a consistent policy on spin-out. If researchers wanted to spin-out, they faced 
difficulties. For instance, Evolutionary Technologies International (ETI), the most 
prominent spin-out from MCC, encountered numerous obstacles. Kay Hammer, the co-
founder of ETI in Workforce Warrior (2000) describes the challenges she faced in 
making the first spin-out based on an MCC technology. Many other spin-outs based on 
MCC technologies did not survive at all. Some MCC employees, however, were able to 
set up independent software companies. Overall the rate of spin-outs from MCC has been 
far less than IBM-AIX.  
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EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE AUSTIN INFORMATION SECTOR 
The section covers a review of the employment growth in the Austin information 
sector.  The Austin information sector, 
is compared with the information 
sectors of five other regions.  Venture 
funding in Austin is reviewed to 
explicate its key role in the growth and 
development of the information sector.   
As discussed before, the Texas 
Workforce Commission and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics currently 
provide employment data according to 
the NAICS classification.  The 
employment data, however, does not 
go beyond year 1990.  The information 
sector in the NAICS classification 
consists of software and data 
processing, telecommunications and 
publishing.  The employment data 
about Austin, however, includes the 
aggregated employment data about the 
information sector and it is not broken 
down to the sub-sectors of software 
and data processing, 
Figure C.1: Employment Growth in the Austin 
Information Sector 
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telecommunications and publishing.  Accordingly, this section concentrates on the 
employment growth of the Austin information sector to demonstrate patterns of 
employment growth.  
In the 1990s, the Austin information sector enjoyed a rapid rate of growth with 
two short-term stagnations in 1994 and 1999, as Figure C.1 demonstrates.  Between 
January 2001 and January 2003, the Austin information sector, however, faced a major 
slump in employment, suffering a loss of more than 3600 jobs, about 14% of its 
workforce (data source: Texas Workforce Commission Website).  This downturn was not 
confined to the information sector; it was indeed the greatest economic challenge to the 
entire Austin region in recent history.  Understanding the growth patterns of the 
information sector and its potential recovery is crucial for the further development of the 
Austin region.  
The rise of the Austin information sector in the 1990s, and then its dramatic fall 
after January 2001, provide an opportunity to compare the patterns of development in 
both periods of boom and bust.  Accordingly, this study conducts its operational topic 
(impacts of business plans, capital, and technology on the patterns of enterprise growth 
and development) in the context of the Austin information industry.   
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE AUSTIN REGION  
To gain a better understanding of the patterns of development in the Austin 
region, Figure C.2 compares the patterns of growth of employment in eight sectors, all in 
the Austin-San Marcos Metropolitan Statistical Area.  A Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA), according to the U.S. Census Bureau, “is a large population nucleus, together 
with adjacent communities having a high degree of social and economic integration with 
that core” (U.S. Census Bureau Website).  The Austin-San Marcos MSA consists of the 
following counties: Bastrop, Caldwell, Hays, Travis, and Williamson.  The Texas 
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Workforce Commission is the source of data for Figure C.2.  In the figure, the sectors are 
based on the North American Industrial Classification System – NAICS, discussed 
before.  
Figure C.2 demonstrates that 
the scientific and technical (S+T) 
services sector had a growth pattern 
that mirrors the information sector.  
The manufacturing sector had a growth 
pattern similar to the information 
sector.  The manufacturing sector 
enjoyed a fast rate of growth between 
1994 and 2000 with a short slump in 
January 1999 and a deep downturn in 
2001 that has continued beyond 
January 2003.   
Figure C.2 also demonstrates 
that in the 1990s the rate of growth of 
the construction sector in Austin 
surpassed the information sector 
without major technological 
innovations in construction.  This 
indicates that technological innovation 
is not the only factor that contributes to 
the growth of employment in an 
economic sector.   
Employment Growth 
in Austin, TX --- 1990 - 2003
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Figure C.2: Growth of Employment in Austin 
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The growth patterns in all economic sectors of Austin were not rapid and their 
downfalls were not also fast.  During the 1990s the growth of the financial sector in 
Austin, for example, was gradual and it did not face the sharp economic downturn that 
the information sector experienced. 
In the study of employment growth, one also should pay attention to the total 
employment figures in each sector.  Figure C.3 compares the total employment in 
Austin’s major economic sectors between January 1990 and January 2003.  In spite of 
their rapid growth in the 1990s, the information and construction sectors still constitute a 
small fraction of total employment in the Austin region.  Between January 1990 and 
January 2003, the slow-paced and less turbulent education and health sector surpassed the 
fast-paced and turbulent high tech manufacturing sector.  The government sector had a 
modest growth in the 1990s, but much less than the growth of total private employment 
in total employment.  The government sector with over 150,000 employees, as Figure C.3 
indicates, is still the major source of employment in the Austin region.   
Total Employment in Selected Economic Sectors, 
Jan. 1990- Jan. 2003, Austin Region, TX








































Jan-90 Jan - 03
Figure C.3: Total Employment in the Austin Economic Sectors 
 147
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN THE INFORMATION SECTOR OF SIX REGIONS 
A high rate of growth in employment in the information sector in the 1990s 
followed by a sharp economic downturn since January 2001 was not unique to Austin.  A 
similar pattern also occurred in Silicon Valley.  The Silicon Valley Network, in Index of 
Silicon Valley, indicates: 
Between second quarter 2001 to second quarter 2002, employment declines 
across all clusters; software is hardest hit.  Overall, Silicon Valley’s driving 
industry clusters lost 22% of jobs, declining from 484,000 to 396,000.  Software 
the greatest job losses, from 128,000 jobs to 101,000 jobs.  The second largest 
decline was in Semiconductor and Semiconductor Equipment Manufacturing, 
which lost 16,000 jobs.  Computer and Communication Hardware Manufacturing 
lost 15,600 jobs (2003: 12).  
Figure C.4 depicts the growth in 
the information sector of six regions: 
Austin, TX, Boise, ID, Phoenix, AZ, 
Portland, OR, San Jose, CA and Seattle, 
WA.  Figure C.4, which is based on data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Website, clearly indicates similar patterns 
in all six regions: a high rate of growth in 
the 1990s and then a sharp downturn 
since January 2001.  The sharp spike in 
San Jose and the relative stability of the 
condition in Seattle, however, is 
noticeable.  
It should be noted that between 
January 1990 and January 2003 the total 
employment increase in Seattle was 
Employment Growth in Information Sector 
of 6 Regions, 1990-2003
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Figure C.4: Employment Growth in the 
Information Sector of 6 Regions 
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41,400, as demonstrated in Figure C.5.  This number is almost the same as the total 
employment gain in five other regions combined between January 1990 and January 
2003, which is 45,000.  It demonstrates that the rate of growth in the 1990s, the decline 
since January 2001, and the total employment in each region are not linearly associated.  
VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDING IN AUSTIN  
Venture capital (VC) is a fund-raising procedure that exchanges equity 
(ownership) in return for financial investment.  Venture capital often has been cited as 
one of the main drivers for business growth and regional development.  High-tech growth 
in the Austin region has been fuelled in part by the supply of venture capital to this 
region.  In the 1980’s and early 1990’s, there were few venture capital firms in Austin.  
However, in the mid-1990’s many venture capital firms emerged in Austin.   
Figure C.6 depicts the total amount of venture capital investment in Austin 
(source: Angelou Economics) and in the U.S. (source: Venture Economics Website: 
March 31, 1993) since 1995, as well as the rate of growth in each case.  This figure 
indicates that between 1998 and 2002 the venture capital investment in Austin and in the 
U.S. followed similar patterns.  For instance, there was a surge of investment between 
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Figure C.5: Total Employment in the Information Sector of 6 Regions 
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1998 and 2000.  Between 1998 and 2000 venture capital investments in the U.S. 
increased 490% from $21 billion to $106 billion, and during the same period of time, 
venture capital investment in Austin increased 860% from $265 million to about $2.3 
billion.  Although during this period of time venture capital investments in Austin were 
about one to two percent of total U.S. venture capital investment, the rate of growth of 
venture capital investment in Austin was almost double the rate of growth in the U.S.   
After 2000, the total amount of VC investment in the U.S. has dropped 
drastically.  The total amounts of VC investments, in the years 2000, 2001, and 2002, 
respectively, were about $106 billion, $40 billion, and $21 billion.  Compared to the 
boom years of 1999 and 2000, between 2000 and 2002, the total amount of VC 
investment in Austin has decreased almost two times faster than the average U.S. 
decrease in investment. 
Since 2001, in addition to the total amount of VC investment, the nature of 
venture funding in Austin also has changed.  According to Hawkins, in the third quarter 
of 2002 “existing and running companies took in 80 percent of the investments in Austin 
and the other 20 percent went to early-stage deals.  That is a shift from the third quarter 
Figure C.6: Venture Capital Funding the U.S. and Austin 
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of 2001, when half of the money invested in Austin was pumped into early-stage deals.”  
Hawkins then continued, “Software companies continued to absorb the lion’s share of the 
venture capital investment in Austin.  In the third quarter of 2002, Austin software firms 
received 40 percent of total venture investments; nationally, software companies received 
22 percent of venture investments” (Hawkins, 2002).  Venture capitalists in the first 
quarter of 2003 invested about $3.8 billion compared to about $6 billion in the first 
quarter of 2002, according to a recent survey by Venture Economics.  The Austin area 
absorbed about $53 million dollars in venture capital during the first quarter of 2003.  
A comparison of Figure C.6 (venture capital investment) and Figure C.2 (growth 
of employment in the Austin region) demonstrates the association between venture 
capital investments and the patterns of growth in the information industry, as well as 
some other economic sectors in Austin.  For example, VC investment in Austin 
experienced a rising trend in the mid and late 1990s and peaked in the year 2000.  The 
Austin information sector employment also had a rising trend in the mid and late 1990s, 
as well as a peak in the year 2000.  Between January 2001 and January 2003, Austin’s 
VC investment and information sector declined drastically.   
Following this line reasoning, the surge of growth in the Austin Information 
sector between January 1999 and January 2001 can be attributed, at least partially, to the 
injection of capital resources.  There are, however, numerous other factors that 
contributed to the growth of the Austin Information sector; the injection of venture 
capital resources is only one factor in a very broad set of factors.  Some experts attribute 
the growth of the Austin Information sector in the late 1990s to Y2K influences, as well 
as to new applications for the Internet and Web. 
A preliminary conclusion of the review of the above data indicates that the Austin 
information sector shares common patterns with some other sectors in Austin, such as the 
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science and technology (S+T) sector and the construction sector, as well as with the 
information sector in other regions.  The existence of the above common patterns then 
justifies further study of the Austin information industry.  The lessons learned from the 
examination of the Austin information sector can be used to better understand the process 
of venture and regional development in Austin as well as in other locations.  As we will 
see later in “Austin: the Galapagos Island of Venture Development,” Austin also possess 
unique characteristics that facilitate the study of the interactions between new ventures 
and regional development.  
SUMMARY  
1. This section studies the development of the Austin software and 
information sectors and the regional and industrial context for the enterprise development 
study.   
2. In the 1990s, the Austin information sector enjoyed a rapid rate of growth.  
Between January 2001 and early 2003 the Austin information sector, however, suffered a 
severe downturn.   
3. The growth patterns in all economic sectors in Austin were not rapid and 
the downfalls were not also fast.  For instance, during the 1990s the growth of the 
financial sector in Austin was not rapid, and this sector did not face the sharp economic 
downturn that the information sector faced.  
4. The growth of employment, as an outcome, is due to numerous factors, 
including technological innovations and the diffusion of capital resources.   
5. A study of comparative patterns of growth between information and 
construction sectors demonstrated that in the 1990s the Austin construction sector’s rate of 
growth was greater than that of the information sector.  The growth of the construction 
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sector in the 1990s is more likely related to the injection of capital resources into this 
region, somewhat akin to that of the information sector.  
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Appendix D -  
Austin: the Galapagos Island of Venture Development 
Austin is selected as the regional context for this study because Austin has been a 
rapidly growing region for the last 20 years.  The process of regional development—that 
might have taken more than 60 years in Silicon Valley and as long as 100 years, or more, 
in the Boston region—happened in Austin in about 20 years.  Beginning in the early 
1980s, Austin has changed from a mostly university- and government-centered city into a 
vibrant and innovative region.  Austin has grown and attracted numerous advanced 
technology enterprises, including those in the areas of software, semiconductors and 
computers.  During this relatively short period of time, many new ventures in Austin have 
started up, grown, and become mature and some of the new ventures have shut down or 
been acquired.  The majority of the founders of those ventures, however, are still in this 
region.  This unique characteristic of Austin further justifies the present study on venture 
development in this region, as Austin has been referred to as the Galapagos Island of 
Venture Development.  
The Galapagos is a cluster of thirteen volcanic islands located on the Equator, 
roughly 600 miles (1000 km) west of the South American coast of Ecuador.  The 
Galapagos Islands’ fame is related to Chares Darwin’s short trip aboard the H.M.S. 
Beagle in September of 1835.  The Beagle spent five weeks in the Galapagos charting the 
archipelago.  In the meantime, Darwin made careful observations about the geology and 
biology of the Islands and he noted local variations among the birds and other animals he 
encountered.  Darwin later developed his theory of evolution based largely on the 
observations of the species in the Galapagos Islands.  After almost twenty-five years of 
deliberation, in 1859, Darwin set forth the theory in his book On the Origin of Species by 
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Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life 
or The Origin of Species for short. 
Darwin’s theory of evolution is premised on the study of the variations in the 
characteristics of the members of a species and the generalization of those patterns of 
evolution among the species.  The Galapagos Islands provided a historical laboratory for 
Darwin to make a set of longitudinal studies of biological evolution based on a 
comparative study of species.  
It was not accidental that Darwin was able to develop his theory of evolution 
largely based on the observations of a limited number of species in the Galapagos 
Islands; the Islands have unique characteristics for the natural evolution of species:  
1. The Galapagos Islands are volcanic; geologically they are young islands 
with an old basis.  
2. The Galapagos Islands are semi-isolated from the main land.  This means 
that the species were able to migrate to Galapagos Island, but their later evolution was 
localized.  
3. The Galapagos Islands enjoy mild a climate in spite of being near the 
Equator.  The mild climate allowed the migrated species to survive, grow, and sustain 
themselves.  
4. The ocean water around the Galapagos Island is rich in nutrients and it 
provides the sources needed for the growth of the network (chain) of species around, and 
in the Islands.  
Similar to the Galapagos Islands, at least metaphorically, the region of Austin has 
unique characteristics that may provide a fertile ground for the development of new 
views on venture and regional development:  
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1. Austin’s new industrial base is fairly recent; the rapid growth of new 
ventures in Austin has happened in about twenty years, since the early 1980s.  Austin, 
however, has an old intellectual basis, like The University of Texas at Austin.  Most of 
the main players in the recent evolution of Austin, from a college town to an innovation 
hub, are still around and it is possible to get first-hand information from them.  A similar 
process of regional development in Silicon Valley might have taken more than sixty 
years, and even longer around Boston.  Many original entrepreneurs and players in 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 have passed away; consequently first-hand information 
about the development of the original ventures that catalyzed regional development in 
Silicon Valley and Boston is more difficult to collect. Building on the analogy of the 
Galapagos Islands, Austin not only acts like a natural laboratory for the study of evolved 
ventures, but it also is rich in the fossils of dead ventures.  
2. Similar to the Galapagos Islands, Austin is semi-isolated from big centers 
of technology development, like Silicon Valley, Route 128, even Dallas and Houston. It 
means many people who migrated to Austin stayed in Austin and they contributed to the 
further development of the city.  Direct human interactions facilitate trust and the transfer 
of tacit knowledge, which are essential for innovation and development.  Austin, 
however, was not completely isolated.  Modern communication systems, for instance the 
Internet, allowed Austin immigrants to stay in touch with the forefront of advanced 
technologies.  Later, the people who migrated to Austin founded many new ventures.  
Some of the ventures survived and were able to grow to become mature enterprises.  
Some of the new ventures were acquired, or died and dissolved.  Interestingly enough, 
the majority of the founders and executives of mature and dissolved enterprises are still in 
Austin.  
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As discussed in Appendix C, the growth of the Austin software industry, for 
instance, is mostly attributed to projects like MCC, IBM-AIX, and Texas Instruments, 
which provided many one-way migrations to Austin.  MCC brought scientific and 
administration talent plus visibility to Austin.  IBM-AIX brought technical, 
technological, and managerial talents to Austin.  SEMATECH (SEmiconductor 
MAnufacturing TECHnology) started as a joint initiative between fourteen U.S.-based 
semiconductor manufacturers and the U.S. government to solve common manufacturing 
problems by leveraging resources and sharing risks.  In 1988 Austin was chosen as the 
site for SEMATECH.   
3. Similar to the Galapagos Islands, Austin enjoys a tolerant society as well 
as a mild climate.  The hospitable social and environmental conditions permitted the 
migrated talents to grow and flourish. 
4. The existence of some financial resources in the form of early angel 
investors and later venture capitalists, similar to the rich waters around the Galapagos 
Islands, helped the growth of a network (chain) of new enterprises.  In addition, UT-
Austin provided fresh graduates needed for venture and regional development.   
In spite of the commonalities, Austin and the Galapagos Islands are distinct in 
numerous other aspects.  The evolution of species in the Galapagos Islands has happened 
as a natural process; the development of Austin, however, has been both evolutionary and 
deliberate.  In the 1980s, for instance, the development of Austin, to a great extent, was 
based on a series of deliberate actions, such as luring MCC and then SEMATECH to 
Austin.  The development of Austin, however, was not all due to a series of planned 
actions, and although the city of Austin enjoyed a high rate of growth, the Austin-San 
Antonio Corridor (a term coined by the late George Kozmetsky) is still a dream rather 
than a reality.  
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The Darwinian approach is not the only theory of evolution, and indeed a pure 
Darwinian approach does not fully explain all aspects of human development.  But just as 
the Galapagos Islands have provided a fertile ground for new theories of natural 
evolution, so does Austin for ideas about new venture and regional development.  
The researcher’s residence in Austin was another reason to select Austin as the 
regional base for this study.  As data collection for this study is based on direct 
networking with the founders and executives of the firms, it was crucial to have personal 
contacts with them.  Residing in Austin is essential for this purpose.  
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Appendix E -  
The Chi-Square Test 
The Chi-Square (χ2) is a non-parametric test of statistical significance for bi-
variant tabular analysis.  The main issue that the Chi-Square test addresses is whether any 
relationship in the sample data is strong enough to justify making inferences about the 
larger population from which the sample has been drawn.  The Chi-Square (χ2) test is 
well summarized by Vaughan, 2003. 
In a statistical analysis format, the Chi-Square test explains the nature of the 
observed relationships among the variables.  The Chi-Square test can be used to figure 
out relationships among, or independency between, variables.  The most common use of 
the Chi-Square test is to test for differences between proportions.  The Chi-Square test 
can be based on a matrix with many columns and many rows.  The precise calculation of 
the Chi-Square (χ2) test is given by following relationship: 
χ2 = Σ [(Observed Frequency - Expected Frequency)2 / Expected Frequency] 
The degree of freedom is calculated as (Number of Row – 1) X (Number of 
Column –1).  For a 2 X 2 matrix the degree of freedom is 1.  The critical value of the 
Chi-Square test with 1 degree of freedom for a p-value of 0.05 (95% confidence = α 
level) is 3.84, and the critical value of the Chi-Square test with 1 degree of freedom for a 
p-value of 0.01 (99% confidence) is 6.63.   
In addition to the Chi-Square test, this study in Chapter Four also uses simple 
comparative analysis between the data related to the set of two factors (for instance Initial 
Sources of Capital and Style of Business Plan) to demonstrate relationships between 
them.   
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Chi-Square Value between Initial Sources of Capital and Original Styles of Business 
Plans  
Table E.1 demonstrates the “observed data” between “Initial Sources of Capital” 
(Self-funded Ventures versus VC funded Ventures) and “Original Styles of Business 
Plans” (Formal Business Plans versus Other Types of Business Plans).  
 
Table E.1: Observed Data Between Initial Sources of Capital  
and Original Styles of Business Plans 
 
 Formal Business 
Plans 
Other Types of 
Business Plans 
VC Funded Ventures  10 10 
Self-Funded Ventures  4 24 
Table E.2 demonstrates expected frequency between “Initial Sources of Capital” 
and “Original Styles of Business Plans” among the same group of ventures.  
 
Table E.2: Expected Frequency Between Initial Sources of Capital  
and Original Styles of Business Plans 
 
 Formal Business 
Plans 
Other Types of 
Business Plans 
VC Funded Ventures  5.8 14.1 
Self-Funded Ventures  8.2 19.8 
χ2 = Σ [(Observed Frequency - Expected Frequency)2 / Expected Frequency] 
χ2 = (10-5.8)2 / 5.8 + (8.2-4)2 / 8.2 + (14.1-10)2 / 14.1 + (24 - 19.8)2 / 19.8  
χ2 = 7.27 
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Chi-Square Relationship between Initial Sources of Capital and Later Styles of 
Business Plans  
Table E.3 demonstrates the “observed data” between “Initial Sources of Capital” 
(Self-funded Ventures versus VC funded Ventures) and “Later Styles of Business Plans” 
(Formal Business Plans versus In-Formal Business Plans).  
 
Table E.3: Observed Data Between Initial Sources of Capital  
and Later Styles of Business Plans 
 




VC Funded Ventures  10 4 
Self-Funded Ventures  10 18 
 
Table E.4 demonstrates expected frequency between “Initial Sources of Capital” 
and “Later Styles of Business Plans” among the same group of ventures.  
 
Table E.4: Expected Frequency Between Initial Sources of Capital  
and Later Styles of Business Plans 
 




VC Funded Ventures  6.6 11.4 
Self-Funded Ventures  8.4 14.5 
 
χ2 = 4.72 
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Chi-Square Relationship between Original Styles of Business Plans and Rate of 
Growth in the VC Funded Ventures 
Table E.5 demonstrates the “observed data” between “Original Styles of Business 
Plans” (Formal Business Plans versus Short Business Plans) and “Rate of Growth” 
among the VC funded ventures.  
 
Table E.5: Observed Data Between Original Styles of Business Plans 
and Rate of Growth among the VC Funded Ventures 
 
 Number of 
Cases 
Rate of Growth 
Formal Business Plans 10 13.9 
Short Business Plans  9 14.8 
χ2 = 0.08 
Chi-Square Relationship between Original Styles of Business Plans and Current 
Number of Employees in the VC Funded Ventures 
Table E.6 demonstrates the “observed data” between “Original Styles of Business 
Plans” (Formal Business Plans versus Short Business Plans) and “Current Number of 
Employees” among the VC funded ventures.  
 
Table E.6: Observed Data Between Original Styles of Business Plans 
and Current Number of Employees among the VC Funded Ventures 
 
 Number of 
Cases 
Rate of Growth 
Formal Business Plans 10 51.7 
Short Business Plans  9 54.8 
χ2 = 0.10 
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Appendix F -  
The Survey Form 
Please send back the completed questionnaire by fax or e-mail to Darius 
Mahdjoubi.  This study is registered at the University of Texas at Austin (a copy of IRB 
form can be sent upon request) and the sources of all information will be kept 
confidential.  
Darius Mahdjoubi 
The School of Information 
The University of Texas at Austin 
1 University Station - D7000 
Austin TX 78712-0390 
E-mail: <dariusm@mail.utexas.edu> - Fax: 512-471-3971, Tel: 512-471-2718 
************ 
1. Name of the company:  
2. Major activities or services of this company:   
3. Time that the company incorporated: Month ( _________ ) and year ( 
_______ ).   
4. Time and place that the company was founded, if it is different from the 
month and year that it was incorporated: Month ( ______ ) and year ( _______ ) in 
______ (Place). 
5. Name of the founder(s) of this company: 
6. Your name and position in this company:  
7. Date that you completed this form:   
8. Approximate total number of employees of this company: 
a. End of 2003:   
b. End of 2002:   
c. End of 2001:   
d. End of 2000:   
e. End of 1998:   
f. End of 1996:   
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g. End of 1994:   
 
9. In your opinion what were major sources of capital during the first year 
after this company was founded.  Please check all that apply: 
 [  ] Personal resources of capital from the founders and their families and friends,  
 [  ] Angel investors, as sources of capital 
 [  ] Venture Capitals, as sources of capital  
 [  ] Corporations as sources of capital  
 [  ] Bank loans as financial resources 
 [  ] SBIR 
 [  ] Other resources of capital, please specify.  
 
10. When founded, was this company a subsidiary or a department of a 
corporation?  
 [  ] Yes   [  ] No  
11. If this company was founded as a subsidiary or a department of a 
corporation, please indicate the name of the corporation.  
12. Did this company receive Venture Capital (VC) finance?  Yes [  ]   
No [  ] 
13. If this company received VC, please indicate month ( _________ ) and 
year ( ________ )of the first stage of the VC.  
14. In your opinion, please indicate the type of business plan that this 
company started with. Please check all that apply: 
 [  ] A formal (classical) business plan, consisting of market study, technology 
forecasting, and financial analysis.  
 [  ] A short plan (say about 5-10 pages) consisting of a brief description of the 
technology and a brief description of potential markets, without a detailed market 
study and financial analysis. 
 [  ] Worked up financial projections for potential investors? 
 [  ] A one page (back-of-the envelope) type plan? 
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 [  ] No conventional business plan. 
 [  ] Other? Please describe.  
15. In your opinion, if this company started with a full-blown formal 
(classical) business plan or a short plan, what was the main application of that 
business plan? 
 [  ] For communication with the third parties such as banks, government agencies, 
etc.  
 [  ] A practical internal guide for implementation.  
16. In your opinion, if this company started with a full-blown formal 
(classical) business plan, how was that plan implemented during the first year of 
operations?  
[  ] Almost as planned (say more than 80% of the plan for the first year was actually 
implemented). 
[  ] Major changes in the original plan (say about 50-80% of the plan for the first 
year was actually implemented). 
[  ] Strong changes in the original plan (say about 20-50% of the plan for the first 
year was actually implemented). 
[  ] Drastic changes in the original plan (say less than 20% of the plan for the first 
year was actually implemented). 
17. In your opinion, if this company did not start with a full-blown formal 
business plan, did the company suffer from not having a formal business plan?  
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
18. In your opinion, if this company did not start with a full-blown formal 
business plan, do you wish it had a formal business plan?  
[  ] Yes  [  ] No 
19. After the first year, how was the plan and vision for this company 
transformed? 
[  ] The transformation was mostly based on formal (classical) business planning.  
[  ] The transformation was mostly based on adaptation without formal planning. 
20. In your opinion, did this company start with patented technology? 
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[  ] Yes. This company started with ( __________ ) patent (s).   
[  ] No. This company did not start with patented technologies. 
21. Does this company currently have patents? 
[  ] Yes . Currently this company has applied for ( _____ ) patent and have 
registered ( ____ ) patents.   
[  ] No. Currently this company has no patents 
[  ] No. Currently this company has no patents, but its technologies are patentable if 
we pursue it.  
22. If you are familiar with other companies in Austin that might be interested 
in participating in this study, please list the name of the company and a contact 
person below.  
 
23. Any other question that you suggest?  
 
24. Your further comments, please:  
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Appendix G -  
Interview Questions  
The first set of questions for the interviews are the same as questions for the 
survey section.  
INNOVATION CAPABILITIES OF THE VENTURE 
 
25. When you started this business, what was the technology that you started with?  
26. How different was that technology from the competitors’ technology?  
27. What was the source of that technology, and how did you get the idea about that 
technology? 
28. Was that technology based on a patent?  
29. How many patents has this business? 
30. Did you apply or received R&D tax credit 
31. When you started this business, what were the innovation advantages of this 
business? 
FOUNDER’S AND CEO’S BACKGROUND AND THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND VISION 
 
32. What was your professional background, prior to starting this business? 
33. What were your previous experiences in starting a new venture, prior to starting this 
business? 
34. How did you find ways to learn from the challenges you faced in this business? 
Learning for your failures and near-failures, as well as your successes? Could you 
classify the types of your near-failures that you faced?  




ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AND OTHER REGIONAL 
STRUCTURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VENTURE  
 
36. Why did you initiate this business in Austin?  
37. If you could start this business again, would you start it in Austin or in another city? 
Where? Why? 
38. In what aspects the University of Texas at Austin was important in the development 
of this business? 
39. In what aspects other regional support was important in the development of this 
business? 
REACTIONS AND RESPONSES TO THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN OF 2001 
 
40. What did you do in this firm to react to the changes after 2001? How they were 
different from what you did before? 
41. When did you come to conclusion that the recent economic change (late 2000 and 
early 2001) is not short-lived and is going to stay for a longer period of time? 
42. How different is this recent economic downturn compared to the others that you 
have seen before? 
43. What are you understanding and observations for the sources of this economic 
change? What was the source of economic growth in Austin in the 1990s? 
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Appendix H -  
The Questions for Investors 
 
1) What are your main criteria for investing in a new venture? 
2) How important is the role new technologies in your decisions to invest in a new 
venture? 
3) How important is the role of patents in your decisions to invest in a new venture? 
4) How important is the role of having formal business plans in your decisions to invest 
in a new venture? 
5) How important is the role of professional backgrounds of founders, prior to starting 
this business 
6) What do you think of the main reasons behind the rise and fall of employment in the 
Austin information sector? 
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Appendix I -  
List of the Enterprises that Participated in the Survey Stage 
1 13 Colonies Software 
2 212 Studios 
3 360 Commerce 
4 Athens Group 




9 Big Lever Software 
10 Black Lab 
11 Calavista 
12 CCI-Triad 
13 Clear Commerce  
14 Clear Orbit (BPA Systems) 
15 Colabornet 
16 Collective 
17 Concero Inc. 
18 Convio 
19 Coremetrics 
20 Daedalus Group 
21 Dolphin Group Technologies 
22 eBlox 
23 Egeria Design 
24 Emerging Leaders Network 
25 Enspire 
26 ETI  
27 Exterprise Inc 
28 Forward Vue Technologies 
29 Grande Communication 
30 Guard IT 
31 Hyperformix 
32 Intesil Americas 
33 Inventes 
34 iVEEA LLC 
35 Journee 
36 Ki-Soft 
37 Knowledge Discovery One 
38 Less Network 
39 Lombardi Software 
40 MIP  
41 Magdesign 
42 Momentum Software  
43 Momentum Technical  






49 Novoua (Lares) 
50 OnRamp 
51 Optive Research 
52 Pavilion 
53 PeopleAdmin 
54 Percpetive Sciences 
55 Photoddex 
56 Pixel Magic 
57 Pragma 
58 Quick Arrow 
59 Raak Technologies 
60 S3PT 
61 SciComp 
62 Sematic Design 
63 Siberlink 
64 SigmaTrak 
65 Smarte Price 
66 Smarte Solutions 
67 Technology Futures 
68 TeraQuest 
69 Tonic 
70 Tower Technology 
71 Trade Technologies 









Appendix J -  
List of the Interviewees  
1. George Kozmetsky: Chairman, IC2 (Institute for Innovation, Creativity and 
Capital), UT-Austin36 
2. Bobby Inman: Chair in National Policy, LBJ School of Public Affairs, UT-Austin  
3. Ed Taylor: CEO, Collective Technology  
4. Neil Webber: Co-founder, Vignette 
5. Miller Hicks: President, RMH.  
6. Carolyn Stark: Executive Director, Austin Technology Council 
7. Bill Bishop: Staff Writer on Innovation, Austin American Statesman 
8. Carolyn Purcell: Chief Information Officer, State of Texas 
9. Susan Davenport: Greater Austin Chamber of Commerce  
10. Gordon Walton: Vice President, Sony Online Entertainment 
11. Craig Fryar: Entrepreneur in software industry 
12. Laura Kilcrease: CEO, Triton 
13. Jamie Rhodes: CEO, Austin Usability 
14. Douglas Neuse: Vice President, Hyperformix 
15. Herb Krasner: Director, Center for Advanced Research in Software Engineering, 
UT-Austin 
16. Frank Milton: IBM BCS Partner, U. K. Director of PWHC Surveys on Innovation  
17. Katherine Hammer: CEO, ETI  
18. Robin Curle: CEO, Zebra Imaging  
19. Michael Clifford: CIO, Whole Foods Market 
                                                 
36 UT-Austin stands for The University of Texas at Austin. 
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20. Randolph Bias: Associate Professor, School of Information, UT-Austin 
21. David Gibson: Director of Research, IC2, UT-Austin 
22. Glynn Harmon: Professor, School of Information, UT-Austin 
23. Robert Ronstadt: Vice President of Technology Commercialization, Boston 
University  
24. Claudia Chidester: Lecturer, School of Information, UT-Austin 
25. Chris Engle: Vice President, Angelou Economics 
26. Stacey Higginbotham: High-Tech Columnist, Austin Business Journal 
27. Rob Adams: Partner, Austin Ventures 
28. Kent Hemingson: Director, Quality Management Consortium. UT-Austin 
29. Joel Wiggins: Director, Austin Technology Incubator  
30. Scott Uhrig: CEO, Whiterock Partners.  
31. John Wolper: Manager, IBM Extreme Blue 
32. Elaine Wetmore: CEO, Austin Entrepreneurs Foundation  
33. Bobby Afshin: Consultant, Schon Technologies.  
34. Mark McCary: Senior Manager, Grande Communications 
35. Les Belady: CEO, Eutecus 
36. Mike Mayeux: CEO, Novotus.  
37. Gary Cowsert, Manager, CCI-Triad 
38. Andrew Dillon: Dean, School of Information, UT-Austin 
39. David Gerhardt: President, Capital Network, Austin 
40. Gary Cadenhead: Director, MootCorp. UT-Austin 
41. Keith Moe: Angel Investor and former COO, 3M  
42. James Ronay: CEO, Ronay Enterprises 
43. Paul Schumann: CEO, Glocal Vantage, Inc. 
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44. Donna Prestwood: Consultant 
45. Raymond Yeh: CEO, Fun-Soft 
46. Bijoy Goswami: CEO, Aviri 
47. James Galbraith: Professor, JBJ School of Public Affairs, UT-Austin 
48. Anthony Ambler: Chairman, Department. of Electrical and Computer Engineering, 
UT-Austin 
49. Ben Streetman: Dean, College of Engineering, UT-Austin  
50. Paul Toprac: Consultant, Selling Events 
51. Steve Nichols: Associate Vice President of Research, UT-Austin 
52. Pike Powers: Attorney at Law 
53. Leslie Martinich: President, Competitive Focus 
54. Randi Shade: CEO, Austin Entrepreneurs Foundation 
55. Brad Zehner: Director, MSSTC Executive Master Program  
56. Alex Cavalli, Deputy Director, IC2, UT-Austin 
57. Fred Patterson: The SBIR Coach 
58. Denny Hamill: VP Nanotechnologies (Ex-Chairman of MCC) 
59. Steve Portnoy: CEO, Nichibei Consulting 
60. Neal Kocureck: CEO, St. David’s Health Care System 
61. Peter Zandan: Managing Director, Public Strategies Inc.  
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Appendix K -  
Combined Data about Initial Sources of Capital, Growth, and Patents 
The table K.1 is organized into four groups: VC funded, VC backed, Self-funded 
and Micro Ventures.  In each group, the information is in descending order according to 
the current number of employees.  The list of self-funded ventures includes two 
corporation funded ventures, by two medium size corporations.  The list of the VC 
backed ventures includes three ventures that no longer exist, so in the table they are 
marked with zero employees.  It was possible, however, to contact the founders of the 
three ventures, and they provided information about the whole lifecycle of the ventures.   
 



















VC Funded   
210 42 1 12  
150 12.5    
100 33.3  4  
75 37.5    
68 5.7   1 
64 16.0  5  
62 13.8    
60 15.0    
57 11.4    
50 12.5  3  
50 11.1  3  
42 26.3  1  
40 10.0    
35 8.8    
25 4.2    
22 4.9    
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20 4.0 1 1  
15 3.8    
5 0.3  1  
5 1.4    
VC Backed     
450 16.7    
140 11.7  1  
65 5.9  6  
45 1.4    
17 2.6   1 
0 0.0  4  
0 0.0    
0 0.0    
Self Funded     
314 34.9  5  
180 20.0    
150 6.8    
50 7.1    
43 7.2  3  
25 2.6    
25 2.5    
25 5.0    
20 5.0    
20 5.0    
15 3.3    
15 1.9    
15 3.8    
15 15.0    
15 2.5    
15 1.1   1 
15 1.0   1 
15 0.9    
12 1.7 1   
12 2.2    
8 1.0  1  
8 4.0   1 
7 2.8   1 
5 5.0    
Micro 
Ventures     
4 1.1    
4 1.3    
4 4.0    
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4 4.0    
4 1.6   1 
3 0.3    
3 0.2    
3 1.5   1 
2 0.1    
2 0.7    
2 0.4   1 
2 0.3    
2 0.1    
2 5.0   1 
1 0.3   1 
1 0.5   1 
1 0.2    
1 0.3    
1 0.3    
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